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“We think that we can prove ourselves to ourselves. The truth is that we cannot say that we are 
one entity, one existence. Our individuality is really a heap or pile of experiences. We are made 
out of experiences of achievement, disappointment, hope, fear, and millions and billions and 
trillions of other things. All these little fragments put together are what we call our self and our 
life. Our pride of self-existence or sense of being is by no means one entity. It is a heap, a pile of 
stuff. It has some similarities to a pile of garbage.” 
 
 
“It’s not that everything is one. Everything is zero.” 
 
 
Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche 
“Galaxies of Stars, Grains of Sand” 
“Rhinoceros and Parrot”  
iii 
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David Hume’s thought has interrupted entire disciplines from dogmatic slumbers. Yet 
Hume’s influence is even more expansive and continuous than we might have thought. There 
are two significant areas of inquiry where Hume’s influence has not been adequately appreciated 
or articulated: analytic phenomenology and analytic process philosophy. My dissertation 
explores these traditions’ indebtedness to Hume by engaging with the work of Edmund Husserl 
and Alfred North Whitehead, who introduce consequential changes into their systems in direct 
response to what they see as Humean problems with their initial models. 
Three major themes are of special interest. First, vis-à-vis “Unity of Mind,” each 
philosopher asks what accounts for the apparent unity of mind and experience, including what 
principles connect distinct experiences. Second, vis-à-vis “Temporal Awareness,” each 
philosopher inquires into what grounds temporality and the experience of temporal passage, 
including what principles connect distinct moments. Third, vis-à-vis “Personal Identity,” each 
philosopher investigates what constitutes the experience of continuity and unity over time, 
including personal continuity and unity qua “personal identity.” 
 
xiii 
A fourth concordance is methodological. In pursuing the aforementioned themes, each 
philosopher accords epistemic primacy to lived experience and what discloses itself therein. An 
overarching Humean problem for all, correlatively, is how continuity and unity arise from 
distinct items: perceptions, intentional experiences, and actual occasions, respectively. My 
dissertation attempts to explicate this and related systematic issues from a historical perspective 
informed by contemporary analytic metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and recent scholarship in 
Hume, Husserl, and Whitehead studies. 
Chapter One argues that Hume’s infamous “Appendix problem” concerns reconciling the 
incontrovertible unity of mind with his unrenounceable epistemological principle that the mind 
never perceives real connections between distinct perceptions. Chapter Two traces Hume’s 
proto-phenomenological influence on Husserl’s theories (not theory) of temporal awareness. 
Chapter Three examines Hume’s proto-processual influence on Whitehead's theories (not theory) 
of personal identity. 
Unfortunately, neither Husserl nor Whitehead read each other’s work. Nevertheless, both 
take Hume to be the one who knocks at, yet ultimately fails to walk through the doors that his 





David Hume’s thought has interrupted entire disciplines from dogmatic slumbers. An incisive yet 
tempered gadfly, Hume has inspired such divergent explorations that “Humeanism” and “neo-
Humeanism” encompass: 
 reductive nominalism or “Humean supervenience” vis-à-vis (putative) universals and 
laws of nature; 
 skepticism regarding the existence of truth-makers for general and negative truths; 
 regularity and probabilistic theories of causation; 
 four-dimensionalism and perdurantist theories of persistence and personal identity; 
 views according to which there is a sharp division or “fork” between matters of fact and 
relations of ideas; 
 logical empiricism and positivism; 
 positions that reject the solvability of the problem of induction; 
 theories that deny the existence of proprietary cognitive phenomenology; 
 belief-desire models of psychology; 
 internalist theories of reason, according to which one’s having a reason to do something 
requires one having a desire that would be served by enacting it; 
 views according to which instrumental rationality is the only kind of practical rationality; 
 internalist theories of motivation, including moral motivation, which hold that both a 
belief and a desire (or conative state) are required to motivate action; 
 the general view that one cannot infer an “ought” from an “is”; 
 constructivist meta-ethical theories that take the truth of normative judgments to derive 
from evaluative idiosyncrasies of particular individuals; 
 compatibilism vis-à-vis determinism and free will; 
 skepticism regarding the existence of God; 
 antitheism; 
 aesthetic theories that ground experiences of and judgments about pleasure and/or taste in 
natural sentiments; 
 conceptions of private property that reject its naturalness. 
 
Furthermore, recent scholarship has seen a resurgence in Hume studies—with respect to a “New Hume” 
whose epistemic skepticism allegedly accommodates metaphysical realism about causation, the existence 
of external objects, and persons, for example. 
Yet Hume’s influence is even more expansive and continuous than we might have thought. In 
particular, there are two significant areas of inquiry where Hume’s influence has not been adequately 
appreciated or articulated: analytic phenomenology and analytic process philosophy. My dissertation 
explores these traditions’ indebtedness to Hume by engaging with the work of Edmund Husserl and 




what they see as Humean problems with their initial models. The dissertation's title, accordingly, is The 
Legacy of Humeanism: Unity of Mind, Temporal Awareness, and Personal Identity. The scope of “Unity” 
is intentionally ambiguous. Hume, Husserl, and Whitehead are concerned with not only the unity of mind, 
temporal awareness, and personal identity per se, but also the more encompassing “Unity” of the unity of 
mind, temporal awareness, and personal identity. Concordantly, Husserl’s and Whitehead’s major themes 
resonate with Humean basics. Three of these themes are of special interest and receive detailed treatments 
below. 
First, vis-à-vis “Unity of Mind,” each philosopher asks what accounts for the apparent unity of 
mind and experience, including what principles connect distinct experiences. Hume (eventually) accounts 
for the mind’s unity in terms of associative connections and association-generating relations that form 
interconnected complexes among discrete, discontinuous perceptions. Husserl and Whitehead, in contrast, 
explain the mind’s unity in terms of non-Humean causal connections, in accordance with which 
experiences that arise in the stream of consciousness are always-already unified with their immediate 
predecessors and successors. Husserl and Whitehead differ, however, about the nature of the experiencers 
to which experiences “belong.” Husserl’s initial model is Humean; he holds that the ego is identical to the 
unified stream of experience. Following detailed engagement with Hume’s analyses of time and 
individuation—which, as we will see, motivated Husserl to introduce a new model of time and temporal 
awareness—Husserl rejects his Humean model and recognizes a pure ego that necessarily remains one 
and the same while experiences flow. Here Whitehead sides with Hume, for he rejects the possibility of 
diachronic numerical identity and contends that the unity of mind amounts to connections between 
ontologically distinct entities. The challenge for Whitehead, then, as for Hume, is to explain how 
ontologically distinct entities can constitute one mind. 
Second, vis-à-vis “Temporal Awareness,” each philosopher inquires into what grounds 
temporality and the experience of temporal passage, including what principles connect distinct moments. 
Hume takes his analyses to prove that time is identical to the discontinuous, irregular, and atomistic 




is, and must be, a continuous manifold. Furthermore, both take temporality to derive from a more 
fundamental manifold: absolute consciousness and ontological becoming, respectively. Husserl and 
Whitehead differ, however, as to what properties these fundamental manifolds exemplify. Husserl takes 
absolute consciousness to be continuous, self-constituting, and specific to human persons, whereas 
Whitehead takes ontological becoming to be discontinuous, other-constituting, and universal to all 
entities. 
Third, vis-à-vis “Personal Identity,” each philosopher investigates what constitutes the experience 
of continuity and unity over time, including personal continuity and unity qua “personal identity” 
(properly conceived). Hume and the early Husserl propone reductive theories of personal identity that are 
saddled with explaining how distinct experiences can be diachronically unified. This Humean problem 
came to vex Whitehead; reconsideration of Hume’s theory brought Whitehead to believe that his initial 
model of personal identity was susceptible to the same problem and motivated him to introduce an 
incompatible model. Whitehead’s second model follows Plato’s Timaeus in postulating “formless 
receptacles,” the sole function of which is to unify diachronically distinct experiences. Such postulates are 
inadmissible, by Hume’s and Husserl’s lights, because they discord with what presents itself in the flow 
of experience. Tellingly, Whitehead would come to agree; for he came to recognize that a refined version 
of his initial model obviated the Humean problem of explaining the inescapable fact of personal unity. 
This epistemological consideration invokes a fourth concordance that is less thematic than 
methodological. In pursuing the three aforementioned themes, each philosopher accords epistemic 
primacy to lived experience and what discloses itself therein. An overarching Humean problem for all, 
correlatively, is how continuity and unity arise from distinct items: perceptions, intentional experiences, 
and actual occasions, respectively. My dissertation attempts to explicate this and related systematic issues 
from a historical perspective informed by contemporary analytic metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and 
recent scholarship in Hume, Husserl, and Whitehead studies. 
Chapter One argues that Hume’s infamous “Appendix problem” concerns reconciling the 




perceives real connections between distinct perceptions. The argument is unique in that it employs 
retrodictive reasoning that attends to what Hume found to be so impressive about Lord Kames’s method 
of analyzing personal identity, in addition to a subtle yet significant shift introduced in An Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding. These considerations lead me to defend the claim that Hume’s 
attempted redress accounts for the unity of mind via perceivable associative connections and the 
association-generating relations that they presuppose. In other words, Hume comes to realize that “the 
true idea” of the human mind is consistent with his negative epistemic position regarding necessary, 
inseparable connections. 
The explanation of unity among flux takes a different form in Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology. Chapter Two examines Husserl’s explanation by tracing Hume’s proto-
phenomenological influence on Husserl’s theories (not theory) of temporal awareness. More specifically, 
the chapter explicates how Husserl—in direct response to Hume’s analyses of time and individuation—
grounds the unity of mind, temporal awareness, and personal identity in an atemporal manifold: absolute 
consciousness. Husserl takes the atemporal character of consciousness’ absolute dimension to avoid the 
vicious regress entailed by Hume’s and the early Husserl’s models, since both take the constitution of 
temporality to be temporal. Moreover, Husserl takes absolute consciousness to be a continuous manifold, 
pace Hume’s argument that the experience of continuity presupposes the primacy of discontinuous, 
discrete, and atomistic succession. Husserl could not have envisaged the notion of an atemporal, 
continuous manifold of intentionality without first addressing the Humean problem of individuation over 
time, consideration of which also motivated Husserl to reject his Humean conception of the reduced ego. 
Husserl’s mature theory of time-consciousness and transcendental phenomenology are Neo-Humean, in 
this respect. 
Whereas Husserl’s estimation of Hume becomes increasingly laudatory in later writings, 
Whitehead’s engagement with Hume remains predominantly negative. Whitehead focuses on what 
Hume’s analyses explicitly reject but implicitly presuppose; for example, the primacy of process 




influence on Whitehead's theories (not theory) of personal identity. More specifically, the chapter 
explicates how Whitehead—in direct response to the primacy of process presupposed in Hume’s analysis 
of mind—grounds the unity of mind, temporal awareness, and personal identity in an atemporal manifold: 
ontological becoming. Although Whitehead agrees with Husserl that the fundamental level of constitution 
is atemporal, he takes consideration of Zeno’s paradoxes to entail that it must be discontinuous. Thus 
Whitehead agrees with Hume, whom Whitehead countenances among the greatest philosophers, that the 
experience of continuity presupposes discontinuity. But Whitehead also takes the implications of this 
insight to contradict and undermine Hume’s analyses of mind, time, and personal identity. Despite the 
fact that Whitehead’s estimation of Hume is less approbative than Husserl’s, therefore, Whitehead's 
theories of personal identity and his process-philosophical system are Neo-Humean (or Post-Humean, if 
one prefers) in this respect. 
Unfortunately, neither Husserl nor Whitehead read each other’s work. Both nevertheless 
take Hume to be the one who knocks at, yet ultimately fails to walk through the doors that his 
explorations unveil. By so doing, they beg that we do the same with them.  
A process-philosophical phenomenology or phenomenologically-anchored process philosophy, 




I. HUME’S APPENDIX PROBLEM AND ASSOCIATIVE CONNECTIONS 
IN THE TREATISE AND ENQUIRY 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO HUME’S SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE 
 The titles of Hume’s major works indicate both the scope and focus of his philosophical project: 
human nature, human understanding, the principles of morals, the passions, and natural religion. The 
subtitle of the Treatise expresses Hume’s general method: “an attempt to introduce the experimental 
method into moral subjects.”1 By “moral” Hume means subjects concerning human nature; his “moral 
philosophy,” correlatively, is a “science of human nature.”2 Hume’s philosophy purports to address and 
redress perennial philosophical problems by examining the nature of the mind. It is an empirical “science 
of man [sic],” in this sense—hence the term “empiricism”—where human nature serves as Hume’s 
“principal Study, & the Source from which I would derive every Truth.”3 Hume’s philosophy is 
ambitious, moreover, in that it attempts to explain how all sciences are grounded in the science of human 
nature that provides “the only solid foundation for the other sciences… [which] must be laid on 
experience and observation.”4 Hence Hume’s logic, in his idiosyncratic sense, foregrounds both Husserl’s 
phenomenology (according to which transcendental logic grounds formal logic), Whitehead’s process 
philosophy (according to which the logic of experience grounds deductive logic), and other forms of 
Humeanism that are alive and well or not-so-well in contemporary philosophy. 
                                                     
1 I follow standard conventions when referencing Hume’s works. When citing the Treatise of Human Nature 
(hereafter cited as Treatise), I first indicate the book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by a slash, then 
the page number of Nidditch’s revision of Selby-Bigge’s edition. When citing from the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (hereafter cited as Enquiry), I first indicate the section and paragraph number, followed by a slash, 
then (when applicable) the page number of Nidditch’s revision of Selby-Bigge’s edition. Passages occurring 
between ibid., 3.3/24 and 4.1/25 did not appear in the 1777 edition, hence lack Selby-Bigge-Nidditch designations. 
References to subsets of the Treatise and Enquiry, e.g., the “Appendix,” employ the same conventions. 
2 Hume, Enquiry, 1.1/5. 
3 Hume, Letters, 3.6. 




  When responding to objections to the analysis of time that Hume delivers by way of examining 
the idea of time, he contends that “my philosophy… pretends to explain only the nature and causes of our 
perceptions, or impressions and ideas.”5 One year later, Hume qualifies this claim in a manner that aptly 
expresses the proto-phenomenological character of his project: 
As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without 
entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all 
difficulties, and can never be embarrass’d by any question.6 
Hume delegates the task of explaining the origin of sensations to natural philosophers (meaning 
anatomists)7 and pretends not to explain the ultimate “secret springs and principles by which the mind is 
actuated in its operations,” despite his endeavor to discover some of the mind’s principles as far as they 
can be conceived.8 Hume’s philosophy, therefore, hence also certain (though certainly not all) forms of 
Humeanism, profess modesty—one may be tempted to say “skepticism”—in philosophical pursuits. 
Hume’s modesty becomes increasingly evident in later writings; yet all of his philosophical writings 
focus on clarifying and/or confirming general, empirically evident relationships between the mind’s 
constituents: perceptions. 
All perceptions, Hume holds, fall under two headings: impressions and ideas, each of which 
admits of various subtypes.9 These include impressions of sensation, which effectively function as 
primitives in Hume’s system, and “abstract ideas” such as time, unity, and the mind. Curiously, Hume 
takes impressions and ideas to differ only in the degree of force, liveliness, or vivacity attending their 
objects10—the phenomenal character of their intentionality, we might say.11 So while “the universe” is 
                                                     
5 Hume, Treatise, 1.2.5.26/64. 
6 Ibid., 1.2.5.26/638n12 (from “Appendix”). 
7 Ibid., 1.1.2.1/8; cf. ibid., 2.1.1.1-2.1.1.2/275-76. Hume proposes a quasi-physiological explanation as to why 
mistakes can occur when the mind perceives relations holding between objects of ideas (ibid., 1.2.5.20/60). 
8 Hume, Enquiry, 1.15/14. “If, in examining several phenomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one 
common principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at last arrive at those few simple principles, on 
which all the rest depend. And tho’ we can never arrive at the ultimate principles, ’tis a satisfaction to go as far as 
our faculties will allow us” (“Abstract,” 1/645). 
9 Perceptions can be primary or secondary, simple or complex, sensations or reflections, mediate or immediate, etc. 
10 Here and in the sequel “object” means only “object of a perception,” unless specified otherwise.   




tantamount to the universe of the imagination,12 and more specifically, a universe composed only of 
perceptions13 (as far as we can know),14 Hume thinks that we can discover the principles that govern that 
universe with a striking degree of probability; sufficient probability, indeed, to justify strong belief in the 
truth of ideas that represent those principles. 
Among the most important of these principles—Hume’s use of which, if nothing else, “can entitle 
[him] to so glorious a name as that of an inventor” (ibid.)—are the imagination’s principles of the 
association, in virtue of which representations of objects, perceptions, and relations are possible. The 
mind’s associative principles also make possible all forms of reasoning regarding matters of fact, 
including especially causal reasoning, which concerns “the only connexion or relation of objects, which 
can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses.”15 This positive (if not 
positivistic) aspect of Hume’s philosophy is counterbalanced by an opposing force: our inexorable, 
irrevocable ignorance about the mind’s “real nature and operations”—hence also “the universe’s” real 
nature and operations. 
 
2. INTRODUCING HUME’S APPENDIX PROBLEM 
At the age of twenty-eight, Hume anonymously published Books I and II of the Treatise. 
Approximately one year later, he penned an anonymous Abstract of the Treatise “wherein the chief 
argument of that book is farther illustrated and explained” and subsequently published Book III along 
with an infamous Appendix, the meaning of which has vexed scholars much as the problem that Hume 
raises, but woefully (and uncharacteristically) underdescribes, vexed Hume. Widespread, longstanding, 
and recalcitrant disagreement about the nature of Hume’s Appendix problem had led many interpreters to 
maintain that Hume’s second thoughts remain underdetermined by the “‘interpretive openness’ of Hume’s 
                                                     
12 Hume, Treatise, 1.2.6.8/67. 
13 “I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception” 
(ibid., 1.4.6.3/252). 
14 Hume, “Abstract,” 35/662. 




actual text”16—meaning the Treatise and Appendix. Furthermore, virtually every interpreter agrees that 
the two principles Hume claims he can neither “render consistent” nor “renounce,” call them Hume’s 
unrenounceable principles,17 are not inconsistent.18 
I will refer to Hume’s first unrenounceable principle as the distinct-existence principle: “that all 
our distinct perceptions are distinct existences.”19 This particular formulation of the distinct-existence 
principle, which Hume expresses within the dialectical context of having all his hopes vanish, does not 
adequately express Hume’s considered position. The reason concerns the modality of Hume’s claims 
regarding perceptions’ independent/dependent existence. Hume takes two of his other principles (the 
separability and conceivability principles, discussed below) to entail that perceptions being independent 
or self-sufficient existences is metaphysically possible. But Hume takes his empirical experiments to 
prove that perceptions are not in fact independent; for they depend for their existence both on the body, 
especially the brain, and “animal spirits.” Hume’s considered position, therefore—which is enough to 
help generate the Appendix problem, as I interpret it—is that all our distinct perceptions are possibly self-
sufficient existences, whereas in fact perceptions depend on the brain, animal spirits, and (as we will see) 
each other. 
I will refer to Hume’s second unrenounceable principle as the perception principle: “that the 
mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (ibid.). The crucial part of this 
expression concerns the connection’s being “real.” The word “real” is a technical term—though only in 
the Treatise and Appendix and not the Enquiry, for reasons explained below—which ipso facto means 
necessary and inseparable. Hume’s hopelessness, therefore, somehow concerns the unrenounceable 
principle that the mind never perceives any necessary, inseparable connection among distinct existences, 
especially perceptions, and the similarly unrenounceable principle that it is metaphysically possible for 
perceptions to be independent existences.  
                                                     
16 Garrett, “Once More,” 78; cf. Inukai, “Hume’s Labyrinth,” 258.  
17 This terminology derives from Garrett, “Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts,” 22. 
18 Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume; cf. Fogelin, “Hume’s Worries.” 




It is logically consistent to maintain both the distinct-existence and perception principles. From 
these, it follows inter alia that the mind never perceives any real connection between distinct perceptions. 
Most commentators take the consistency of Hume’s unrenounceable principles to entail that one or more 
additional principles generate an “inescapable inconsistency” regarding either the metaphysics of 
bundling, meaning what actually connects distinct perceptions in a way that constitutes one mind, or the 
psychology of ascription, meaning how the mind can attribute perfect simplicity (partlessness) and 
identity (invariability and uninterruptedness) to itself when it is neither simple nor identical.20 
Given the alleged underdetermination of Hume’s second thoughts and the difficulty of explaining 
the inconsistency that he has in mind, is it striking how few interpreters have considered how Hume 
redresses the Appendix problem in the Enquiry, let alone that Hume addresses it in the Enquiry. In what 
follows, I argue that Hume’s 1746 letter to Lord Kames prefigures a significant, albeit subtle change 
introduced in the Enquiry of 1748, and that the latter provides the (retrodictive) key to a systematically 
satisfactory account of Hume’s second thoughts. 
Interpreters’ tendency to confine attention to the Treatise and Appendix, occasionally with 
passing references to the Dialogues, is an unnecessarily restrictive methodological bias which often 
operates implicitly but also finds explicit expression, for instance in Garret’s influential contention that 
“no trace of [Hume’s misgivings with his earlier account] recurs in the first Enquiry, nor in any of 
Hume’s other writings.”21 My account locates Hume’s inconsistency not in one or more additional 
philosophical principles, but in his reasonings regarding and expressions of the perception principle—
reasonings and expressions that shift slightly, albeit significantly between the Appendix and Enquiry. 
Underscoring this discontinuity between the Treatise and Enquiry is consistent with taking seriously 
Hume’s qualification that the Enquiry corrects “some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the 
expression” and respecting his desire “that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing 
                                                     
20 Stroud, Hume, 135; cf. Ainslie, “Hume’s Reflections,” 569; Cottrell, “Minds,” 536; Garrett, “Once More,” 78. 




[Hume’s] philosophical sentiments and principles.”22 It is consistent, moreover, with the clarifications that 
Hume expressed later in life: that his “philosophical Principles are the same in both” the Treatise and 
Enquiry; that “By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render them much more complete”;23 
and that the Treatise’s shortcomings “proceeded more from the manner than the matter” of what Hume 
argued therein.24 The Appendix problem concerns Hume’s reasonings regarding and expressions of the 
perception principle. 
Interpreters of the Appendix problem often describe criteria that any plausible interpretation must 
satisfy.25 Accordingly, I propose two new criteria that any plausible interpretation must satisfy. The first 
is the Kames Criterion: an interpretation must explain why Hume judges Lord Kames’s method of 
analyzing personal identity to be “more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur’d to [him]” six 
years after the publication of the Appendix and two years prior to the publication of the Enquiry.26 This 
criterion is especially important in light of the fact that Kames contends—explicitly against Hume and 
implicitly against the perception principle—that he can directly perceive “the only connecting principle, 
that binds together, all the various thoughts and actions of my life.”27 The second criterion is the Enquiry 
Criterion: an interpretation must explain whether Hume addresses the Appendix problem in the Enquiry; 
and if not, why Hume would forgo discussing a problem that caused all his hopes to vanish and continued 
to vex him until at least 1746; or if so, how Hume eventually addressed and (putatively) redressed the 
problem that vexed him.28 
Immediately many commentators will object that, since Hume does not respond to the Appendix 
problem (as they interpret it) in the Enquiry, the so-called “Kames Criterion” and “Enquiry Criterion” are 
at best trivial or at worst assume the initial point. My response is that, although Hume finds himself to be 
                                                     
22 Hume, “Advertisement,” 1/xlii.  
23 Hume, Letters, 73.2. 
24 Hume, “My Own Life,” 8. 
25 The widely accepted criteria that I have in mind derive from Ainslie, “Hume’s Reflections.” Cf. Garrett, “Once 
More,” 78. 
26 Quoted in Tsugawa, “Hume and Kames,” 398. 
27 Kames, Essays (1st ed.), 233-34. 
28 In light of Moore, “Hume and Hutcheson,” it is unfortunate that I will not be able to engage with Hutcheson’s 




involved in a labyrinth specifically “upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal 
identity”;29 and despite the fact that the Enquiry forgoes mentioning the phrase “personal identity”; it does 
not follow that the Enquiry forgoes addressing and redressing an inconsistency most evident in, but not 
thereby quarantined within, the Treatise’s section concerning personal identity. Put differently, from the 
fact that Hume’s doubts arise upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, it 
does not follow that Hume’s doubts or the alleged inconsistency pertains to personal identity tout court. 
The difficulty concerns finding a theory that would enable Hume to satisfactorily “explain the principles, 
that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.”30 As such, the difficulty extends 
beyond one section of the Treatise. The unity and systematicity of the mind are as “unrenounceable” as 
Hume’s unrenounceable principles: 
Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join them; and ’tis impossible the 
same simple ideas shou’d fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some 
bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces 
another.31 
Hume introduces the Appendix problem by claiming that it pertains not to his theory of personal identity, 
but his “theory of the intellectual world.”32 This includes his theory of perception and “true idea” of the 
human mind. 
It is precisely a difficulty of this magnitude—a difficulty most evident in, but not solely confined 
to the section concerning personal identity—which could cause “all [Hume’s] hopes [to] vanish” due to a 
“very considerable [mistake] in the reasonings deliver’d… on one article.”33 Most commentators interpret 
“article” to mean personal identity; but Hume never says this. A fortiori, the Treatise, as several 
                                                     
29 Hume, “Appendix,” 10/633. 
30 Ibid., 20/636. 
31 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.1.4/10 (emphasis mine). Note that the unity and systematicity of mind does not universally 
require there to be some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another; the mind can join two 
ideas even in the absence of such an associating quality (ibid.). Also note, however, Hume’s contention (discussed 
below) that the vast majority of perceptions involve some associating quality. 
32 Hume, “Appendix,” 10/633.’ 
33 I therefore disagree with narrow interpretations of the “Scope Criterion” that appear to conflict with the “Crisis 




commentators observe, employs “mind,” “self,” “person,” “thinking being,” and “soul” interchangeably.34 
These terms are annexed to the abstract “true idea” of the mind that represents it “as a system of different 
perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by cause and effect, and mutually produce, 
destroy, influence, and modify each other.”35 Although this specific formulation occurs in the section 
concerning personal identity, what it represents—the mind, self, person, thinking being, or soul, truly 
conceived—is presupposed throughout the Treatise and Hume’s philosophy as a whole. 
Contending that the Kames and Enquiry Criteria are trivial or beg the question, therefore, itself 
risks begging the question or trivializing the magnitude of the crisis that causes all Hume’s hopes to 
vanish. I cannot settle this point now; the argument requires detailed exegesis of relevant texts. At 
present, the important point is to recognize that the Enquiry may address and (putatively) redress the 
Appendix problem despite forgoing explicit discussion of “personal identity” by that phrase, especially 
since discussion of the mind occurs throughout the Enquiry. The mind’s operations remain both the 
fundamental presupposition and principal object of Hume’s science of human nature. 
In the Treatise, Hume reasons that the distinction between real and associative connections is 
mutually exclusive. Relatedly, Hume takes any (putative) real connection to be ipso facto necessary and 
inseparable, hence (in light of the perception principle) unperceivable and undiscoverable. I will argue 
that the Enquiry corrects this erroneous reasoning and that this erroneous reasoning is Hume’s problem by 
Hume’s own lights. Hume’s revised reasoning, I will argue, allows for both association-generating 
relations and associative connections to sufficiently connect and unify their relata without those 
connections being necessary or inseparable. In effect, the Enquiry allows associative connections to 
partially constitute the mind’s systematicity while preserving Hume’s argument against the absurd 
(because empirically false) claims that ideas are entirely loose and unconnected, and that relations 
between perceptions are necessary or inseparable. The author of the Enquiry comes to realize that 
                                                     
34 Hume uses these terms interchangeably in the relevant sections of the Treatise. See Cottrell 2015, 535n4; G. 
Strawson, Evident Connexion, 35; Swain, “Personal Identity,” 134. Cf. Bettcher, “Berkeley,” 208 (mentioned in 
Cottrell, ibid.). 




associative connections (one necessary condition) taken together with the association-generating relations 
that almost invariably give rise to them (another necessary condition) are jointly sufficient or sufficiently 
“strong” to explain the unity and systematicity of mind. Hume’s epistemic justification for this revised 
reasoning takes inspiration from Lord Kames’s method of explaining personal identity. Against his earlier 
reasonings, Hume realizes that associative connections (and association-generating relations) are directly 
perceivable and discoverable as such, a fact evident by “certain proof,” meaning it leaves no room for 
doubt or opposition.36 
This revised reasoning resolves the Appendix problem, as I interpret it: the inconsistency of the 
perception principle, as reasoned about and expressed in the Treatise and Appendix, and the empirically 
provable “true idea” of the mind qua system that Hume assumes throughout his corpus. The unity 
facilitated by associative connections and association-generating relations explains how distinct 
perceptions, which can (modally speaking) but do not (as a matter of fact) have independent existence, 
constitute the interconnected system of successive perceptions that is the mind.37 Therewith, the Appendix 
problem disappears. 
My strategy is as follows. First, I will examine the Appendix and provide exegetical and scholarly 
context for the claims that I will defend (§3). After introducing considerations that favor interpreting 
Hume’s second thoughts as concerning the metaphysics of bundling, I argue that, when we consider 
Hume’s epistemology of perception, discovery, proof, and truth (§4), the implications of Hume’s praise of 
Kames (§5), and the revised reasonings and expressions introduced in the Enquiry (§6), the account 
adumbrated above satisfies evaluative criteria proposed by other commentators in addition to the Kames 
and Enquiry Criteria. Having advanced my account, I will respond to objections (§7) and differentiate it 
from alternative metaphysics-of-bundling interpretations (§8). My conclusion will provide a transition to 
the two remaining chapters by way of explicating Hume’s views regarding temporality, discontinuity, 
                                                     
36 Hume, Enquiry, 3.1/23, 6.1/56n10. 
37 Hume’s revised reasonings also happen to be more phenomenologically accurate, pace James and even Husserl, 
who took the Enquiry to be “badly watered down” in comparison with the Treatise, as we will see in Chapter Two 




atomism, and individuation vis-à-vis the mind’s unity (§9). This will help us appreciate the 
underappreciated Humeanism of Husserl’s and Whitehead’s philosophies. 
 
3. CONTEXTUALIZING HUME’S APPENDIX PROBLEM 
Hume’s “explanation” of his second thoughts are infamously (and uncharacteristically) opaque. 
This opacity has resulted in over thirty incompatible interpretations of what has come to be known as 
Hume’s Appendix problem. 
We can parse these interpretations into four general but internally heterogeneous groups.38 Group 
1 interpretations take Hume’s problem to concern the metaphysics of bundling: how distinct perceptions 
are actually connected such that there can be a mind qua system of successive perceptions to which we 
erroneously ascribe the attributes of simplicity and identity.39 Group 2 and 3 interpretations, in contrast, 
take Hume’s problem to concern the psychology of ascription: how the operations of the mind, and the 
associative principles of the imagination (resemblance, contiguity, and causation) in particular, account 
for our ascriptions of identity and simplicity to the mind. Group 2 interpretations differ from Group 3 
interpretations, in that the former take Hume’s problem to concern principles other than resemblance and 
causation,40 whereas the latter take Hume’s problem to concern something about the scope or operation of 
resemblance and causation.41 Group 4 interpretations locate Hume’s problem in neither the metaphysics 
                                                     
38 Following Ellis, “Contents of Hume’s Appendix.” Cf. Garrett, “Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts”; Stroud, 
Hume, 135. 
39 Group 1 interpretations include Basson, David Hume; Cottrell, “Minds”; Garrett, “Hume’s Doubts,” Cognition 
and Commitment, and “Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts”; Inukai, “Hume’s Labyrinth”; Kail, Projection and 
Realism; Pears, “Hume’s Account”; G. Strawson, “‘All My Hopes Vanish,’” Evident Connexion, and “Hume on 
Himself”; and Stroud, Hume. 
40 Group 2 interpretations include Fogelin, “Hume’s Worries”; Lalor, “Antilogistic Puzzle”; Mascarenhas, “Hume’s 
Recantation.” McIntyre, “Is Hume’s Self Consistent?”; Nathanson, “Hume’s Second Thoughts”; Robison, “Hume of 
Personal Identity”; and Waxman, “Hume’s Quandary.” 
41 Group 3 interpretations include Ainslie, “Hume’s Reflections”; Baier, Death and Character; Baxter, “Hume’s 
Labyrinth”; Patten, “Hume’s Bundles”; Haugeland, “Hume on Personal Identity”; Roth, “What Was Hume’s 




of bundling nor the psychology of ascription.42 Even when interpreters agree about the general character 
of Hume’s problem, however, they disagree about its specific character—hence the plethora. 
Given the alleged underdetermination of Hume’s second thoughts and the difficulty of identifying 
the inconsistency he mentions, is it striking how few interpreters have considered whether Hume 
addresses and/or redresses the Appendix problem after 1740—in the Enquiry, for example. This is not 
only unfortunate but ironic; for in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may 
reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind: “This difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I 
pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more 
mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions.”43 To see how 
(and why) the author of the Enquiry reconciles the contradictions that he has in mind, we must begin with 
Hume’s initial reflections. 
The Appendix begins with Hume noting that the terms “self” and “substance,” to be intelligible, 
must signify some abstract idea: a particular idea that has been annexed to a general term in virtue of 
which that idea has a more extensive signification, meaning that it can bring to mind similar ideas.44 
Hume then (re)asserts the copy principle introduced at the beginning of Book I: “Every idea is deriv’d 
from preceding impressions.”45 Taken together, these observations lead Hume to (re)affirm the critical 
position proponed in the section concerning personal identity: since we have no impression of self or 
substance as simple and individual, we have no abstract idea of self or substance “in that sense”—that is, 
as a partless particular.46 
The Appendix continues by (re)asserting the separability (and converse separability) principles: 
“Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or 
                                                     
42 Group 4 interpretations include Beauchamp, “Self Inconsistency?”; Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume; 
Penelhum, “Hume on Personal Identity”; and Swain, “Personal Identity.” 
43 Hume, “Appendix,” 21/636. 
44 Ibid., 11/634; cf. Treatise, 1.1.7.1/17. 
45 Hume, “Appendix,” 11/634; cf. Treatise, 1.1.1.7/4. 




imagination.”47 These conjoin with Hume’s conceivability principle—if x is conceivable, x is possible—
to yield the following: “All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, 
and may be conceiv’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or 
absurdity” (ibid.). As noted above, Hume does not contend that perceptions are in fact separately existent, 
meaning ontologically or metaphysically independent. The conceivability principle entails only that that 
which is conceivable (epistemically) is possible (metaphysically). The general position that Hume 
reiterates in the Appendix, then, is that it is possible for perceptions to be ontologically independent. 
The more specific position that Hume (re)asserts is that it is intelligible and consistent for 
perceptions to be ontologically independent of a simple substance or subject of inhesion. Hence Hume 
continues to reason as he did in Book I: because (almost) all ideas derive from preceding impressions,48 
“no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to 
perceptions.”49 And since it is “intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and 
independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion,” it follows that it is 
intelligible and consistent to say that perceptions exist distinctly and independently from any common 
simple substance or substrate qua subject of inhesion (ibid.). 
As an empirical matter of fact, however, perceptions are not ontologically independent. For 
although perceptions exist independently of any substance or subject of inhesion, Hume takes other 
“experiments” to show that perceptions depend on bodily organs, especially the brain, and “animal 
spirits.”50 He also holds that most perceptions depend on other perceptions; for example (apropos of the 
copy principle), the simple primary idea of the object of a simple primary impression, qua copy, depends 
on that impression qua cause, despite the fact (nota bene) that such connections are neither necessary nor 
                                                     
47 Ibid., 12/634. 
48 Modulo missing shades of blue and the like which, as Garrett notes, remind us that the copy principle is a general 
empirical maxim and not a universal, necessary, a priori law. See Hume, Treatise, 1.1.1.11/6; cf. Enquiry, 2.8/21. 
49 Hume, “Appendix,” 14/634. 




inseparable.51 After all it is conceivable, hence (via the conceivability principle) possible, for a simple 
primary impression not to give rise to a simple primary idea that represents the former’s object. Another 
impression or idea could immediately arise.  
That said, Hume also maintains that it is inconceivable, hence metaphysically impossible, for all 
perceptions to be joined merely “by chance alone,” meaning the negation of a cause or, as Hume puts it in 
the Enquiry, “not any real power, which has, any where a being in nature.”52 It is empirically evident that 
the same type of simple ideas (or resembling tokens thereof) commonly fall regularly into complex ones. 
Correlatively, it is empirically evident that there is a mind, “the true idea” of which represents it as an 
interconnected system of successive perceptions—of copied or resembling ideas, for example. 
Appropriately, the issue as to how perceptions are connected as to constitute one mind arises immediately 
after the Treatise’s claim that it is impossible for perceptions of all types (and not just simple ideas)53 to 
be entirely loose and unconnected: “This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider’d as an 
inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination.”54 Thus we have “bonds 
of union” between perceptions, which are established by the imagination’s associative principles, and we 
also have necessary, inseparable connections, which Hume’s experiments (via the copy, separability, 
converse separability, and conceivability principles) have excluded from the imagination and the mind. 
Since the phrase “associative connection” is not Hume’s yet perspicuously expresses his 
considered view, I should specify what I mean by it. If the objects of different perceptions are 
experienced as standing in a natural relation, meaning resemblance, temporal or spatial contiguity, or 
cause and effect, then ideas of those objects almost invariably come to be associated in (and by) the 
imagination. Relations do not ontologically differ from perceptions, however. A natural relation is itself a 
                                                     
51 “Thus tho’ we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in our career, 
and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continu’d existence” (ibid., 1.4.2.51/214). 
52 Ibid., 1.3.11.4/125; Enquiry, 8.25/95. 
53 The passions, too, are connected and mutually dependent; and such connections are “found by experience” 
(Hume, Treatise, 1.4.2.20/195). Passions qua impressions are often associatively connected. Thus while Hume 
sometimes writes as if associative connections hold only between ideas, he also allows and in the Enquiry explicitly 
contends that associative connections can hold between perceptions of all kinds, including lively non-
representational perceptions. Here I agree with Cottrell, “Minds,” 548n36. 




perception, and more specifically a complex idea55 that “produces an union among our ideas.”56 Natural 
relations are association-generating, in this sense. Perceptions of objects that resemble, are contiguous to, 
or are causally related naturally cause the imagination to produce ideas of the initial perceptions’ objects 
and the relevant relation(s).57 For this reason, commentators employ the formulation “association-
generating relations” to refer to relations that cause perceptions to be associated. Associated ideas, like 
associated perceptions more generally, establish and maintain associative connections between token 
perceptions, many of which exemplify general types—a fact particularly pertinent to the natural relation 
of causation vis-à-vis causal reasoning. Indeed, even “unnatural” or philosophical relations can be 
association-generating. The reason is that when we (as Hume thinks philosophers are prone to do) 
arbitrarily compare objects that do not stand in a natural relation, for example the edge of the expanding 
universe and this cup of sencha,58 we still acquire an idea of a relation, such as distance, by having 
imaginarily compared the objects.59 The imagination causes there to be an associative connection between 
the perceptions (and their objects) as a result of the philosophical relation that was present to the mind 
making the comparison. Any associative connection between perceptions, therefore, presupposes the prior 
presence of some relation—an association-generating relation. 
This brings us back to Hume’s distinction between associative connections and real, necessary, 
and inseparable connections. Hume takes the distinction between these two general kinds to be mutually 
exclusive. The former are relatively weak. The uniting principle among ideas, for example, is to be 
regarded merely “as a gentle force, which commonly prevails.”60 The latter (if they exist) are not only 
                                                     
55 Hume holds that complex ideas divide into relations, modes, and substances (ibid., 1.1.4.7/13). 
56 Ibid., 1.3.6.16/94. Inukai argues that relations are not objects of separable perceptions because they are not distinct 
so as to constitute separable, potentially independent impressions (“Hume on Relations,” 204).  
57 Cottrell notes the Treatise’s ambiguity as to whether ideas become associated when ideas themselves stand in 
relations or their objects stand in relations; and he takes the Enquiry to demonstrate that the latter is Hume’s 
considered view (“Minds,” 545n32). 
58 Hume would deny that these objects are spatially contiguous in any natural sense. 
59 For details, see Hume, Treatise, 1.1.5.1/13-14. 




relatively but absolutely strong. There is nothing “stronger” than a (putative) necessary, inseparable 
connection.61 
Recall that Hume’s unrenounceable perception principle concerns the mind’s inability to perceive 
real connections between distinct existences such as perceptions. Throughout the Treatise, when Hume 
discusses “real connections” he employs “real” as a technical term to mean necessary, inseparable 
connections.62 In the section titled “Of the idea of necessary connexion,” for example, Hume contends 
that, “If we really have no idea of a power of efficacy in any object, or of any real connexion between 
causes and effects, ’twill be to little purpose to prove, that an efficacy is necessary in all operations.”63 
When discussing the reason of animals, moreover, Hume contrasts necessary, inseparable connections, 
which he refers to as “real,” with the constant conjunction of objects in perception: “Beasts certainly 
never perceive any real connexion among objects. ’Tis therefore by experience they infer one from 
another.”64 Similarly, Hume’s analysis of the idea of time contrasts the mere succession of perceptions 
with a real succession of objects.65 
Most significantly, in the section concerning personal identity Hume contrasts real connections 
with associative connections vis-à-vis attributions of identity to persons: 
But, as, notwithstanding this distinction and separability [of different perceptions], we suppose 
the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this 
relation of identity; whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or 
only associates their ideas in the imagination.66 
Identity is a philosophical and indeed the most universal relation, “being common to every being, whose 
existence has any duration.”67 The subsequent sentence adds an epistemic qualification to Hume’s 
                                                     
61 Cf. Cottrell, “Minds,” 543. 
62 Here I agree with Garrett that by “real connexion,” Hume means at least a connection between two objects that is 
more than simply an associate relation in the imagination (Cognition and Commitment, 181). In a footnote, Garrett 
claims that Hume implies that “in a ‘real connexion,’ the existence of one object in some way entails or is 
impossible without the existence of the other (ibid., 252n7). Cottrell rightly points out “that a real connection would 
involve ‘absolute’ inseparability” (“Minds,” 543). 
63 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.14.27/168. 
64 Ibid., 1.3.16.8/178.  
65 Ibid., 1.2.3.8/35. 
66 Ibid., 1.4.6.16/259. 




metaphysical distinction between real and associative connections—precisely the kind of epistemic 
qualification mentioned in Hume’s description of what would solve the Appendix problem: “That is, in 
other words, whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond 
among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them?” (ibid.). These questions are 
easily decidable, Hume contends, because he takes himself already to have “prov’d at large,” in the 
technical sense of proof that we will examine in §4, “that the understanding never observes any real 
connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examin’d, resolves 
itself into a customary association of ideas.”68 
As early as 1.1.4.1, then, Hume foreshadows the Appendix problem by maintaining that 
associative connections between distinct perceptions are not tantamount to necessary, inseparable, and 
real connections.69 The upshot is that while there must be some connecting principle or principles that 
unite possibly independent perceptions, it is impossible for the relevant connections to be real. When 
memory acquaints us with the causal relations that unite distinct perceptions (qua parts) into one 
interconnected chain of succession (qua whole) and thereby enables us to “discover personal identity, by 
showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions,” the relevant connections are 
not real but merely associative.70 Shortly after publishing Book 1, Hume comes to believe that he needs 
real connections to explain the systematicity of mind and that they must be perceivable or discoverable as 
such. 
This brings us back to the Appendix. Hume’s reasonings regarding and expressions of the 
perception principle employ “real” in his technical sense: “the mind never perceives any real connexion 
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69 We should not be misled by Hume’s claim that “The very nature and essence of relation [qua complex idea] is to 
connect our ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of the one, to facilitate the transition to its correlative” 
(ibid., 1.4.2.34/204). What Hume refers to as “natural connections” are associative connections generated by the 
imagination in response to complex perceptions involving natural relations of resemblance, contiguity, or causation. 
The Treatise does not countenance these as being real connections. 




among distinct existences.”71 This sense of “real” also motivates Hume’s reasoning regarding how 
perceptions are connected: 
If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no 
connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only 
feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another.72 
The mutually exclusive distinction between associative and real connections enters into not only Hume’s 
formulations of the problem, but also its potential solution: “Did our perceptions either inhere in 
something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d 
be no difficulty in the case.”73 If Hume could help himself to either of these claims, the difficulty that he 
describes would disappear. In the first case, perceptions would constitute an interconnected whole by 
inhering in one and the same self or substance that serves as their uniting principle. Hume rejects this 
position in the section concerning personal identity, the anonymously published Abstract of March 1740 
(which predates the Appendix by only eight months),74 and the Appendix itself.75 
The real contender, therefore, is the second option. In that case, perceptions qua distinct 
existences would belong to one interconnected system in virtue of connections that really (hence 
sufficiently) unite them; and the relevant connections would be perceivable or discoverable as such. If 
there are no such connections, however, then it is not clear how can there be a mind at all. More 
specifically, it is not clear that “the true idea” of the mind described in the section concerning personal 
identity and reasserted in the Appendix and Abstract is true.76 If neither resemblance nor (especially) 
                                                     
71 Hume, “Appendix,” 21/636. 
72 Ibid., 20/635. 
73 Ibid., 21/636. 
74 “The soul, as far as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions, those of heat and 
cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity…. 
Every thing, that exists, is particular: And therefore it must be our several particular perceptions, that compose the 
mind. I say, compose the mind, not belong to it. The mind is not a substance, in which the perceptions inhere…. So 
our idea of any mind is only that of particular perceptions, without the notion of any thing we call substance, either 
simple or compound” (Hume, “Abstract,” 28/657-58). 
75 Hume, “Appendix,” 14-15/634. 
76 The author of the Appendix maintains that the self or mind is a composition of perceptions and that we have no 
idea of the self as something simple and individual (ibid., 11/633, 15/634). Furthermore, Hume takes these 
reasonings to entail “that we have no notion of [the mind], distinct from the particular perceptions,” a principle that 
seems “to be attended with sufficient evidence” (ibid., 19-20/635). The true idea of the mind that represents it as an 




causation can generate sufficiently “strong” connections between distinct perceptions, despite the 
imaginary “links” or “natural connections” that those relations generate, then it is not clear how Hume 
can legitimately claim that the mind is a system of perceptions—a claim that Hume needs to avoid the 
absurd alternative that perceptions are entirely loose and unconnected.77 
The claims that the author of the Treatise and Appendix advances via the copy, separability, 
converse separability, and conceivability principles result, he thinks, in the loosening of all “our” (though 
Hume should restrict his claim to his) particular perceptions.78 The “real” disconnection entailed by this 
loosening requires Hume to explain what principle of connection binds particular perceptions together 
because the mind is in fact—so his experiments show—a system of perceptions. Yet Hume thinks that he 
cannot help himself to such a principle, since it would contradict the unrenounceable perception principle. 
If experience can neither perceive nor discover real connections, then either there is no principle that 
unifies distinct perceptions, or there is, but belief in it would be empirically unjustified—however 
strongly Hume might believe (as he must) that some such principle exists. If Hume were able to perceive 
real connections between perceptions, the Appendix problem would disappear, for then all our particular 
perceptions would be really connected, and perceivably so, versus being merely associatively connected 
and merely felt to be really connected. Hume’s reasonings regarding and expressions of the perception 
principle preclude this possibility. The systematicity of mind, therefore, appears to be both a systemically 
necessary and systemically unjustifiable postulate. This is precisely the kind of contradiction—an 
apparent contradiction between the perception principle and true idea of the mind—that would generate a 
crisis of sufficient magnitude to cause all of Hume’s hopes to vanish and lead him to plead the privilege 
of a skeptic. 
Thus far, I have introduced an account of Hume’s Appendix problem that accords with 
formulations delivered in the Treatise, Abstract, and Appendix. The introduction has not established the 
account, however, for other commentators have interpreted the same formulations differently. The 
                                                     
77 Hume, Treatise, 1.4.6.19/261. 




account adumbrated above becomes more appealing when we consider writings produced after the 
Appendix, especially Hume’s letter to Lord Kames and the Enquiry. Consideration of these texts will 
show that I have not stacked the deck in favor of an idiosyncratic, metaphysics-of-bundling interpretation. 
Before we examine those texts, a brief foray into Hume’s epistemology will help clarify what it 
would mean to either perceive or discover a real connection; what constitutes a proof, in Hume’s 
technical sense; and what makes the true idea of the mind “true.” These epistemological considerations 
will illuminate Hume’s praise of Kames and the Enquiry’s subsequent claims about being able to perceive 
and discover—indeed, prove—that associative connections contribute to the unity of mind. 
 
4. PERCEPTION, DISCOVERY, PROOF, AND TRUTH 
I contend that, rather than abandon the unrenounceable perception principle, Hume revised his 
reasonings regarding and expressions of it. Hume employs the technical term “reasoning” in both the 
Appendix to the Treatise and Advertisement for the Enquiry: 
But having this loosen’d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of 
connection, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and 
identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming 
evidence of the precedent reasonings cou’d have induc’d me to receive it.79 
Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in [the Treatise]: 
A work which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published 
not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too 
early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former 
reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected.80 
In all relevant texts, furthermore, Hume distinguishes between his philosophical principles, reasonings 
regarding those principles, and expressions of his principles and reasonings.81 
All forms of reasoning consist in a comparison and discovery of the constant or inconstant 
relations that two or more objects (of perceptions) bear to each other.82 When any number of objects is 
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80 Hume, “Advertisement,” xlii. 
81 By “principle,” Hume sometimes means a theoretical item and other times a real item that a theoretical principle 
aims to characterize as accurately as possible. See G. Strawson, Evident Connexion, 113. 




present to the senses without a relation between them, the mind can reason by making a comparison and 
thus discover the relation(s) that those objects bear. Discovery is thus a diachronic epistemic process 
involving: first, the immediate presentation of two or more objects without an immediately evident 
relation; and subsequently, a comparison that reveals a relation or relations holding between those objects. 
Perception, in contrast, involves all related objects being present to the senses along with the relation 
itself (ibid.). Discovery and perception, therefore, differ: the former but not the latter is a form of 
reasoning; and the latter but not the former involves observation of an immediately evident relation 
between two or more objects, in addition to the relation’s relata. Perception (in the narrow epistemic 
sense)83 does not involve the exercise of thought in the imagination. It is synchronic; hence perceived 
evidence, in the strict sense, is immediate. Discovery, on the other hand, is diachronic; hence discovered 
evidence, in the strict sense, is mediate (at least temporally). Perception and discovery are 
complementary, however. One can discover and thus foster stronger belief in what one previously 
perceived. 
When I perceive (in the narrow epistemic sense) this cup of sencha on my desk the perception (in 
the wide metaphysical sense) is a complex consisting of the cup of sencha, my desk, and the relation of 
being-on-top-of—a form of spatial contiguity—which I immediately perceive along with its relata.84 
Natural relations of this kind typically facilitate the production of associative connections in imagination 
or memory, such that my idea of the cup of sencha on the desk is associatively connected with my earlier, 
more vivacious perception thereof. Connections between initial impressions and subsequent ideas 
constitute one kind of discoverable relation-type: the copy-type. 
                                                     
83 This qualification is important because even discovery, or indeed any mental item, counts as a perception in 
Hume’s wide metaphysical sense. In the narrow epistemic sense, however, perception and discovery differ. 
84 I have simplified for illustration. The complex perception, as described, would also involve sensing the cup, green 
liquid, the relation of spatial contiguity between them, and features of the surrounding environment—an outer 
horizon, in Husserl’s technical sense (D. W. Smith, Husserl, 444). Cf. Whitehead: “Consciousness is an ever-
shifting process of abstracting shifting quality from a massive process of essential existence. It emphasizes. And yet, 




Given the distinction between perception and discovery, causation is vital to inquiries concerning 
matters of fact. Only causal reasoning enables us to go beyond immediate perception and discover 
relations between various types of relata. Only causation can “[produce] such a connection, as to give us 
assurance from the existence or action of one object, that ’twas follow’d or preceded by any other 
existence or action.”85 Causal reasoning thus amounts to probable reasoning from experience concerning 
matters of fact. This means that causal reasoning does not generate knowledge in the strict sense (for only 
demonstrative reasoning generates knowledge), but belief.86 Nevertheless, causal reasoning enables us to 
characterize some beliefs as not only probable, but extremely likely—likely enough to “give us 
assurance” to such a degree that doubting or opposing those beliefs would be absurd.87 
The highest degree of confidence obtainable via probable reasoning is proof, which Garrett 
perspicuously describes as “a high level of psychological certainty resulting from the experience of 
completely uniform and pervasive constant conjunction.”88 Probable proofs differ from demonstrative 
proofs of the kind produced by mathematicians in that demonstrations concern relations of ideas; hence 
the denial of a demonstration’s conclusion is logically contradictory or absurd.89 A probable or sensible 
proof, in contrast, is non-demonstrative reasoning concerning matters of fact and real existence, where a 
high level of certainty results from uniform and commonly experienced constant conjunctions.90 Denial of 
a probable proof’s conclusion is empirically contradictory or absurd. 
                                                     
85 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.2.2/73-74. 
86 Later Hume distinguishes between three kinds of reasoning: from knowledge, meaning the assurance derived from 
comparison of ideas; from proofs, meaning arguments derived from the relation of cause and effect; and from 
probabilities, meaning evidence that is still attended with uncertainty (ibid., 1.3.11.2/124). Knowledge from 
probabilities admits of further distinction between that founded on chance and that which arises from causes. 
87 The distinction between highly probable and proven beliefs need not be sharp for the latter to have significant 
empirical import, for the gradation “from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible; and the difference 
betwixt these kinds of evidence is more easily perceiv’d in the remote degrees, than in the near and contiguous” 
(ibid., 1.3.12.2/131). 
88 Garrett, Hume, 95. 
89 “But with regard to any matter of fact, however strong the proof may be from experience, I can always conceive 
the contrary, tho’ I cannot always believe it” (Hume, “Abstract,” 18/653). 
90 “’twould perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark 
the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from proofs, 
and from probabilities. By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those 




Consider Hume’s proof of the copy principle: 
The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are 
the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions 
are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.91 
(Hume takes his “experiments” to constitute a proof of the copy principle, despite the fact that there may 
be exceptions to it. Hume infamously allows that it is possible to acquire the idea of a particular shade of 
blue without having previously sensed that shade.92) Hume introduces his proof of the copy principle 
prior to his refutation of belief in necessary connections between causes and effects. One of the 
implications of that refutation is that causal reasoning regarding relations between perceptions cannot 
deliver positive conclusions regarding real relations. The author of Treatise and Appendix takes causal 
reasoning to deliver the negative conclusion that the associative connections generated by natural 
relations are not real. Belief in real connections between perceptions, therefore, is empirically absurd, 
meaning false or fictitious. Similar reasoning applies to belief about the natural resemblance relations that 
memory seems to produce among all of “a person’s” perceptions, since resemblance seems prima facie to 
unite them.93 Natural resemblance relations between perceptions are neither necessary, nor inseparable, 
nor real, hence—given Hume’s reasoning regarding the perception principle—not sufficient to justify 
belief in the empirically evident systematicity of mind. 
When the author of the Appendix describes his second thoughts, he takes them to concern the 
mind never being able to either “discover” any connection among distinct existences or “perceive” real 
connections among distinct existences. Real connections are neither discoverable nor perceivable. 
Epistemically speaking, this is precisely the kind of quandary that could cause all of Hume’s hopes to 
vanish. The author of the Appendix remains committed to “the true idea” of the mind asserted in the 
Treatise despite the fact that he has loosened all our particular perceptions and must explain the principle 
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91 Hume, Treatise, 1.1.1.8/5. 
92 See ibid., 1.1.1.11/6; cf. Enquiry, 2.8/21. 




of unity in virtue of which perceptions are actually connected. Yet this is what the perception principle 
precludes Hume from doing—so the author of the Appendix reasons. 
What makes “the true idea” of the mind true? Hume notes that this conclusion derives from 
causal reasoning.94 Belief in the true idea of the mind is not supported by perception (in the narrow 
epistemic sense) because the systematicity of successive perceptions, according to the author of the 
Treatise and Appendix, is not immediately perceivable.95 It takes time, hence a form of reasoning, to 
discover that there are systematic connections among the mind’s perceptions.96 The phrase “true idea” 
occurs only twice in the Treatise; once with regard to extension and once with regard to the mind.97 In 
Book III, Hume asserts that reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood, which he elaborates as follows: 
Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or 
to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or 
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason.98  
Hume also holds that the truth and falsehood of ideas concerning matters of fact can be proven.99 Falsity 
or contradiction concerning matters of fact “consists in the disagreement between ideas, consider’d as 
copies, with those objects, which they represent.”100 When Hume refers to a true idea, therefore, he means 
that the reality of that idea’s object (what it represents) has effectively been proven. This, in turn, entails 
that strong belief in the represented reality is epistemically justified.  
                                                     
94 Ibid., 1.4.6.19/261. 
95 This may seem to conflict with the Treatise’s earlier claim that “we may observe, that what we call a mind, is 
nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ 
falsly, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity” (ibid., 1.4.2.39/207). The observation, however, is 
“observable” only because a discovery has taken place. Once a relation-type is discovered to be constantly conjoined 
with multiple tokens of an object-of-perception-type, one can perceive (or observe) various objects represented by 
that abstract idea. 
96 Similarly, Hume holds that “time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attending with a steady 
unchangeable object, but is always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects” (ibid., 
1.2.3.7/35). Whereas a succession of changeable objects is directly perceivable, time qua relation is not; it must be 
discovered. “An idea of time is an idea that requires some time for an individual to have,” as Garrett puts it 
(Cognition and Commitment, 246n11]). 
97 Hume, Treatise, 1.2.5.15/59; 1.4.6.19/261. 
98 Ibid., 3.1.1.9/458; cf. Cottrell, “Minds,” 540n19. 
99 Hume, Treatise, 2.1.12.2/325. 




 This brief foray into Hume’s epistemology enables us to appreciate Hume’s quandary more fully. 
On the one hand, his science of human nature discovers and proves the true idea of the human mind. On 
the other hand, his reasonings regarding the perception principle preclude him from proving that idea 
because they entail that he can neither discover nor perceive any real connection in virtue of which that 
idea truly represents its object. 
Here we can interrogate Hume on his own terms. Why would Hume take only necessary and 
inseparable connections to be “real,” meaning sufficiently “strong” to explain the evident systematicity of 
mind? There seems to be no principled empirical or empiricist reason to do so—as Husserl and 
Whitehead would recognize. The kind of connections that Hume needs are those in virtue of which 
perceptions are not in fact loose and disconnected even if it is possible that perceptions could exist 
independently. Are such connections not established by the imagination and memory, for example, or by 
associative connections more generally? Associative connections presuppose the previous occurrence of a 
bundle involving at least one association-generating relation. Such a relation is the principle of its 
bundle’s synchronic unity. Why then would associations deriving from such bundles not count as 
connections that contribute to the unity of mind? Hume holds, moreover, that impressions and ideas have 
“real existence” or are real existences in the sense of being (empirical) matters of fact.101 Why would 
connections between real existences not count as “real,” albeit neither necessary nor inseparable? It seems 
even that on empirical (and phenomenological) grounds, mind-derived connections between perceptions, 
even if merely associative, are sufficient to “really” contribute to the evident systematicity of mind. 
In texts written after the Appendix Hume no longer employs the term “real” in the technical sense 
of the Treatise, Abstract, and Appendix. The reason, as I will now proceed to argue, is that Hume realized 
that associative connections, together with the association-generating relations from which they derive, 
explain the unity of mind. 
 
                                                     




5. HUME’S LETTER TO LORD KAMES 
 Henry Home, more widely known as Lord Kames, was a personal friend of Hume to whom Hume 
sent drafts of everything that he intended to publish.102 Likewise, Kames sent drafts to Hume. Six years 
after the publication of the Appendix, Hume reviewed a manuscript copy of Kames’s Essays, the first 
edition of which Kames published in 1751. The letter that Hume penned to Kames in May or June of 
1746 includes a striking, oft-overlooked compliment: 
I like exceedingly your Method of explaining personal Identity as more satisfactory than any 
thing that had ever occur’d to me. As to the Idea of Substance, I must own, that as it has no 
Access to the Mind by any of our Sense or Feelings, it has always appeared to me to be nothing 
but an imaginary Center of Union amongst the different & variable Qualitys that are to be found 
in every Piece of Matter. But I shall keep myself in suspense till I hear your Opinion.103 
Although we do not have access to the specific manuscript that prompted Hume’s compliment, we can 
use the first edition of Kames’s Essay to help determine what Hume found so satisfying about Kames’s 
method. This may help illuminate Hume’s second thoughts and whether Hume redressed the Appendix 
problem in the Enquiry. Kames’s method involves perceiving a uniting principle that connects all 
particular perceptions. 
In the first edition’s short essay, titled “Of the Idea of Self and of Personal Identity,” Kames 
begins by explicitly referencing the Treatise to help differentiate his account from Hume’s: 
Had we no impressions but those of the external senses, according to the author of the treatise of 
human nature, we never could have any consciousness of self; because such consciousness cannot 
arise from any external sense. Mankind [sic] would be in a perpetual reverie; ideas would be 
constantly floating in the mind; and no man be able to connect his ideas with himself. Neither 
could there be any idea of personal identity. For a man, cannot consider himself to be the same 
person, in different circumstances, when he has no idea or consciousness of himself at all.104 
Kames then implicitly uses Hume’s conception of internal impressions against him: 
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103 Quoted in ibid., 398. 




Beings there may be, who are thus constituted; but man is none of these beings. It is an undoubted 
truth, that he has an original feeling, or consciousness of himself, and of his existence; which, for 
the most part, accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind 
and body.105 
Kames seems to be criticizing the following reasoning. “The uniting principle among our internal 
perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than 
by experience.”106 Yet reasoning from experience, and causal reasoning in particular, proves only the 
existence of associative connections. Associative connections are not sufficiently “strong” to be one of 
the principles or the principle in virtue of which our perceptions are united, as they evidently are.107 Given 
that there is no internal impression of a diachronically identical self, moreover, it would be absurd to 
believe that any (putative) idea thereof truly represents its purported object. Thus there is no such self. 
The true idea of the mind, meaning its being systematically interconnected or “personally identical,” must 
have some other origin. 
Against this reasoning, Kames contends that nearly every moment of experience includes not 
only awareness of what I am feeling, thinking, or doing, but also awareness that I am feeling, thinking, or 
doing thus and so.108 Kames goes on to criticize the conclusion that Hume draws from the example of 
being in sound sleep; namely, that whenever Hume’s perceptions are removed, he is insensible of himself 
and may be truly said not to exist.109 Kames’s criticism invokes an argument related to a qualification that 
Locke introduces in his account of personal identity:110 to constitute personal identity, consciousness need 
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(Hume, Treatise, 1.2.3.3/33). 
106 Hume, Treatise, 1.3.14.29/169. 
107 This reconstruction does not beg the question. Other interpreters, e.g., Garrett, Inukai, Kail, and G. Strawson, 
would endorse this reading even if they reject what I take it to imply. 
108 Cf. Tsugawa, “Hume and Kames,” 399. 
109 Hume, Treatise, 1.4.6.3/252. 
110 In the third edition of his Essays, Kames criticizes Locke who “inadvertently jumbles together the identity that is 
nature’s work with our knowledge of it” (204). Kames then speaks favorably of Reid and quotes him at length, 
citing his contention that “All men agree, that personality is indivisible: a part of a person is an absurdity” (ibid., 
204-5). In effect, Kames invokes Reid to counter Hume’s rejection of the simplicity of self, since he has already 
taken himself to have countered Hume’s rejection of the identity of self. Kames also invokes Reid to underscore 
their common opinion that while memory (along with a present impression of self) serves to acquaint one with one’s 




not actually but only possibly extend to a previous thought or action.111 Similarly, Kames argues that the 
feeling or consciousness of one’s self and existence need not accompany every perception in order to 
justify belief in a continuous, identical self. In most circumstances, however, the impression of self is “of 
the liveliest kind” (ibid.). Kames takes the liveliness of this impression to entail the “undoubted” truth 
that one’s impression of oneself accompanies most perceptions. 
Kames maintains that most perceptions involve self-preservation, hence that perception per se is 
self-preserving: “the vivacity of this perception [of oneself] is necessary to make us attentive to our own 
interest, and particularly, to shun every appearance of danger.”112 Kames allows that reveries or 
circumstances in which the mind “forget[s] itself” are possible; when one falls asleep to the sound of rain, 
for example, or when one becomes engrossed in reading. Such exceptions prove the general empirical 
rule that the perception of oneself rarely, for good (self-preserving) reasons, vanishes. Thus while Hume 
(partially) grounds his accounts of perception, association, and mind in a quasi-neurological theory about 
bodily organs and animal spirits, Kames (partially) grounds his account in a proto-evolutionary theory 
about self-preservation. This move also seems subversive; for the Treatise rejects the notion that there are 
internal impressions of agency or powers that would aim at self-preservation.113 
The internal impression of oneself that Kames believes to be necessary to explain our instinct for 
self-preservation also helps explain personal identity: 
It is this perception, or consciousness of self, carried through all the different stages of life, and 
all the variety of action, which is the foundation of personal identity. It is, by means of this 
perception, that I consider myself to be the same person, in all varieties of fortune, and every 
change of circumstance.114 
Here Kames means “perception” in not only a wide metaphysical sense, meaning an impression that has 
the self as its object, but also a narrow epistemic sense that accords with Hume’s usage. Strictly speaking, 
however, present consciousness of oneself explains only why synchronic feelings, thoughts, and actions 
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are experienced as belonging to or being owned by a self, meaning some self or other.115 What explains 
diachronic “ownership” and personal identity is not present awareness of oneself, but more specifically 
the “feeling of identity” that recurs in a lively manner during most occasions of experience. Note how 
closely Kames’s diction resembles expressions delivered in Hume’s Appendix: 
The main purpose of this short essay, is to introduce an observation, that it is not by any argument 
or reasoning, I conclude myself to be the same person, I was ten years ago. This conclusion rests 
entirely upon the feeling of identity, which accompanies me through all my changes, and which is 
the only connecting principle, that binds together, all the various thoughts and actions of my 
life.116 
This observation purports to achieve precisely what Hume thought that he could not, as I have interpreted 
it: the perception or discovery of the connecting principle(s) that actually binds together all of one mind’s 
particular perceptions. The feeling or impression of self-identity through time and change, Kames 
contends, is that connecting principle. 
Kames’s proto-evolutionary theory should not mislead us into thinking that he takes himself to 
proffer an alternative and more probable line of reasoning than Hume’s. Kames takes himself to identify 
an empirically pervasive, immediate perception that contravenes Hume’s method—a perception that, a 
fortiori, Kames claims to be the only connecting principle that binds together particular perceptions.117 In 
addition to grounding personal identity, the impression of self-identity purportedly explains why the mind 
is not perpetually in reverie but pervasively self-concerned—even (on a charitable reading) when other-
than-self concerned.118 
The third edition of Kames’s Essays, published three years after Hume’s death, places further 
emphasis on directly perceivable connections between perceptions. The sense of self and one’s existence 
that naturally accompanies experiences qualifies not only every present thought and action, but also 
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must qualify every idea of memory; because that faculty recals to the mind things as they 
happened: I was present at the King’s coronation; and, at a greater distance of time, I saw the first 
stone laid at the Ratcliff library at Oxford.119 
The sense of self that accompanies the majority of present perceptions, especially present impressions and 
memories, acquaints one with her or his personal identity.120 As in the first edition, Kames underscores 
the connections made possible by the sense of self-identity that attends present perceptions and memories: 
“I am assured of my own identity by connecting every thing I thought and did with myself” (ibid.). 
Kames goes on to claim that the same process that acquaints one with her personal identity also acquaints 
her with the mind-independent identity of plants and animals—where again the issue concerns 
connections between the human mind’s perceptions: “Were I kept ignorant of my personal identity, it 
would not be in my power to connect any of my past actions with myself: I could not think myself 
accountable for them, more than if done by another person.”121 Such connections are epistemically 
accessible in only one way: “inward sense of consciousness of fact.”122 
The crucial dialectical point regarding to what Hume found to be “more satisfactory” about 
Kames’s account concerns not its content per se but—following Hume’s letter to the letter—the form or 
“Method” of Kames’s account. Unlike the author of the Appendix, Kames does not preclude the 
possibility of perceiving a system-generating principle that unites distinct perceptions. In addition, Kames 
rejects the relevance of discovering such a principle via probable reasoning.123 Instead Kames highlights 
an observation that provides immediate evidence of “the only” connecting principle that unites particular 
perceptions. The fact that Hume judges Kames’s method to be “more satisfactory than any thing that had 
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ever occur’d to [him],” therefore, does not entail Hume’s coming to believe, contra the Treatise and 
Appendix, in an impression of a diachronically identical self. Hume still takes himself to have 
undermined the legitimacy of that belief. His praise pertains to Kames allowing there to be some 
perception (in the narrow epistemic sense) to provide evidence for a principle that actually connects 
distinct perceptions (in the wide metaphysical sense). The method that Hume finds so satisfactory 
conforms to the two general requirements prescribed in the Appendix’s potential solution: it features both 
a metaphysical and an epistemic component, the latter of which justifies strong belief in the former. Once 
we examine the Enquiry, we will see that consideration of Kames’s method helps motivate Hume to 
retain the perception principle while advancing an epistemically qualified claim about what helps explain 
the mind’s unity. 
One might object that my interpretation presumes that Hume’s praise of Kames was intended in 
earnest. Yet Ross (following Hume’s and Kames’s contemporary, Boswell) notes that the “high point” of 
Hume and Kames’s relationship occurred in June 1745, whereas sometime thereafter Hume’s relationship 
with Kames became marked by “some reserve and even irony and antipathy,” as many of Kames’s 
relationships with younger protégés did because of the judge’s domineering character.124 
My response is that even if Hume only one year after the “high point” of his long-standing 
relationship with Kames intended his praise to be somewhat ironic and/or antagonistic, the objection does 
not undermine my interpretation as to why Kames’s method seems to and should have appealed to Hume. 
Let us grant the objector’s assumption that Hume’s praise was ironic and/or antagonistic. Then an 
appropriate rephrasing of his letter on such an assumption would resemble the following: “The method of 
your account, Lord Kames, is more satisfactory than anything that had ever occurred to me…” This ironic 
rephrasing suggests that such a method did occur to Hume, perhaps as prefigured in the Appendix’s 
second solution—a method that Hume felt forced to reject in light of his reasonings regarding and 
expressions of the perception principle. The rephrasing’s implications still accord with my claim that 
                                                     




Hume’s second thoughts concern the apparent inconsistency between the perception principle and true 
idea of the mind. An ironic rephrasing, in other words, preserves there being something genuinely 
methodologically satisfying that would have motivated Hume to praise (earnestly or ironically) his long-
standing friend. 
Alternative rephrasings, of course, are available. Tsugawa’s analysis of typical letters from 1750 
and earlier, however, indicates that there is no reason to presume that Hume was being merely polite, 
ironic, or antagonistic.125 Given other contemporaries’ and Hume’s own accounts of his interpersonal 
ethos, it seems extremely unlikely that Hume’s letter would be designed to ironically antagonize Kames. 
Consider what Hume wrote in his brief autobiography, penned months before his death: 
I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful 
humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my 
passions…. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character 
and conduct.126 
Of course, we should not take Hume at his word. But consider Kames’s concluding comments in the third 
edition of his Essays, published three years after Hume’s death. 
I am fond however of any apology I can make for Mr Hume…. Whatever prejudice I may have 
against the doctrines of the [Second] Enquiry, my conscience acquits me of any prejudice against 
the author. Our friendship was sincere while he lived, without ever a difference, except in matters 
of opinion. I never was addicted to controversy; and would have avoided the attacking a 
gentleman who had both my love and esteem, had it been consistent with the plan of the present 
work.127 
The burden of proof, it seems to me, falls on the objector. 
Hume did not adopt Kames’s view, but was motivated by Kames’s method to introduce 
reasonings that differ from those treated in the Treatise and Appendix. 
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6. THE  ENQUIRY’S EVIDENT PRINCIPLES 
 I have claimed that the Appendix problem concerns how there can be a mind at all, given Hume’s 
belief that the perception principle precludes him from explaining the evident systematicity of the mind. 
The author of the Enquiry, in contrast, reasons that the principles of connection in virtue of which the 
mind is a system are “evident,” “observable,” and “discoverable” to the mind—provably so. Thereby, the 
Enquiry obviates the Appendix problem. Hume’s revised reasonings enable him to achieve precisely what 
was so epistemically satisfying about Kames’s method—it explains via direct observation those 
connecting principles that bind together all the various thoughts and actions of one’s life—while 
preserving Hume’s critique of belief in necessary connections. Hume recognizes, in other words, that 
associative connections and association-generating relations unify distinct perceptions in such a way that 
justifies belief in “the true idea” of the mind regardless of whether such connections count as “real.” 
Hume’s considered view, accordingly, is that association-generating relations and the associative 
connections caused by them jointly constitute the interconnected system of successive perceptions that is 
the mind. 
 The Enquiry begins with Hume noting that there are truths and falsehoods about the mind’s 
constitution that fall within the compass of human understanding.128 As in the Treatise, Hume holds that 
we may obtain certain truths and falsehoods about the mind, for example that it is neither by chance alone 
nor via necessary connections that all our particular perceptions are united. Yet Hume slightly and subtly 
widens the scope of the kinds of truths and falsehoods that we may know about the mind, including the 
range of phenomena that we can perceive and discover regarding the mind’s unity. He claims, for 
example, that we can “observe” and “examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts 
to each other [in the mind].”129 
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That said, the Enquiry distinguishes associative connections from “the secret springs and 
principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations.”130 As in the Treatise, Hume pretends 
not to explain the origin of primary impressions of sensation, but only other subtypes of perceptions, 
especially ideas, since determining the origin of our abstract ideas may help us discover something 
probable about the mind’s secret springs and principles.131 Hume proceeds approximately as he did in 
Book I of the Treatise, noting that while at first sight the mind and the imagination in particular may seem 
to be unrestrained and possess “unbounded liberty,” closer examination shows that it is constrained by 
general principles such as the copy principle and associative principles of the imagination—evident 
principles. 
Hume concedes that we cannot reflect on the operations and principles of the mind without their 
seeming to be obscure. Yet he also allows that we may apprehend those operations and principles in an 
instant via a form of “superior penetration” that derives from nature and improves with habit and 
reflection. He describes such insight as follows: 
This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to 
external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations 
of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it.132 
Whereas the mind’s secret springs and principles are not directly perceivable via superior penetration, 
associative connections are.133 So far, this is consistent with the Treatise. The twist is that Hume allows 
associative connections to be principles of connection that unify particular perceptions—perceivably and 
discoverably so. This justifies strong belief in the true idea of the human mind. 
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The key passage occurs at the outset of Section 3, “Of the association of ideas”: 
It is evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the 
mind, and [it is evident] that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce 
each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or 
discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract 
or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected.134 
Compare these claims with the Appendix: “But no connexions among distinct existences are ever 
discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to 
pass from one object to another.”135 The author of the Enquiry does not contend that we merely feel a 
fictional and therefore unreal connection between a determination of ideas qua distinct existences. The 
fact that the principle of connection between ideas is merely associative, moreover, does not entail that 
Hume (by his own lights) cannot explain the principle of connection that unites successive perceptions. 
Hume now maintains that “it is evident” and “observable” that such associative connections are the 
principle of connection between different ideas of the mind. He allows, in other words, that we can 
perceive the principles of connection that unite distinct perceptions. The metaphor of a chain is fitting, for 
it expresses the general empirical maxim that each idea qua part of the mind is connected with both its 
immediate predecessor and successor whether they are impressions (apropos of the copy principle) or 
ideas (apropos of the associative principles of the imagination and/or memory). Like links in a chain, such 
connections constitute a system that remains unified as its number of parts increases. 
Throughout the Enquiry, Hume reiterates that the mind’s principles of connection are 
epistemically accessible. Even when the mind does not presently perceive the principle of connection 
between successive perceptions, the connection is discoverable upon reflection: 
We shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there 
was still a connection upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the 
loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, 
which connected it in all its transitions.136 
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Hume prefigures this claim in the Abstract immediately after lauding the author of the Treatise for being 
an inventor for the use he makes of the principles of the association: “Hence arises what we call the 
apropos of discourse; hence the connexion of writing: and hence that thread, or chain of thought, which a 
man naturally supports even in the loosest reverie.”137 (Here and elsewhere Hume focuses on the 
principles of idea-idea connections because the imagination is the principle source of all our errors. His 
claims about the mind’s principles of unity, however, also apply to impression-idea (à la the copy 
principle), idea-impression (à la ideas giving rise to impressions of reflection),138 and impression-
impression (à la the passions) connections.139 All such connections are discoverable upon reflection, even 
if not immediately perceived.140) Hume takes the fact that different languages are capable of expressing 
the same ideas, moreover, to provide “certain proof” of universal principles of connection that hold for all 
human beings, which makes it “too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected 
together.”141 The three epistemic modes that we examined in §4 (perception, discovery, and proof) 
support the Enquiry’s claim about it being evident that there are principles of connection between 
different perceptions.142 
These modes also justify strong belief in the true idea of the mind defended in the Treatise and 
presupposed throughout Hume’s corpus, including the Enquiry and Dialogues, in which all participants 
seem to agree about the mind’s general nature.143 
But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange 
themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves that there is 
an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. [Philo] 
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What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, 
indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas which 
are the parts of its discourse arrange themselves in a certain form or order, which is not preserved 
entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement…. How is this 
compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true theists ascribe to the 
Deity? [Demea] 
A mind whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive, one that is wholly 
simple and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, 
no love, no hated; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation. 
[Cleanthes]144 
In the Treatise, Hume maintains that no philosophical question is more abstruse than that concerning 
identity and the nature of the uniting principle that constitutes a person, and that the question cannot be 
settled by the senses, but only the understanding and “the most profound metaphysics.”145 Here and 
elsewhere Hume supposes that there is some uniting principle that constitutes a person or mind. Even 
Hume’s more “skeptical” or critical moments (which often function as precursors to his constructive 
moments) presuppose the systematicity of mind. This presupposition finds clear expression in the 
Abstract, for example, which concludes as follows: 
So far as regards the mind, these [principles] are the only links that bind the parts of the universe 
together, or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves. For as it is by means of 
thought only that any thing operations upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our 
thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, 
in a great measure, depend on them.146 
The qualification “to us” foreshadows the Appendix problem; for what Hume takes the cement of “the 
universe” (meaning the universe of the imagination) to explain is the unity of the mind, as far as 
reasoning will allow. 
The Enquiry’s epistemic justifications recur in multiple sections: 
We have already observed, that nature has established connexions among particular ideas, and 
that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our 
attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement.147 
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As in Section 3, the mind’s evident principles of connection not only bind and unite perceptions, but also 
“beget that regular train of reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among 
all mankind.” (ibid.). When describing a prisoner being conducted to the scaffold, Hume writes: “His 
mind runs along a certain train of ideas…. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary 
actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in passing from one link to another.”148 The 
upshot is that while the prisoner does not perceive (in the narrow epistemic sense) the evident principles 
of connection between his rapidly successive perceptions, most of which are quite vivacious and hence 
not “perfect ideas,” reflection would enable him to discover them, if only he had time. 
In this way, the associative connections that the Treatise describes as principles of merely 
imaginary union are refashioned in the Enquiry as perceivable, discoverable, and provable connecting 
principles: “That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted.”149 The 
proto-phenomenological analyses conducted in the Treatise, motivated as they are by Hume’s reasonings 
regarding the perception principle, failed to recognize that associative connections contribute to the 
mind’s systematicity even if they are “merely” imaginary and neither necessary nor inseparable. (Husserl 
was mistaken about the Enquiry being a “badly watered-down” version of the Treatise, which Husserl 
regarded as the first draft of a pure phenomenology, albeit a “sensualistically perverted” one.150 Although 
the Treatise’s explorations more closely resemble Husserl’s preferred style, the Enquiry contains 
important proto-phenomenological developments concerning the unity of mind.) Associative connections 
are precisely the epistemically justified, system-generating principles that Hume’s philosophy requires. 
After all, he takes matters of fact, including perceptions, to be real existences and thinks that principles 
pertinent to perceptions can be proven to be “real” or “have reality” in a way that does not entail their 
being necessary or inseparable.151 Hume comes to realize that associative connections between 
perceptions “have reality” in this revised sense, and provably so. 
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As prefigured in the Abstract, Hume employs analogical reasoning to explain why narrative 
compositions and compositions of genius, which necessarily have some plan or object and thus unity 
among the events and actions related therein, exhibit the same type of unity exhibited by the mind. Both 
“form a kind of Unity” in the imagination, a “rule [that] admits of no exception.”152 The key feature of 
narrative and historical productions is “unity, amidst all their diversity,” where relevant connections are 
typically those of cause and effect. The connecting principle at any given moment may be resemblance, 
contiguity, or causation. But some such principle, in almost all cases (save exceptions that prove the rule, 
such as madness) connects the narrative’s events, hence also the narrator’s and reader’s ideas of those 
events. More “perfect” productions present an unbroken chain of events that are connected via causation, 
the relation or connection that is “the strongest of all others; [and] also the most instructive.”153 
Biographies also presuppose uniting principles that connect the events of a person’s life “by showing their 
mutual dependence and relation.”154 As with the connections between narrative and historical events, the 
mutual dependence and relations between distinct events of a person’s history presuppose resemblance, 
contiguity, and/or causal connections—that is, a “certain required unity”—between the ideas that 
represent those events (ibid.). 
The Enquiry’s claims regarding associative connections are directly relevant to personal identity, 
meaning the unity of distinct experiences and our experience thereof. Hume’s analogical reasoning 
regarding narrative, historical, and bibliographical productions alludes (intentionally or not) to the 
Treatise claim that 
The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; 
pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations…. The 
comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that 
constitute the mind.155 
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The connections characteristic of productions and bibliographies are directly relevant to questions 
concerning personal identity. The mind is also a production that unfolds over time, where “a certain unity 
is requisite in all productions” just as a certain unity is requisite in all minds.156 When an epic poem’s 
miraculous events resemble each other and are contiguous in time, Hume holds that there is “sufficient 
unity to make them be comprehended in one fable or narration.”157 By analogy, when the object of a 
perception that is temporally contiguous to an appropriately related chain of perceptions stands in some 
relation to the object of simultaneous or immediately preceding perception, there is sufficient unity to 
make that perception comprehended in one person’s life. Hume’s revised reasonings, therefore, are 
directly relevant to personal identity despite the fact that the phrase “personal identity” does not occur in 
the Enquiry. 
 Even the forms of reasoning that Hume employs in the Treatise and Enquiry presuppose there 
being experienceable connections that constitute the unity of mind. Analogical reasoning presupposes 
there being some perceived resemblance between analogous objects that may also be causally related. 
Causal reasoning, furthermore, presupposes an interconnected admixture of three elements: an original 
impression, an idea qua copy of that impression, and a transition or “connexion” from the impression to 
the idea. Constant conjunctions of such object- and perception-types are also “connexions,” meaning 
connections that are perceivable and discoverable in light of their evident contribution to the systematicity 
of mind.158 
Issues pertinent to personal identity occur throughout the Enquiry. In Section 8, for example, 
Hume inquires: 
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Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from 
infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual 
change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail in the 
different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, 
have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons, and our 
observation of their conduct, could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our 
behaviour with regard to them.159 
Hume speaks freely of persons remaining the same despite the diversity of sentiments, inclinations, 
characters, conduct, and particular perceptions that constitute them. This line of reasoning is consistent 
with Section 3’s reasoning regarding the evident principles of connection between perceptions: 
Not only in any limited portion of life, a man’s actions have a dependence on each other, but also 
during the whole period of his duration, from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible to strike off 
one link, however minute, in this regular chain, without affecting the whole series of events, 
which follow.160 
The cited passages advance claims about the nature of personal identity; and fittingly, Hume employs the 
metaphor of an unbroken regular chain to emphasize the evident unity of different perceptions. This 
effectively redresses Hume’s second thoughts, as I have interpreted them: thoughts concerning what 
actually connects distinct perceptions in a way that is consistent with the true idea of the human mind. At 
the same time, the Enquiry preserves the Treatise claim that “this uniting principle among ideas is not to 
be consider’d as an inseparable connexion; for that has already been excluded from the imagination.”161 
The Enquiry also preserves the Treatise distinction between primary (necessary, inseparable, and “real”) 
connections and secondary (associative, imaginary, and customary) connections while allowing the latter 
to partially constitute the unity of mind.162 Hume’s revised reasonings, moreover, are more empirically 
and phenomenologically accurate, as Husserl and Whitehead would agree. Far from betraying Hume’s 
empiricism or rejecting any of his philosophical principles, Hume’s revised reasonings regarding and 
expressions of the perception principle enable him to embrace the proto-phenomenological and 
(epistemically qualified) metaphysical implications of his experiments. (Not surprisingly, the challenge of 
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explaining what connects distinct existences is endemic to forms of Humeanism defended in analytic 
metaphysics à la Lewis, Sider, and other Humean perdurantists.) 
We can paraphrase Hume’s revision most succinctly as follows: 
The mind never perceives or discovers any real, necessary, inseparable connections between 
distinct existences, including perceptions. [Treatise, Abstract, Appendix] 
The mind never perceives or discovers any necessary, inseparable connections between distinct 
existences, including perceptions. That said, the mind can perceive and discover associative 
connections between distinct perceptions; and these, taken together with the association-
generating relations on which they depend, sufficiently establish the mind’s evident unity. 
[Enquiry] 
Note that since the Enquiry no longer employs the word “real” in the technical sense of the Treatise, its 
omission in the second formulation is philosophically insignificant. Whether associative connections 
count as real is not a substantive philosophical issue, but a linguistic issue concerning whether a word 
would be more perspicuously employed in one way or another. Hume might want to avoid claiming that 
associative connections are real; it might seem possible for two perceptions to be associatively but not 
more-than-associatively, meaning necessarily or inseparably, connected. Alternatively, Hume might want 
to allow that associative connections really connect distinct perceptions, despite being neither necessary 
nor inseparable. Nothing substantive depends on this linguistic decision; Hume has already clarified and 
confirmed “what matters” epistemically and metaphysically. Hume’s revised reasonings regarding and 
expression of the perception principle effectively enable him to assert the Appendix’s proposed solution 
while preserving his unrenounceable principles. The Enquiry’s revisions satisfy the Appendix solution’s 
epistemic and metaphysical criteria. 
 
7. OBJECTIONS 
One might object that in Section 7, Hume reiterates the Treatise claim that we can never observe 




So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion, 
which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows 
another; but we never can observe any tye between them. They seem conjoined, but never 
connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing, which never appeared to our outward sense 
or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or 
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in 
philosophical reasonings, or common life.163 
This seems to undermine my claim that the Enquiry allows the mind to perceive and discover associative 
connections that unify distinct perceptions. 
The problem with the objection is that it ignores the context in which the words “connexion” and 
“tye” appear—a section titled “The Idea of Necessary Connexion” that focuses exclusively on beliefs 
concerning necessary, inseparable connections. The general strategy of the section is to clarify and 
(dis)confirm the idea of necessary connections by attempting to discover the impression that gives rise to 
that idea. Hume considers body-body causation, body-mind causation, and mind-mind causation, but 
concludes that the idea of necessary connection cannot be perceived in any particular instance of causal 
reasoning. This entails that the idea cannot underwrite causal reasoning.164 As in the Treatise, Hume once 
again takes himself to prove that we can neither perceive nor discover necessary connections, especially 
those we naturally but erroneously believe to hold between causes and effects. Instead, he grounds the 
idea of necessary connection in customary transitions between causes and effects, whereas historically, 
others had done the opposite. The words “connexion” and “tye” thus do not refer any connection 
whatsoever, but specifically the “idea of a necessary connexion among events”—where the word “events” 
encompasses not only perceptions, but also (putative) “natural objects.”165  
Hume goes on to claim that we feel or have an impression of “this customary transition of the 
imagination from one object to its usual attendant,” a transition he explicitly refers to as connection: 
This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination 
from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the 
idea of power or necessary connexion.166 
                                                     
163 Hume, Enquiry, 7.26/74; cf. 10.5/111. 
164 I am grateful to Sean Greenberg for helping elucidate the structure of Section 7. 
165 Hume, Enquiry, 7.28/75, 7.26/74. 




Hence we perceive (have an impression of) an epistemically relevant but unnecessary and separable 
connection: the customary transition of the imagination that nature has established or implanted within us 
as a general principle for the succession of perceptions. “When we say, therefore, that one object is 
[necessarily] connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our 
thought.”167 This is consistent with claiming that “we feel a customary connexion between the ideas,” 
meaning an associative connection generated by custom, and “transfer that feeling to the objects,” but 
never discover a necessary “connecting principle.”168 Hume’s recapitulation of Section 7 reiterates that 
we have impressions of customary connections but not necessary connections.169 The passage cited in the 
objection, therefore, does not pertain to associative connections. Hume’s critique of necessary 
connections in both the Treatise and Enquiry is consistent with allowing associative connections to be 
perceivable or discoverable principles of the mind’s unity. 
A different objection is that, if what I have said is correct, then the perceivability of associative 
connections entails that such connections must be common to not only perceptions, but also external 
objects. In the Treatise, Hume holds that “Every idea of a quality in an object passes thro’ an impression; 
and therefore every perceivable relation, whether of connexion or repugnance, must be common to both 
objects and impressions.”170 Assume that the author of the Enquiry also holds this position. Given that 
associative connections are perceivable relations between perceptions, they must be common to both 
extended objects and impressions. But this is absurd. Associative connections hold only between 
constituents of the mind.  
This objection inaccurately interprets the cited passage to refer to external objects. The dialectical 
context clearly indicates that this is not what Hume has mind. Prior to the cited passage, Hume argues that 
it is impossible for the idea of an object or external existence to represent something that is specifically 
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different from perceptions.171 Furthermore, he takes himself to have established the “certain maxim” that 
when we discover a connection or repugnance between objects, it ipso facto extends to impressions; and 
he qualifies this maxim: “tho’ the inverse proposition may not equally be true, that all the discoverable 
relations of impressions are common to objects.”172 The objection fails, therefore, whether one interprets 
“objects” to mean external objects or objects of perceptions. 
 
 8. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF HUME’S APPENDIX PROBLEM 
 Although I cannot hope to address all alternative accounts of Hume’s Appendix problem, 
especially those (belonging to Groups 2, 3, and 4) that disagree about its general character, differentiating 
my account from other Group 1 interpretations will help support my contention that it is more 
systematically satisfying while prefiguring some central features of the Humean frameworks that we will 
examine in Chapters Two and Three. Accordingly, I will focus on those accounts that identify genuine 
challenges for Hume’s philosophy, despite my disagreement as to whether they accurately describe 
Hume’s Appendix problem. The challenges raised, moreover, are germane to Husserl’s and Whitehead’s 
sustained engagement with Hume, as we will see. 
 Let us begin with Galen Strawson, a neo-Humean phenomenologist and proto-process-
philosophical proponent of psychism who recently supplemented his controversial interpretations of 
Hume’s theory of causation and Appendix problem with a controversial interpretation of Humeanism per 
se.173 Prima facie, my account might seem to accord with Strawson’s; for he holds that “within a year, 
Hume sees that he can’t maintain the view that [the idea of a mere bundle] is the true idea of the mind, 
although his empiricist principles commit him to the view that it is.”174 Everything depends on what one 
                                                     
171 Ibid., 1.4.5.19/241. 
172 Ibid., 1.4.5.20/242. 
173 G. Strawson, Selves, 301-04; Secret Connexion; Evident Connexion; “‘Humeanism.’” 




takes Hume’s empiricist principles to be, however, since they determine that to which Hume’s philosophy 
is wittingly or not committed. On this point (bracketing myriad others),175 Strawson and I disagree: 
Or rather, he sees that [“the true idea” is] not the idea of the mind that he’s worked with in his 
philosophy, although his empiricist principles commit him to working with no other. This is his 
problem: the empiricistically “true” idea of the mind isn’t consistent with his philosophical 
commitments and presuppositions considered as a whole…. His philosophy relies—essentially—
on a richer idea of the mind or self than his empiricist principles allow him.176 
Strawson maintains that Hume’s philosophy relies essentially on and unequivocally presupposes 
perceptions being really connected, such that the mind is “something more” than a system of perceptions 
and commits him to “the existence of some sort of real continuity of mind or self.”177 Being committed to 
real continuity, however, is inconsistent with Hume’s empiricist principles, the perception principle in 
particular. Hence Hume allegedly “realizes that he needs the real thing, the real connection, not just the 
constant conjunction that is all that is represented in the empirically respectable ‘true idea.’”178 
These claims exemplify the principal problem with Strawson’s account: it rests on an erroneous 
interpretation of what Hume’s empiricist principles are and what his philosophy as a whole requires. 
Relatedly, Strawson’s account overlooks the subtle shift that Hume’s thought (thanks in part to Kames) 
undergoes between the Appendix and Enquiry, and thereby fails to satisfy the Kames and Enquiry 
Criteria.179 This is ironic, for Strawson’s interpretation is inconsistent with his recognition both of the 
                                                     
175 I disagree with G. Strawson that Hume’s skepticism precludes him from advancing the kind of epistemically 
qualified metaphysical thesis that I have attributed to him. This aligns me with Cottrell, “Minds.” 
176 G. Strawson, Evident Connexion, 33-34; cf. Selves, 358ff.; “‘All My Hopes Vanish,’” 181. 
177 G. Strawson, Evident Connexion, 46. 
178 Ibid., 48n29. 
179 In a footnote, G. Strawson refers to Hume’s praise of Kames’s account but forgoes considering its significance 




Enquiry’s authoritative status in interpreting Hume’s philosophy180 and the fact that Hume addresses the 
Appendix problem in the Enquiry.181 
Strawson takes Hume’s philosophy to be inexorably committed to the existence of real 
connections that constitute the mind as a real continuity. Although Strawson acknowledges that (though 
does not explain why)182 the word “real” functions as a technical term only in the Treatise, Abstract, and 
Appendix, he takes the technical sense of “real” to apply to the Enquiry’s claim that the principle of 
connection between different perceptions is evident to the mind, despite the fact that the Enquiry does not 
employ the term “real” in that or any relevant passage.183 Furthermore, as I argued above and as Pitson 
and others have recognized, the dialectical context of Section 3 (titled “Of the Association of Ideas”) and 
related sections (excluding Section 9) concerns only associative connections.184 There is therefore no 
textual basis, especially in the text that Strawson rightly recognizes to contain the authoritative statement 
of Hume’s philosophy, for interpreting Hume’s shift as allowing the mind to perceive real connections, let 
alone real continuity. Were Strawson’s interpretation correct, the Enquiry would renounce one of Hume’s 
unrenounceable principles: the perception principle. Yet Hume consistently claims in both the 
Advertisement and subsequent writings that the Treatise and Enquiry present the same philosophical 
principles. Renouncing the perception principle, moreover, would undermine the epistemological 
                                                     
180 “We can read the Enquiry back into the Treatise, when trying to understand his considered view; we cannot go 
the other way. Everything in the Treatise that is or appears incompatible with the Enquiry must be discarded. 
Nothing in the Treatise can legitimately be used to throw light on any passage in the Enquiry unless two conditions 
are fulfilled: the passage in the Enquiry must be unclear (this is not often the case), and the passage from the 
Treatise must not be incompatible with anything in the Enquiry that is not in dispute. Even when a passage from the 
Treatise is called in evidence, its claim to make a contribution to interpretation must be weak when compared with 
competing claims from passages in the Enquiry other than the passage under consideration” (G. Strawson, “Objects 
and Power,” 32). 
181 G. Strawson, Evident Connexion, 35. 
182 Ibid., 103n3; cf. “‘All My Hopes Vanish,’” 196n13. 
183 “Here [Hume] refers to a real connection of precisely the sort that the empiricistically ‘true idea’ of the human 
mind can’t countenance” (G. Strawson, Evident Connexion, 35; cf. “‘All My Hopes Vanish,’” 186). 
184 “In fact, it is clear from the context of Hume’s remark that his ‘principle of connexion’ is an allusion to the 
association of ideas of which we are aware by reflection and not a reference to some ‘real’ underlying connection 
unavailable to experience. There is no evidence here of Hume renouncing the view of the relation between the mind 




foundation of the critical and constructive phases of Hume’s analyses of causation and the mind. The 
magnitude of Hume’s crisis, by his own lights, is considerably less than Strawson alleges.  
Nor does Hume’s shift consist in renouncing the provably true idea of the mind asserted 
throughout Book I, including that Book’s conclusion, Book II, the Abstract, Appendix, and the 
posthumously published Dialogues that Hume continued to refine until his final years.185 Instead the 
Enquiry allows, without violating the perception principle or true idea of the mind, that the mind can 
perceive and discover those connections—association-generating relations and associative connections—
in virtue of which it is unified. This revised reasoning constitutes a direct response to the loosening 
(putatively) entailed by the separability and conceivability principles, which is precisely (even by 
Strawson’s lights) when all of Hume’s hopes vanish. The magnitude of Hume’s problem may have 
temporarily caused all of his hopes to vanish, but the evidence does not suggest that it motivates him to 
reject a provably true idea or renounce an unrenounceable principle.186 
Strawson is correct that, were Hume to assume more about the mind than his empiricist principles 
allow, for example its being a real continuity, then that assumption would threaten his philosophy as a 
whole. But Strawson is incorrect that Hume’s second thoughts in the Appendix pertain to the fact that “no 
suitable continuing entity (or observable real connection) can have a legitimate place in his 
philosophy.”187 Hume’s second thoughts derive from but are not tantamount to this fact. As Hume’s letter 
to Kames and the Enquiry help show, Hume does not continue to reason that only a continuing entity or 
observable real connection would explain the mind’s unity. Observable associative connections, taken 
together with the association-generating relations that they presuppose, are jointly sufficient and 
empiricistically innocuous. 
                                                     
185 At the conclusion of Book I, Hume reiterates that it is “that succession of perceptions, which constitutes our self 
or person” (Treatise, 1.4.7.3/265). In Book II, Hume reiterates that the self is “that succession of related ideas and 
impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” (ibid., 2.1.2.2/277). What we call “self” or 
“mind” is “that connected succession of perceptions”—nothing more, nothing less (ibid., 2.1.2.3/277 (emphasis 
mine)). 
186 On this point, I agree with Garrett that it is in complete accordance with Hume’s empiricism for the mind to be 
able to perceive and discover systematizing connections that are not real, in the technical sense (Cognition and 
Commitment). 




Even if Hume’s philosophy and Humeanism require more than Hume’s empiricist principles 
allow, the range of evidence that I have considered suggests that Hume’s second thoughts do not concern 
a problem of system-undermining magnitude, though it does extend beyond the section concerning 
personal identity that make the problem most evident. By the time of the Enquiry, Hume (thanks in part to 
Kames) rejects needing something real. Hume comes to believe that, despite having once lost hope, he 
does not need to abandon his empiricist account of the mind, the perception principle, or his philosophy 
as a whole. Hume delivers on the Appendix’s promissory note that while the difficulty initially presents 
itself as being too difficult for his understanding, more mature reflections may enable him to discover a 
hypothesis that reconciles the apparent inconsistency of the perception principle and true idea of the mind. 
Given that Hume’s philosophy inspired Husserl’s and Whitehead’s divergent reflections on 
continuity, unity, association, and constitution more broadly, it is important to understand why neither 
continuity nor “something more” than associative connections is the problem that worries Hume. Hume 
grounds apparent continuity and unity in the fundamentally discontinuous, discrete, and atomistic nature 
of perception. Correlatively, Hume’s problem concerns the unity of perception given that perception is 
discontinuous, as Hume takes his experiments (for example, those concerning sound sleep) to prove. 
Hume does not take perception’s discontinuity to conflict with the mind’s systematicity, however. 
Associative connections and association-generating relations unify perceptions without generating “real 
continuity.” Thus it is possible for the parts of mind to be both discontinuous and systematically 
connected, pace Strawson. 
 That said, Strawson’s account identifies a genuine problem with Hume’s philosophy, hence 
highlights an explanatory challenge endemic to various forms of Humeanism, including Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism: the mind involving “something more” than 
associative connections, association-generating relations, and discontinuous, discrete, and atomistic 
succession. The explanatory challenge is to account for how succession per se, temporality per se, the 
experience of continuity and unity in general, and the experience of the mind’s continuity and unity in 




copies or their objects can “remain” in the mind to make mental operations like recall possible. Suppose I 
have an impression, then an idea that represents that impression’s object. Thereafter, my mind is 
constituted by different perceptions involving other objects. Where are the former perceptions and their 
objects? What makes possible my present memory of previously experienced objects? Furthermore, how 
can I presently remember having had past experiences? (Nota bene: It is precisely these kinds of questions 
that enabled Husserl, following sustained engagement with Hume’s Treatise, to recognize insuperable 
difficulties with his Humean models of temporal awareness and the reduced ego.) In Strawson’s words, 
If the bundle view of the mind is the right one, then, there is no possible structure or mechanism 
given which the occurrence of the original [impression] or [idea] can be the basis of the 
occurrence of any later, temporally non-contiguous [idea of the same object]. The whole 
phenomenon of memory, furthermore, must be a complete illusion.188 
Strawson suggests that Humean causation is not adequate to the explanatory task because causal relations, 
once empiricistically reconstructed, connect only immediate predecessors and successors.189 Strawson’s 
criticism highlights important questions regarding Hume’s (hence Humeanism’s) capacity to explain 
experience’s intentionality, conditions for the possibility of the experienceable unity of experience, and 
the mind being the kind of “place” where memory and other mental operations like association take 
place—precisely those questions that would occupy Husserl’s and Whitehead’s attention. 
 This brings us to Garrett’s interpretation,190 which I invoke not to criticize but to appreciate since, 
like Strawson, Garrett identifies a genuine problem for Hume’s philosophy.191 Garrett argues that what 
Hume came to realize “was simply that his own conception of the mind did after all require just what he 
remarked he could not provide: ‘a notion of the place’ where all and only the perceptions of each mind 
occur.”192 Hume’s second thoughts, as Garrett interprets them, concern the need yet simultaneous 
unavailability of such a conception.193 Bracketing disagreement as to whether this is the problem that 
                                                     
188 Ibid., 58. 
189 Ibid., 58-59; cf. Garrett, “Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts,” 22, 34. 
190 Garrett’s earlier interpretation finds expression in “Hume’s Self-Doubts” and Cognition and Commitment, 163ff. 
191 G. Strawson identifies a similar difficulty regarding Hume’s need of a “place of residence” for the mind’s 
operations, but one that by Garrett’s lights is less radical than the problem Garrett proposes (“Rethinking Hume’s 
Second Thoughts,” 36-37n23). 
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vexed Hume,194 Garrett identifies a genuine problem for Hume’s philosophy which, given that it concerns 
“where” and therefore how experience can be unified, is directly relevant to a pseudo-problem that 
Whitehead explicitly associated with Hume and (for a time) took to undermine his initial model of 
personal identity. Whitehead’s second model postulates a “place” where unification occurs: a “formless 
receptacle,” the sole function of which is to unify distinct experiences within the same manifold or life. 
Whitehead’s receptacle model, as we will see in Chapter Three, has its own problems; but the “problem” 
of requiring a notion of the place where all and only the perceptions of each mind occur is not one of 
them, thanks to Whitehead’s consideration of Hume. Unlike Hume, whom Garrett rightly criticizes for 
holding that certain types of perceptions are “placeless” while forgoing explanation as to how such 
perceptions can be unified in one mind (versus any other), Whitehead recognizes the importance of not 
“attenuating” personal history into a genetic relation between distinct occasions of experience—especially 
in light of the fact that the fundamental constitution of experience for Whitehead, as for the later Husserl, 
is non-spatial and non-temporal.  
Inukai’s interpretation of Hume’s Appendix problem also highlights a genuine problem in 
Hume’s philosophy by emphasizing the Treatise’s inconsistency regarding whether association-
generating relations are perceivable. Inukai also rightly points out that “it is misguided to assume that the 
associative principles initially unite perceptions into a whole bundle,” since associative connections 
cannot be “initial”: they presuppose initial association-generating relations that are dependent parts of 
complex perceptions.195 However, Inukai incorrectly infers from this that Hume’s Appendix problem 
cannot concern whether associative principles generate bundles of perceptions. Although associative 
connections per se are not sufficient conditions for the mind’s unity, they are necessary; otherwise a mind 
could be in a state of “perpetual reverie,” to employ Kames’s phrase. Similarly, association-generating 
                                                     
194 My criticism, as with G. Strawson, would rely essentially on the Kames and Enquiry Criteria that I have 
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rejecting several principles defended in the Treatise, among them one of the “Three Central Doctrines” that Garrett 
refers to as “Placeless Perceptions.” This, in turn, would contradict Hume’s statements that the Treatise and Enquiry 
contain the same principles. 




relations per se are not sufficient conditions for the mind’s unity, yet they too are necessary; otherwise a 
mind would be unable to associate and form complex ideas as it almost invariably does. Association-
generating relations and associative connections are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the 
mind’s unity. Hume’s considered position is that association-generated relations, as dependent parts of 
complex perceptions, are immediately perceived along with their relata. This almost invariably causes the 
mind’s associative principles to form a new perception (often a less lively perception) of the objects of 
those relata in addition to the relation itself.196 The contributions of both association-generating relations 
and associative connections, therefore, explains the evident unity of mind even as the liveliness of 
experience shifts radically from sensations to thoughts. 
Relatedly, Inukai errs in claiming that the Appendix problem concerns the “radical 
independence” of perceptions because she misconstrues the modality of Hume’s claims regarding the 
dependence and independence of particular perceptions. As noted above, Hume claims only that it is 
possible for perceptions to be ontologically independent; he does not hold that they are in fact 
ontologically independent.197 Thus it is inaccurate to maintain that “perceptions are for Hume completely 
loose, bearing no connections to any other perceptions and anything else whatsoever.”198 And from this, it 
is inaccurate to infer that Hume’s Appendix problem concerns the incompatibility of the existence of 
unified bundles and the radical independence of individual perceptions. Like Strawson, Inukai takes 
Hume’s Appendix problem, by Hume’s own lights, to be insoluble within his philosophical system. This 
contradicts not only the letter and spirit of Hume’s letter to Kames and the alterations introduced in the 
Enquiry, but also Hume’s reiterated assertion that the Enquiry contains his corrected reasonings regarding 
and authoritative expressions of his philosophical principles. We do not need to look as far ahead as 
James to find an empiricist solution to Hume’s Appendix problem.199 The Enquiry is far enough, and the 
Dialogues lend support. 
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9. TRANSITION VIA HUME’S ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF TIME 
 Though I have not emphasized it, Hume’s contention that the true idea of time represents a 
discontinuous, rapid, irregular, and atomistic succession of perceptions plays an important role in his 
account of how the mind is individuated by (in that it is) such an interconnected succession. Both Husserl 
and Whitehead laud Hume for raising essential questions about the relationship between continuity and 
discontinuity vis-à-vis temporality, temporal awareness, and the constitution thereof, despite the fact that 
each takes Hume to fall short of recognizing the atemporal constitution of temporality by a more 
fundamental process (inner time-consciousness and ontological becoming, respectively).200  
Husserl’s initial “schematic model” of time and temporal awareness shares several affinities with 
Hume’s (by way of Brentano). This includes locating the constitution of temporality in the nature of 
apprehension à la Humean association and, tellingly, conceiving of “the phenomenologically reduced ego 
[as] nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own 
interconnected unity.”201 Returning to Hume’s Treatise helped Husserl recognize insuperable difficulties 
with his Humean model. More specifically, direct engagement with the Treatise’s analysis of time vis-à-
vis individuation motivated Husserl to develop a model that attributes temporality’s constitution not to 
apprehension, since apprehension (like Humean association) presupposes the constitution of temporality, 
but rather to an atemporal, continuous manifold that Husserl refers to as “absolute” or “inner time-
consciousness”—the ground of association. Even after Husserl worked out the details of this model, he 
continued to engage with Hume’s philosophy more than with Kant’s, despite exaggerated claims about 
Husserl taking a “transcendental turn” to “transcendental idealism,” a description Husserl eventually 
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regretted and rejected.202 Hume’s theory of association became especially important in Husserl’s later 
writings on active and passive synthesis and “primal impressions,” a term Husserl adapts from Hume. 
Whitehead also locates temporality’s constitution in an atemporal manifold, but takes 
consideration of Zeno’s paradoxes to entail that that manifold is discontinuous. In addition, Whitehead 
adopts a form of atomism that accords with Hume’s claim (via Malezieu) that “existence in itself belongs 
only to unity,”203 meaning the unity of experiences, without adopting Hume’s view that experiences are 
capable of independent existence. Whitehead rejects the notion of independent existence.204 
Consideration of Hume’s analysis of the idea of time will enable us to appreciate the profound 
influence that he had on Husserl and Whitehead, who take Hume’s philosophical project to have radically 
different implications. 
 Hume purports to examine time by first clarifying and confirming the true idea of time.205 One of 
Hume’s intentions is to prove that belief in “time itself,” as if time were objective, mind-independent, or 
separable from perception, is unjustified. The reason is that experiencing time itself would require a direct 
perception (and more specifically, a primary impression) of time per se, independently of the succession 
of perception. Hume’s principles rule out this possibility; the notion of “time itself” cannot be verified 
empirically or experientially.206 
                                                     
202 As Husserl puts it in a letter to Abbe Baudin in 1934: “No ordinary ‘realist’ has ever been as realistic and 
concrete as I, the phenomenological ‘idealist’ (a word which I no longer use)” (quoted in Miller, Husserl’s Theory of 
Perception, 197.) Miller’s elaboration is apt: “Still, if ‘idealism’ is a misleading name for Husserl’s phenomenology, 
so is ‘realism.’ Indeed, Husserl’s phenomenology does not entail that physical objects are ‘nothing but’ bundles of 
experiences, sense-data, or noemata, but neither does it presuppose or entail that physical objects as we ordinarily 
think of them do, in fact, exist. Husserl’s phenomenological theory is neutral to this aspect of the idealist-realist 
debate, and I consider this to be among its virtues” (ibid., 197-98).  
203 Hume, Treatise, 1.2.2.3/30. 
204 “The misconception which has haunted philosophic literature throughout the centuries is the notion of 
‘independent existence.’ There is no such mode of existence; every entity is only to be understood in terms of the 
way in which it is interwoven with the rest of the Universe” (Whitehead, “Immortality,” 687). 
205 Observing the title of Hume’s section, “Of the ideas of space and time,” Baxter contends that the way in which 
Hume oscillates between analyzing the ideas of space and time and time and space themselves is largely responsible 
for 1.2’s neglect among contemporary scholars (“Hume’s Theory,” 105). 
206 “From the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to 




Hume argues that the idea of time derives from the form of perception and more specifically from 
perception of experience’s succession: “[the idea of time is] deriv’d from the succession of our 
perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of 
sensation.”207 Correlatively, one cannot conceive of a time “when there was no succession or change in 
any real existence,” meaning a transition from perception to perception.208 On this point, Husserl and 
Whitehead would tentatively agree; both take experience’s temporality to be “empirically” primary vis-à-
vis objective temporality.  
Hume’s argument relies on there being an essential analogy between the ideas of continuity and 
discontinuity and the idea of time because he takes conclusions about the former to entail conclusions 
about the latter. Does the idea of time represent a continuous or discontinuous whole? To discover which, 
Hume contends that we must determine whether the idea of time is infinitely divisible. If it is, then time 
and our idea thereof are continuous. If not, then time and our idea thereof are discontinuous. 
Hume takes causal and analogical reasoning to discover the truth of the latter. The reason, he 
argues, is that the capacity of the mind is finite, which entails that it may arrive at an end when dividing 
its perceptions. The imagination “reaches a minimum,” in other words, “and may raise up to itself an idea 
[or impression], of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminish’d without a 
total annihilation.”209 Such minimal perceptions (Hume’s example is the simple idea of a grain of sand) 
do not consist of parts that can be distinguished or separated, hence of nothing that is different or 
separable. Similarly, since perception is nothing more than a succession of individual perceptions, each of 
which is finitely divisible into perceptual minima, a succession of such perceptions is also divisible into 
minima—temporal minima. Perception qua succession, in other words, is discontinuous and atomistic. If 
the idea of time derives from the succession of perceptions that is the mind, truly conceived, then time 
and our idea thereof are discontinuous and atomistic. 
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The idea of time is a perception copied from a more vivacious perception of the rapid succession 
of perceptions, meaning a “number” or multiplicity of perceptions. This is why Hume holds that the idea 
of time arises from the manner in which perception unfolds, meaning the form of experience. Succession 
entails there being a multiplicity of moments, but a multiplicity of moments, like any multiplicity, is 
asymmetrically grounded by the unities that compose it; in this case, temporal minima.210 The notion of 
so-called objective time, therefore, derives from the true idea of time that represents it as a discontinuous 
multiplicity composed by atomic minima. 
Given Hume’s contention that only unities and not multiplicities have real existence, does this not 
entail that the mind qua succession cannot be a unity or unified, pace even the author of the Enquiry? 
Given that the temporal and perceptual minima that allegedly constitute time, the mind, and our ideas 
thereof are real existences that constitute a multiplicity that is not a real existence, this seems like a 
damning problem for Hume’s philosophy. Relatedly, Husserl and Whitehead will develop more nuanced 
and powerful mereologies than Hume’s, as we will see. 
Hume goes on to argue that the experience of succession neither requires nor implies 
regularity.211 This means that the notion of the steady progression of an analog time-piece or the 
resonance frequency standard of an atomic clock do not accurately represent time or our idea thereof. On 
the contrary, Hume takes his reasonings to justify the belief that the irregular, chaotic, and unpredictable 
rapidity of the discontinuous way in which perceptions succeed each other constitutes the true idea of 
time. Although we “imagine we can form the idea of a time and duration, without any change or 
succession,” the fiction of mind-independent time and duration asymmetrically presupposes the immanent 
succession of “perpetually perishing” perceptions, as Whitehead (following Locke) might put it.212 
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Perception does not consist of such shorter and longer durations of objective time, but of a flux, a notion 
crucial for both Husserl and Whitehead. The belief that one perception “lasts longer” than another derives 
from its relative vivacity vis-à-vis predecessors and successors. Forming such a belief, moreover, 
presupposes not only the passage of time, but also an association of ideas—hence an associative 
connection between two perceptions. 
Only after having clarified and confirmed the origin of time and our idea thereof does Hume 
address the principle of individuation that would be crucially important for Husserl’s circa-1905 
reflections on individuation, continuity, mereology, time, temporal awareness, and constitution. The 
principle of individuation, by Hume’s lights, “is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of 
any object, thro’ a suppos’d variation of time.”213 This critical assessment is directly relevant to how 
Hume conceives of time, identity, the mind, and personal identity. The reason is that the same guiding 
principle of all human action, namely perception of pleasure and pain (especially avoidance of the latter), 
generates fictional products of the imagination which, despite their falsehood, are often connected with 
strong beliefs.214 The avoidance of pain in particular generates a “great a propension to ascribe an identity 
to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted 
existence thro’ the whole course of our lives.”215—a pleasurable belief, perhaps, despite the unreality of 
what it represents and the suffering entailed by ignorance.216 Hume’s analysis of the idea of time parallels 
his analysis of the idea of personal identity, therefore, in that both arise from the irregular succession of 
perceptions that is the mind, despite our inability to perceive necessary, inseparable connections. 
The account of Hume’s Appendix problem that I have defended helps illuminate Hume’s proto-
phenomenological report that “I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
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observe any thing but the perception.”217 There are only rapidly successive perceptions and their 
connection—or so one, for example Husserl, might think, until he managed to find the pure ego.
                                                     




II. HUME’S INFLUENCE ON HUSSERL’S 
THEORY OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 
The aftermath of the so-called analytic/continental divide has seen a resurgence of interest in 
Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, especially in metaphysics and philosophy of mind vis-à-vis cognitive 
science.1 The systematic explorations conducted throughout Husserl’s corpus have had wide-ranging and 
far-reaching implications for issues concerning dependence, grounding, mereology, truth-making, the 
(“hard”) mind-body problem, perception, mental content, internalism/externalism, intentionality, 
phenomenal character, cognitive phenomenology, neurophenomenology, and empathy. 
Relatedly, in speaking of Husserl’s philosophy, I mean to intimate that his contributions 
encompass more than just phenomenology and phenomenological methodology. Husserl’s 
phenomenology serves as the cornerstone of a system comprising logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and 
value theory.2 Here I will focus only on those aspects that are germane to my primary thesis; to wit, that 
the fundamental shift in Husserl’s thought regarding time and temporal awareness, which had extensive 
consequences for his philosophy as a whole, was occasioned principally by Husserl’s reengaging with 
Hume’s philosophy between 1905-9. The argument that I will advance not only challenges the doxa 
among Husserl scholars that Brentano served as the predominant catalyst for Husserl’s mature theory of 
time-consciousness, but also helps illuminate Husserl’s philosophical motivations for postulating 
something as seemingly esoteric as “absolute consciousness,” a continuous intentional manifold that 
atemporally constitutes temporality and (scandalously) itself. 
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Hume’s “logic” or “science of human nature,” as we saw in Chapter One, aims to address and 
redress perennial philosophical problems and ground all scientific disciplines by examining the nature of 
the mind. Husserl’s ambitions and approach accord with Hume’s in this respect. However, Husserl 
departs from Hume regarding what kind of foundation is required and what the contents of the mind are 
and make possible. 
Husserl discusses Hume extensively in several major works, with bookends at the Logical 
Investigations of 1900-1 and Crisis of European Sciences of 1936, Husserl’s final major contribution. 
Against Hume and Humean “psychologism”—a pejorative that Husserl was especially anxious to avoid 
given Frege’s scathing3 and perhaps inaccurate4 review of Husserl’s first major work—Husserl holds that 
scientific disciplines can be grounded only by ideal (non-spatiotemporal and multiply-instantiable) 
objective meanings. Science requires an a priori foundation, in other words, though in a different sense of 
necessity and universality than that envisioned by Kant. Husserl’s sense derives from phenomenological 
analysis of things themselves (den Sachen selbst), which he distinguishes from Kantian things-in-
themselves (Dinge an sich selbst): 
Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological 
clarity and definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin. Logical concepts, as valid 
thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of an ideational intuition 
founded on certain experiences, and must admit of indefinite reconfirmation…. We must go back 
to the “things themselves.”5 
Husserl takes the propositions that constitute all scientific theories to stand in objective, essential 
entailment relations regardless of contingent psychological facts about how humans reason about them.6 
Husserl’s first landmark work, the Logical Investigations, criticizes Hume for attempting to 
ground all factual sciences in psychological facts and failing to see the necessity of objective meanings: 
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Instead of looking to the semantic character of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, 
[Hume] loses himself in the genetic connections which give names an associative relation to the 
objects of a class. He quite fails to mention, and does not see with operative lucidity, that 
[objective] generality evinces itself in our subjective experience.7 
Husserl counterbalances this criticism with praise, however—a pattern that will recur in Husserl’s future 
engagements with Hume, as we will see. Unlike Berkeley’s “extreme empiricism,” Hume’s “moderate 
empiricism” laudably attempts to preserve an a priori justification for sciences concerning the other tine 
of Hume’s fork, namely relations of ideas, including logic and mathematics.8 Furthermore, Husserl allows 
that while Hume’s theory of abstract ideas “was an extreme case of error from the angle of logic and 
epistemology,” we should 
vindicate for it the glory of having shown the way to a psychological theory of abstraction…. 
Hume’s genetic analyses certainly cannot claim theoretical completeness and finality, since they 
lack a foundation in an adequate descriptive analysis. This does not, however, mean that they do 
not contain valuable trains of thought, which could not escape notice and have also had a fruitful 
effect.9 
The emergence of Brentano’s and Husserl’s phenomenologies are foremost among these fruitful effects, 
the latter of which Husserl explicitly opposes to his “Humean,” psychologistic contemporaries.10 
The hallmark of Husserl’s phenomenology is its theory of intentionality. Any experience that is 
about or directed at something is so directed in virtue of an ideal content (akin to a Fregean eternal 
thought) which determines the mode of presentation of the act’s object. We can schematize the Logical 
Investigations’ basic theory of intentionality as follows: 
act [real] — content [ideal] —[intend]→ object [real or ideal] 
Husserl comes to add significant structure and background to this basic schema, especially following the 
“transcendental turn” inaugurated around 1907 and codified in Ideas I, II, and III. Note that the Logical 
Investigation’s schema makes no mention of a subject. This is not an accident. In the first edition, Husserl 
follows Hume in holding that “the phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore nothing peculiar, floating 
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above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity.”11 That said, 
Husserl’s starting point of experiences’ intentionality differs markedly from Hume’s. Husserl follow 
Brentano in recognizing that experience exhibits more structure and provides access to a greater range of 
objects than Hume’s atomistic perceptions. As Husserl’s philosophy develops, the basic premise of 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality remains the same: experiences can be directed at objects, including 
objects that represent ideal objective meanings, in virtue of directly experienceable ideal contents that are 
“entertained” in real acts of consciousness.12 
The fact that real acts can intend ideal objects (for instance, the ideal objective meaning <not both 
p and not-p> can be represented by the phrase “the law of non-contradiction”) is crucial for Husserl’s 
philosophical project. The reason is that the ability to access ideal objective meanings grounds all 
scientific inquiry, even empirical sciences. Husserl takes scientific method to involve “zigzagging” 
between “the givenness of something itself,” meaning an object or meaning as given immediately in 
experience, “but then going back critically to the results already obtained” to refine and systematize one’s 
judgments.13 The process of zigzagging in the science of phenomenology carries a special requirement: 
the phenomenologist must “bracket,” “suspend,” or “phenomenologically reduce” various features of 
presented objects to attend to one’s consciousness of those objects.14 More specifically, 
phenomenological epoché (the Greek word for “abstain”) involves temporarily suspending 
presuppositions about the existence and nature of the material world, though phenomenological analysis 
will ultimately reveal how the presentation of the material world, or the material world as given, depends 
on consciousness’ intentional constitution of its constituents. Note that this is compatible with realism, 
the view that the material world does not depend for its existence on consciousness. Husserl may be a 
realist about material objects and a “transcendental idealist” (a phrase he eventually regretted and 
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rejected) about contents; for him, constitution is not creation.15 Put differently, constitution can serve as 
experience’s “principle of unity” without being “real” in the technical sense of Hume’s Treatise and 
Appendix. 
 Husserl’s takes his theory of intentionality to ground transcendental logic, which is 
“transcendental” in that the domain about which it reasons concerns the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience and scientific inquiry. The fact that experience immediately presents itself as 
meaningful entails that transcendental logic involves analysis of not only experience’s syntactical and 
structural features, but also its semantical features; in particular, the ideal objective meanings involved in 
intentional acts. The term “logical” in Husserl’s investigations (Logical Investigations and otherwise), 
therefore, encompasses more than formal logic. Like Hume’s logic of human nature and Whitehead’s 
logic of experience (as we will see in Chapter Three), Husserl’s takes transcendental logic to ground 
formal logic. His epistemology is Humean in this sense. The upshot is that returning to things themselves, 
or objects as meaningfully experienced from the first-person perspective, provides precisely what a 
phenomenologically grounded philosophical system must: the a priori grounds of experience and 
scientific inquiry.  
This approach to the grounding of experience would not have been possible without Hume. From 
the beginning, Hume’s philosophy exerted profound influence on Husserl, who confessed: 
In the context of my studies, which at the beginning of the 1890’s were for some time 
predominantly epistemological, I intensively studied and thought about Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume—Hume before all, and Hume time and time again.16 
Sustained engagement with Hume’s philosophy proved to be pivotal at several points during Husserl’s 
development. Edith Stein notes that by Husserl’s own estimation, Hume was one of his two greatest 
influences: “When one day we asked Husserl which philosophers had had the greatest influence on the 
development of his own thought, he mentioned Descartes and Hume.”17 As Husserl’s thought developed 
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his philosophy became increasingly indebted to Hume’s Treatise, which Husserl’s final major work takes 
to “represent… a great historical event.”18 (In the same breath, however, Husserl belittles the Enquiry for 
being “badly watered down” in comparison, despite the more proto-phenomenologically accurate 
observations regarding the mind’s principles of connection that the Enquiry allows, as I argued in Chapter 
One.) In the Epilogue to Ideas II (published in 1931), Husserl goes so far as to say that 
Hume’s Treatise contains the first systematic sketch of a pure, though not eidetic, 
phenomenology, and, in particular, Volume I of it is the first sketch of a comprehensive [albeit 
“sensualistically perverted”] phenomenology of cognition.19 
Hume’s Treatise provided the first systematic sketch of Husserl’s conception of the ego, which like Hume 
he thought to be nothing over and above (or below) experiences’ “interconnected unity.” Yet pace the 
author of the Treatise and Appendix, Husserl views these experiences as self-evidently unified: 
The self-evident fact that the sensory moments, the colour-moment, the shape-moment and other 
immanent determinations, really belong to the unity of intuition, are moments making it up, 
cannot in any manner be interpreted away.20 
Following the revisions that were motivated by Husserl’s rereading of Hume, the second edition of the 
Investigations includes a revisionary footnote wherein Husserl declares that where he once could not find 
the pure ego, he has “since managed to find it.”21 
I will argue that Husserl’s initial “schematic model” of time and temporal awareness counts as 
another Humean draft that Husserl—specifically as a result of reengaging with Hume’s philosophy—
realized that he had to revise. I will focus on the exceptionally fruitful period of 1905-9, wherein 
engaging with Hume’s analysis of time vis-à-vis individuation proved pivotal for a decisive shift in 
Husserl’s thought. Husserl’s later engagements with Hume will help corroborate my claims. 
The full expression of Husserl’s phenomenology, in approximation, is that acts of intentional 
consciousness involve a subject that harbors a background of individual and collective ideal meanings. In 
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virtue of these, the experience of objects is possible, meaningful, and prescribes a horizon of related 
meanings that motivate the continuous flow of experience from moment to moment. 
(background)  subject — act — meaning → object  (horizon) 
Underlying this basic structure of intentionality is a fundamental “level” or dimension of intentionality 
that makes experience, the experience of temporality, and indeed the temporality of experience possible. 
Husserl’s mature account of constitution entails that time itself is constituted in the atemporal form of 
what he calls “absolute consciousness” or “inner time-consciousness,” which as we will see is 
surprisingly akin to Whitehead’s idiosyncratic conception of ultimate process. 
 
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT YET MOST DIFFICULT PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
Husserl took the analysis of time-consciousness to be “perhaps the most important in the whole of 
phenomenology.” Yet he also took that analysis to be “the most difficult of all phenomenological 
problems.”22 
Achieving clarity about the most important yet most difficult phenomenological problem has 
been exacerbated by Stein’s preparation of materials published in 1928 under the title, Vorlesungen zur 
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewussteins (henceforth “Time”). Stein not only arranged in 
chronological disorder texts as old as 1901 and as new as 1917, but also replaced technical terms 
employed in earlier writings (for example, primary memory, now-perception, and primary expectation) 
with technical terms employed in later writings (retention, primal impression, and protention). The shift 
in Husserl’s terminology is not merely terminological: it marks a philosophical advance. 
Given the difficulty of the problem per se and the difficulties introduced by Stein’s editing (in 
concert with Husserl’s willingness to publish such a mélange), it is no surprise that there have been lively 
debates about Husserl’s theories of time and temporal awareness. The recent publication in German of the 
                                                     





Bernau Manuscripts and C-Manuscripts, written in 1917-8 and 1929-34, respectively, has enlivened and 
enriched these debates, for Husserl subjects both his initial and subsequent theories to detailed scrutiny. 
Despite the resurgence of interest, commentators have overlooked a crucial reason as to why 
Husserl’s theory changed: his reconsideration of Hume. This oversight has generated historical and 
systematic inaccuracies in interpreting Husserl’s theory. Adequately appreciating Hume’s influence on 
Husserl remedies these inaccuracies and clarifies how Husserl’s mature theory of time-consciousness, 
while drawing measured inspiration from Hume, rectifies Humean shortcomings of Husserl’s initial 
“schematic model.” Hume prompts Husserl to rethink the constitution of continuity and identity over time 
in addition to temporality and temporal awareness because Hume’s philosophy cannot accommodate 
continuity or identity over time. My aim in this chapter, accordingly, is to revise our understanding of 
how and why Husserl’s theory changed with special attention to the philosophical implications of 
Husserl’s alterations. 
To demonstrate that direct engagement with Hume’s philosophy influenced Husserl’s mature 
theory of time-consciousness despite the fact that Husserl rarely mentions Hume in his most cited 
writings about time, I will first explicate several passages in which Hume’s influence is apparent. This 
will lead me to examine three sets of texts that Husserl wrote between the summer of 1905 and the end of 
1911. Unlike the materials published in Part A of Time, Stein did not alter the content of these texts. 
Husserl also later added several revealing annotations to them, including references to Hume. Focusing on 
these texts will thus enable us to avoid the difficulties introduced by Stein’s editing while affording more 
immediate engagement with the development of Husserl’s thought. 
The claims (with corollaries) that I will defend are as follows. First, Husserl’s rereading of 
Hume’s Treatise circa 1905-9 helped him recognize that temporality and temporal awareness are 
grounded by a (i) continuous, (ii) atemporal, and (iii) apodictically evident (iv) manifold with (v) two 
nexuses of intentionality. Second, this Hume-inspired recognition played a preeminent role in the 
development of Husserl’s philosophy, especially with respect to time and temporal awareness, but also to 




“passive synthesis” presupposed in any intentional act, and the nature of the self. The interruption that 
Hume’s philosophy occasioned also contributed to Husserl eventually finding the pure ego that had 
eluded him. (Sometimes, it seems, “the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.”)23 One benefit of 
my interpretation is that it explains Husserl’s interest in Hume’s account of the origin of identity 
specifically as it pertains to Husserl’s mature theory of time-consciousness; for Husserl took the latter to 
obviate difficulties entailed by the former—and models that the former inspired. 
 
3. THE SCHEMATIC MODEL OF TIME-APPREHENSION 
Husserl’s 1904-5 lectures present a relatively straightforward application of the 
apprehension/apprehension-content schema that Husserl introduced in the Logical Investigations to time 
and temporality. The apprehension/apprehension-content schema is part of the structure of the basic 
theory of intentionality adumbrated above. The schema hinges on two central theses.24 The first is a 
neutrality thesis according to which experiential contents per se do not refer to any specific time, spatial 
region, or object. The ideal objective contents that can be entertained in real acts of consciousness are 
referentially neutral, in this respect, which is why one and the same content can present different objects 
at the same time in different acts, different objects at different times in different acts, the same object at 
different times in different acts, the same object at the same time in different acts, and so on. “The content 
is simply the neutral bearer of the intentional ray,” as Brough puts it.25 The second is an animation thesis 
according to which an act’s apprehensions determine the referent of an act’s ideal content. The fact that 
an act of consciousness is real, meaning that it occurs at a specific time and place in relation to a specific 
object (or set thereof), entails that the act determines the reference of the ideal content that it entertains. 
An act does so, moreover, in virtue of the “apprehensions” that “animate”—meaning determine the 
reference of—that experience’s content. In some cases, an act apprehends an ideal object, such as the law 
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of non-contradiction. In other cases, an act apprehends a real object, such as the rising sun. In all cases, a 
real act’s apprehensions animate an ideal content and thereby determine the act’s referent, whether real or 
ideal. 
The temporally neutral content <red> that forms part of the experience of seeing this Red 
Delicious before me, for example, is presently animated by “time-constituting,” “space-constituting,” and 
“referent-constituting” act-characters. It is in virtue of these act-characters that one and the same Red 
Delicious can present itself as thus-and-so at this moment in this experience and subsequently as thus-
and-so at this moment in this experience. In this way, time and the temporality of experience are possible 
specifically in virtue of each act’s time-constituting apprehensions—apprehensions that are (nota bene) 
immanent to the act itself. Without such time-constituting apprehensions, ideal contents could not be or 
present themselves as being entertained in real acts. A fortiori, acts of consciousness could not 
immediately preset themselves as being temporal and following after and preceding others because there 
would be no determination in virtue of which such successive presentations were possible. 
We can understand the neutrality and animation theses to entail schematizing acts of 
consciousness as follows: 
apprehensions [animating] — content [animated] —[intend]→ object (reference) 
The Logical Investigations do not explain how this schema is supposed to apply to time and temporality; 
Husserl does not explicate the temporal determinations that an act’s animating apprehensions allegedly 
accomplish. Husserl’s explication of consciousness’ temporality (and therewith, the necessary 
preconditions for the possibility of temporal awareness) took shape between 1901 and 1905. This 
culminated in the schematic model of time and temporal awareness, which Husserl presented in “The 
Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time,” lectures that Husserl delivered in Göttingen during the 
winter semester of 1904-5 as he led a seminar on Hume’s Treatise. It was within this context that Husserl 
recognized that he (à la Hume) needed to explain both the temporal succession of experience the 




Here an important qualification is in order. The notion of “temporal succession,” for Husserl, 
encompasses both immanent temporality, meaning the “internal” time or succession of experiences, and 
transcendent temporality, meaning the “external” time of clocks and objects that present themselves as 
existing independently (“transcendently”) of experience. In addition to explaining the succession of 
experience and the experience of temporal succession, then, Husserl holds that any theory of temporal 
awareness must also explain how immanent and transcendent temporality are related or correlated. 
The problem with accounting for this is that the apprehension/apprehension-content schema and 
the schematic model can explain neither our awareness of immanent or transcendent temporality nor their 
putative correlation. The schematic model conceives of the awareness of succession to involve not one 
apprehension, but a continuum of apprehensions. Indeed, on the schematic model temporal awareness just 
is a continuum of time-constituting apprehensions that animates a continuum of temporally neutral 
contents, a “continuum of continua” as Husserl put it in 1905.26 The continuous manifold of time-
constituting apprehensions thus includes: (a) apprehensions of moments as immediately and mediately 
past; (b) the apprehension of the present as present; and (c) apprehensions of moments immediately and 
mediately to come (what may). Conceiving of temporal awareness in this way requires each experience to 
involve a plethora of time-constituting apprehensions in addition to other apprehensions that determine an 
act’s spatial and objectual referents. 
The crucial point is that this profusion of apprehensions itself allegedly—and, on the schematic 
model, must—occur in time. Every present experience thus contains apprehensions that simultaneously 
animate some content(s) as being experienced in the past, some content(s) as being experienced in the 
present, and some content(s) as being potentially experienced in the future. But how can a profusion of 
apprehensions that occurs now in the immanent succession of experience animate contents that are 
presently experienced as being past or future? 
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In addition to requiring a profusion of apprehensions, the schematic model suffers from three 
systemically interrelated but distinguishable problems, each of which Husserl seems to have recognized 
between 1905-9. I will refer to these severally as the problem of correlation, the problem of neutrality, 
and most importantly, the problem of origin (or infinite regress). 
The problem of correlation concerns the schematic model’s inability to explain the relationship 
between immanent and transcendent temporality. Husserl maintains that a phenomenological analysis of 
time should explain the distinction and relation between immanent and transcendent temporality. Whether 
immanent and transcendent temporality are disjointed, strictly identical, or parts of a whole, a 
phenomenological philosophy owes us an account of how and why experience presents objects as 
belonging to two temporal manifolds: the flow of experience and world-time. Clarifying the nature of the 
relationship between (or identity of) these manifolds is crucially important for Husserl’s philosophy, 
because virtually every experience immediately presents itself as occurring both in immanent and 
transcendent time, yet the flow of experience seems to differ from the temporality tracked by clocks and 
employed in the physical sciences. 
Following the lectures of 1905, Husserl recognized that his schematic model did not and could 
not explain the correlation of immanent and transcendent temporality. When we ask why certain 
apprehensions determine specific experiential contents as being immanent versus transcendent, as 
transcendent versus immanent, or as both, the schematic model simply refers us to an assumption: that 
apprehensions animate contents and intend objects as belonging to immanent and/or transcendent 
manifolds.27 For that reason, the schematic model’s assumption that there is some correlation is merely “a 
piece of good fortune for which the theory does not account,” as Brough aptly notes.28 Time-
apprehensions that are immanent to experience—like Humean atomistic association—cannot explain 
what constitutes temporality. 
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The brings us to the interrelated problem of neutrality, which concerns the schematic model’s 
neutrality thesis. The schematic model entails that an act’s determinable contents are animated in time by 
time-constituting apprehensions that also occur in time. Contents themselves are supposed to be 
temporally neutral. Like the problem Hume faces in explaining how memory and anticipation are 
possible, given the atomistic, discontinuous, and discrete nature of individual moments and their 
constituents. Husserl comes to think that numerically one and the same content, despite being ideal, 
cannot simultaneously appear as being past and present, past and future, or present and future. Temporal 
determinations are mutually exclusive; one and the same content entertained in one and the same act 
cannot be past and present, past and future, present and future, or past, present, and future. When one 
presently remembers a past experience, the content of that occurrence, as the schematic model explains it, 
is determined as both present and past. 
The schematic model accounts for present remembrances of past events (“recollections”) by 
postulating time-constituting apprehensions that simultaneously determine the same content as appearing 
both present and past in the same moment. But this, it seems, is absurd, especially on phenomenological 
grounds. If an experiential content is presently determined as appearing in the present, how can the 
subject of that experience presently experience the content as being past? Husserl’s schematic model 
attempts to account for such recollections by allowing different “time-constituting apprehensions” to 
simultaneously animate one and the same content. If that were the case, however, the content would seem 
to be determined by distinct kinds of apprehensions, such that it appears as being both now and past. If 
that were the case, however, it is unclear how experience itself could be successive, let alone how the 
subject(s) of those experiences could become aware of temporal passage. On the schematic model, 
presently occurring apprehensions animate contents as both present and past. But these are mutually 
exclusive determinations. 
In 1909, Husserl recognized that there is an inexorable difficulty in maintaining both that 
experiential contents are temporally neutral and that time-constituting apprehensions occur in time. 




This moment shades off and changes continuously, and according to the degree of change, A is 
more or less past. Thus the past, insofar as it falls within the sphere of the original intuition of 
time, must at the same time be present…. But how in that case do we know that A existed earlier, 
that it already existed before the existence of the present A?… What, then, are the moments of 
original association that are now being experienced? Are they perhaps times themselves? In that 
case, we confront the contradiction: all of these moments are there now, enclosed within the same 
consciousness of an object; they are therefore simultaneous. And yet the succession of time 
excludes simultaneity.29 
The problem with the schematic model is that Husserl just shifts the difficulty from contents to 
apprehensions. An act’s time-constituting apprehensions are supposed to occur simultaneously with its 
other determinations, where such determinations are supposed to presently determine an experiential 
content as both past and present. But how can apprehensions that occur simultaneously in one act 
generate the experience of recollection or (a fortiori) continuous passage? The problem of neutrality, 
therefore, pertains to not only the neutrality thesis, as Hoerl and others have claimed, but also the 
temporality of the apprehensions that allegedly animate an act’s contents. Brough notes this 
parenthetically,30 but it is of central importance—important enough, indeed, to have motivated Husserl’s 
atemporal conception of time-consciousness. As Husserl put it in 1909: 
There are objections here to my original view, my theory of representation, which operated with 
experienced contents (e.g. sensuous contents) and regarded them as apprehended in one way or 
another, depending on the circumstances. Everything is merely a matter of differences in 
apprehension, which would simply attach itself to the content that is experienced and that exists 
in consciousness, “animating” it. But such an interpretation might be quite untenable, and it is our 
particular task to create complete clarity here.31 
In the sheet that immediately follows, Husserl attempts to “create complete clarity” by discussing 
difficulties associated with not only the neutrality thesis, but also the alleged temporality of 
apprehensions:  
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Now if these simultaneous contents were at the same time also apprehensible as successive, then 
both intuition of co-existence and intuition of succession would be possible on the basis of 
identical contents. And evidently it would also be possible that the same contents that 
simultaneously coexist there (and they are always supposed to coexist simultaneously in the 
consciousness of the now) would at the same time be successive as well, and that is absurd. This 
is true not only of the primary contents but also of the thing-apprehensions, and consequently of 
the appearances taken as a whole.32 
The schematic model fails not simply because of the implausibility of the neutrality thesis, but because it 
is absurd to think that apprehensions which occur in immanent time could ground their own temporality 
via the immanent animation of temporally neutral contents. 
This brings us to the problem of origin, which is more devastating than the interrelated problems 
of correlation and neutrality because it entails that the schematic model can account for neither the basis 
of experience’s temporality nor our awareness thereof. Take my awareness1 of the temporal determination 
of a transcendent object; for example, the cup of sencha (here, now) before me. My awareness1 of the cup 
of sencha immediately presents itself as being in time—both immanently (within my stream of 
consciousness) and transcendently (as belonging to world-time). Subsequently, I can become aware2 of 
not only the immanent and transcendent temporality of awarenenss1, but also the temporal passage or 
succession from awareness1 to awareness2. When I aim to identify the origin of the temporal awareness 
that issues in awareness2, however, the schematic model refers me to temporal determinations 
accomplished by time-constituting apprehensions—apprehensions that occur now. In this way, the 
schematic model attempts to ground temporal awareness in present apprehensions that generate immanent 
succession and my experience thereof. Each moment of the succession (qua continuum of continua), 
however, includes a continuum of apprehensions that simultaneously determine one and the same content 
as past, present, and future. 
Like Whitehead, Husserl came to recognize that temporal entities, and particularly time-
constituting apprehensions that as parts of real acts of consciousness necessarily occur in time, cannot 
constitute their own basis. The reason, Husserl holds, is that a temporal manifold of a continuum of 
                                                     




continua must on pain of vicious regress have some atemporal foundation in virtue of which the former 
can present itself to consciousness as temporal. Otherwise the alleged “origin” of temporal awareness will 
have its “origin” in another temporal entity, such as an awareness; and that awareness would have its 
“origin” in another temporal entity, such as another awareness; and so on ad infinitum. The schematic 
model precludes disclosing the origin of temporal constitution and direct awareness of the flow of 
experience because it generates an infinite regress, a vicious circle. The regress is infinite, in that it 
prevents consciousness from discovering the origin of temporality and its awareness thereof. The circle is 
vicious, in that such circularity entails a defect of reasoning via a deficiency of theory. The schematic 
model cannot explain what any theory of temporal awareness must explain: the constitution of time and 
temporal awareness. 
The correlation between immanent and transcendent temporality, Husserl recognizes, is merely 
presupposed. Similarly, the schematic model presupposes that there is an origin of temporality and 
temporal awareness, but this is yet another “piece of good fortune” for which the schematic model does 
not and cannot account. Temporal entities cannot constitute temporality or ground awareness thereof. 
 
4. FROM IMMANENT TIME-APPREHENSION TO INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS 
With the problems of correlation, neutrality, and origin looming, 1906-7 finds Husserl 
introducing the notion of absolute consciousness that he would continue to refine until his final years.  
Absolute consciousness, as previewed above, is an intentional manifold, in Husserl’s technical 
sense. This means that it is a structured multiplicity distinct from mere set-theoretical gatherings. More 
specifically, a manifold is “the form that is abstracted from a domain” or “an objective structure defined 
as the form of a field”—in this case, the domain or field of temporality.33 Husserlian manifolds differ from 
Cantorian sets in that they necessarily involve internal structure. Mereologically speaking, the manifold of 
time-consciousness is a precise (prägnant) whole, in that each part bears an essential relation to every 
                                                     




other part, hence depends essentially but not asymmetrically for its existence on every other part. 
(Husserl’s philosophy is a precise whole, in this sense.) 
The manifold of absolute consciousness cannot be a fully-formed object of the kind experienced 
in perception. It is rather a structured multiplicity or “field of pregivenness,” as Husserl puts it.34 Absolute 
consciousness is neither a thing nor a process, strictly speaking, hence counts as an “object” only in 
Husserl’s abstract sense of being a subject of possible true predications. Minutia aside, this means that 
absolute consciousness is neither a fully-formed object nor a multiplicity of contents. If it were a 
multiplicity of contents, the problem of neutrality would arise; the notion of absolute consciousness 
would generate the same paradox that Husserl took to undermine Brentano's model of temporal 
awareness. Concordantly, Husserl’s conceives of absolute consciousness as being a structured multiplicity 
of intentionalities of retentions, primal impressions, and protentions, which form a proto-Jamesian 
specious present. 
In addition to being a manifold of intentionalities, absolute consciousness exhibits (at least)35 four 
structural features that Husserl highlights via four interrelated claims. At the moment, I will merely 
introduce these claims. After explicating Hume’s “mature” analysis of time and temporal awareness, I 
will argue that each claim plausibly derives from Husserl’s reengagement with Hume’s philosophy. 
The first is Husserl’s continuity claim: that absolute consciousness is a continuous manifold. In a 
text written sometime after Husserl’s lectures of 1904-5 (the exact date appears to be unknown), Husserl 
argues that “wherever we speak of change and variation [in experience, a] consciousness of unity must 
underlie them.”36 Husserl reaches this conclusion by analyzing the “evidential consciousness of duration” 
or temporal awareness via a favorite example: a continuously perceived enduring tone that presents itself 
as unchanging over an interval of time. Husserl observes: 
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The temporal positions [of the continuous tone] are not separated from one another by means of 
self-differentiated acts; the unity of the perception here is an unbroken unity without any internal 
differences interrupting it. On the other hand, there do exist differences inasmuch as each time-
point is individually distinct from every other one—but precisely distinct and not separated 
(ibid.). 
Husserl holds, pace Hume, that experiencing an unchanging tone or the continuity of a tone as if 
unchanging requires a continuous passage of time. We may individuate moments of an interval and refer 
to them as separate via descriptions such as t1, t2, and so on. Yet Husserl maintains that the separability, 
distinctness, and difference of phenomena in thought or imagination (via abstraction or “idealization”) 
does not entail that whatever is psychologically separable, distinct, or different in thought is ontologically 
separable, distinct, or different. On the contrary, Husserl, here prefiguring Russell, Foster, Dainton, and 
others, contends that moments of time cannot be ontologically separable and independent. They are 
moments in Husserl’s technical sense, meaning dependent parts, and in this case parts of a precise whole: 
an intentional, continuous manifold. 
Husserl’s observation regarding the psychological distinctness yet ontological inseparability of 
time-points leads him to conclude that the notion of a discontinuous manifold of temporal atoms is a 
“fiction” produced via abstraction. (Whitehead, as we will see, refers to such cases as “fallacies of 
misplaced concreteness,” which we can recast in more familiar terms as reification and hypostatization.) 
Husserl also contends that the passage of ontologically separable instants cannot generate the unity 
required for our continuous awareness of enduring objects and unfolding processes. (On this point, I agree 
with Miller that constituting a manifold continuously, as continuous, does not require the parts of that 
manifold to be individuated; for constitution and individuation are distinct “operations,” the latter of 
which asymmetrically presupposes the former.37) Details aside, the upshot of this argument for present 
purposes is that absolute consciousness, the intentional manifold that Husserl takes to constitute 
temporality and our experience thereof, cannot be discontinuous. The reason is that it must be an 
                                                     




intentional manifold with interdependent, intersecting, and overlapping parts, such that experiences of 
continuity and discontinuity are possible. 
The distinction between psychological and ontological separability that Husserl employs in his 
discussion of continuity directly contravenes Hume’s separability principle, according to which whatever 
is psychologically separable is ipso facto ontologically separable and capable of independent existence. In 
addition, the aforementioned argument contradicts Hume’s claim that the idea of continuity is a fiction 
generated in discontinuous succession of atomistic perceptions. This is fitting, so I will argue; for the 
investigations that Husserl conducted in Seefeld during the summer of 1905, following the seminar on 
Hume’s Treatise that Husserl led in 1904-5, consistently use Humean ideas and “Humean problems” as a 
springboard for neo-Humean advances. 
Husserl’s second claim about the nature of absolute consciousness—a response to the interrelated 
problems of neutrality and origin—is the non-temporality (or atemporality) claim: that absolute 
consciousness is atemporal. Unlike temporal objects, the intentional parts of absolute consciousness 
(retention, primal impression, and protention) do not “occur” in time; nor are they parts of time. 
Furthermore, neither absolute consciousness nor its parts are processes that unfold over time. The reason 
is that every process, by Husserl’s lights, involves some object that undergoes the process and serves as 
its subject. (Here many process philosophers will disagree.) No formed objects belong to absolute 
consciousness. It is “composed” only of distinct intentionalities that are essentially interdependent and 
constitute the a priori form of experience, including temporal awareness. 
As an atemporal structure, absolute consciousness provides the necessary form for the 
constitution of temporal objects, including acts of consciousness that present themselves immanently in 
the flow of lived experience. Absolute consciousness constitutes what it constitutes atemporally by 
providing the general form or structure for the temporal presentation of objects, regardless of whether 
those objects are presented as being real or ideal. Even ideal objective meanings such as the law of non-
contradiction can be presented in experience. Being presented, however, requires the passage of time and 




experience. In addition to remedying the problems of neutrality and origin, then, Husserl’s atemporality 
claim is supposed to remedy the problem of correlation; for as Miller aptly demonstrates (albeit in a 
different interpretive context), absolute consciousness constitutes both immanent and transcendent 
temporality while allowing for differences between the two, including evident “lapses” between 
transcendent time and immanent time, as when time “flies” or “stops.”38 
Husserl’s third claim about time-consciousness, a “shocking” yet apodictically-evident insight 
that Husserl takes to block the infinite regress described above, is the self-appearance (or self-
manifesting) claim: that absolute consciousness constitutes its own appearance. Husserl’s position as to 
how absolute consciousness manifests itself in inner time-consciousness differs in earlier and later 
writings. Initially he held that absolute consciousness can manifest itself due to the double-intentionality 
of retention or “the retention of retention.”39 Later Husserl seems to have attributed the self-manifesting 
nature of time-consciousness’ flow to the double-intentionality of both retention and protention.40 Despite 
the evolution, from 1909 onward Husserl consistently maintains that absolute consciousness manifests 
itself apodictically, such that no “deeper” level of constitution is necessary. 
The self-generated appearance of absolute consciousness in (and as) inner time-consciousness 
blocks the infinite regress generated by the assumption that temporal objects or processes could ground 
temporality. This claim finds clear expression in the Cartesian Meditations (1931): 
The correlate of this consciousness [of internal time] is immanent temporality itself, in 
conformity with which all the life-processes belong to the ego that can ever be found reflectively 
must present themselves as temporally ordered, temporally beginning and ending, simultaneous 
or successive, with the constant infinite horizon: immanent time…. As these modes of 
appearance, which make up the consciousness of internal time, are themselves “intentive 
components of conscious life [intentionale Erlebnisse]” and must in turn be given in reflection as 
temporalities, we encounter here a paradoxical fundamental property of conscious life, which 
seems thus to be infected with an infinite regress. The task of clarifying this fact and making it 
understandable presents extraordinary difficulties.41 
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Yet conscious life is not in fact infected with the infinite regress entailed by the schematic model. Hence 
Husserl continues: “Be that as it may, the fact is evident, even apodictically evident, and indicates one 
aspect of the ego’s marvelous being-for-himself [sic]: here, in the first place, the being of his conscious 
life in the form of reflexive intentional relatedness to itself” (ibid.). The fact that absolute consciousness 
constitutes its own appearance and does so atemporally transforms a vicious circle into a paradox 
generated by the expressive limitations of natural language. (Husserl thinks that he has no choice but to 
employ the words “process,” “flux,” and related terms metaphorically and potentially misleadingly 
because any process, truly conceived, is essentially temporal and presupposes some object or set thereof 
that undergoes the process.) Fittingly, the infinite regress entailed by attempting to ground temporality in 
a temporal manifold is a problem for not only the schematic model, but also the bundle theory that 
Husserl attributes to Hume. 
Husserl fourth claim, a primary motivation of which is to avoid the infinite regress entailed by the 
schematic model’s problem of origin, is the two-fold intentionality claim: that absolute consciousness 
consists of two interrelated nexuses of intentionalities: “two inseparably united intentionalities, requiring 
one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique 
flow of consciousness.”42 Husserl’s self-appearance claim entails that “the constituting and the constituted 
coincide.”43 His immediate qualification of this statement, “yet naturally they cannot coincide in every 
respect,” implies that absolute consciousness serves two distinct functions and accomplishes both in 
virtue of its form or intentional structure. 
First, time-consciousness is stream-unifying. This means that absolute consciousness constitutes 
the unity of the flow of consciousness. Recast in Humean terms, inner time-consciousness constitutes its 
                                                     
42 Husserl, Time, 393. Andersen and Grush note that “Husserl’s first explicit formulation of the double intentionality 
doctrine is from a note that Bernet dates to around early 1905, where the topic is the double intentionality of 
recollection (or secondary memory). It is later that Husserl works out a doctrine of the double intentionality of 
retention” (“Brief History of Time-Consciousness,” 304). I take this to support my interpretation, especially since it 
intimates that Husserl was aware of the interrelated problems of neutrality and origin—hence his exploration of 
double intentionality—prior to his introduction of the notion of absolute consciousness with double intentionality. 




own “principle of unity.” Husserl expresses this metaphorically by saying that absolute consciousness 
unifies itself “horizontally” in the stream of consciousness, with every moment of the flow overlapping its 
immediately predecessors and successors in a way that constitutes a unified continuum. Husserl refers to 
the stream-unifying aspect of time-consciousness as its horizontal intentionality. 
Second, time-consciousness is object-constituting. This means that absolute consciousness 
constitutes objects as belonging to both the immanent temporality of consciousness and the transcendent 
temporality of the material world. Crucially (vis-à-vis the schematic model), the “objects” constituted in 
inner time-consciousness include acts of consciousness, which count as temporal objects in Husserl’s 
technical sense. Absolute consciousness thus constitutes objects and acts in a way that explains their 
order, temporal extension, and continuous appearance in lived experience. Husserl refers to the object-
constituting aspect of time-consciousness as its transverse intentionality. 
The upshot of these considerations is that the general theory of intentionality adumbrated above 
presupposes a continuous, atemporal, and apodictically evident intentional manifold with two nexuses of 
intentionality. We can represent this as follows, with the general form of intentional experience being 
grounded by the general form of inner time-consciousness: 
(background)  subject — act — meaning → object  (horizon) 
<…>m-1 — < retention — primal impression — protention >m — <…> m+1 
The task now is to see how this neo-Humean model of time-consciousness was influenced by Hume, 
despite or rather because of the fact that it diverges from the Treatise. 
 
5. EVIDENCE OF HUME’S INFLUENCE 
Having adumbrated Husserl’s schematic model and the problems that absolute consciousness is 
supposed to solve, we can now return to the interpretive question posed above. Why should we think that 
Hume, whom Husserl rarely mentions in connection with time, played a preeminent role in the 




Brentano is thought to be both the primary inspiration for and, through some uncanny twist of 
fate, the principal foil of the schematic model. As Brough and others rightly claim, the problems that 
undermine Brentano’s model of temporal awareness also undermine Husserl’s schematic model. This fact 
and select passages from Husserl’s corpus can make it seem as if recognition of Brentano’s failures 
played the predominant role in influencing Husserl’s second theory, which I will refer to as the flow 
model. I wish to dispute this claim, which through repetition and sedimentation has assumed the status of 
a doxa in Husserl scholarship.44 Hume has at least as good a claim to that title. 
If Brentano were the historical figure who motivated Husserl to recognize insuperable difficulties 
with the schematic model and develop a flow model founded on absolute consciousness, the trajectory of 
Husserl’s thought would be unusual and uncanny, to put it mildly. On that view, the shortcomings of 
Brentano’s account motivated Husserl to not only develop the schematic model, as it clearly did, but also 
abandon it. Proponents of this view maintain that Husserl abandoned the schematic model because he 
realized that it fell prey to essentially the same objections that he had previously leveled against 
Brentano’s theory. The first of these objections is that theories which conceive of experiential moments as 
being “temporally undistributed,” such as Hume’s and Brentano’s, cannot adequately explain awareness 
of temporal passage, because they are saddled with atomistic time-points that preclude constituting the 
past or future. The second is that representational theories like Hume’s and Brentano’s cannot account for 
the experiential immediacy of temporal awareness. 
The psychologistic affinity between Hume’s and Brentano’s accounts would explain why in the 
lectures of 1904-5 Husserl felt no need to directly criticize Hume’s analysis of the idea of time. 
Criticizing Brentano enables Husserl to dismantle Hume’s psychologistic theory in one fell swoop, with 
one phenomenological analysis, while publicly distinguishing Husserl from his teacher. That said, 
returning to Hume’s Treatise proved to be decisive for the transformation of Husserl’s position, especially 
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with respect to the mereological, phenomenological, and ontological details of temporal awareness and 
the pre-personal nexus of absolute consciousness that Husserl would introduce. 
There are at least five sources of evidence for direct connections between Hume’s and Husserl’s 
analyses of time, in addition to corroborating evidence that I will present below. 
First, while delivering his lectures during the winter term of 1904-5, Husserl conducted a seminar 
titled “Reflection[s] in Connection with Hume’s Treatise.” This means that Husserl had the Treatise 
squarely in mind while delivering his lectures on time, despite the fact that the lectures do not explicitly 
refer to Hume. Furthermore, this entails that Husserl’s reflections on Hume’s Treatise served as a 
background for the Humean explorations that Husserl conducted in Seefeld during the summer of 1905, 
which may be the precise date that Hume’s investigations concerning time first influenced Husserl’s. (I 
delve into these explorations below.) 
Second, in his extensively annotated copy of the Treatise—specifically at 1.4.2.25/200ff., where 
Hume contends that explaining the origin of the principle (or idea) of identity requires the analysis of the 
idea of time delivered earlier at 1.2ff.—Husserl writes with emphasis, “My lectures and investigations 
concerning time!”45 This annotation indicates that Husserl took interest in Hume’s interrelated analyses of 
identity and time specifically because he took them to be germane to his own investigations concerning 
time and temporal awareness. More specifically, the annotation suggests that Husserl took interest in 
Hume’s claim that explaining the origin of the belief in diachronic identity requires explaining the origin 
of temporal awareness—a claim with which Husserl would tentatively agree, with the qualification that 
Hume and Husserl conceive of mental phenomena in incommensurable ways. 
Unfortunately, the exact date of Husserl’s annotation appears to be unknown. Thanks to the 
editorial efforts of Boehm and Brough, we know that Husserl returned to Hume’s Treatise after delivering 
his lectures of 1904-5, since the annotation refers at least to them and Husserl did not complete a full draft 
of the lectures until February 1905. (I write “at least” because between 1905-9 Husserl delivered three 
                                                     




other lecture courses that investigate time and temporal awareness, as we will see.) Moreover, in 1909—
precisely at the time that Husserl’s theory of temporality was undergoing radical change—Husserl 
returned to material on time that he had initially written in 1905 to add a marginal reference to Hume’s 
Treatise.46 This reevaluation suggests that Husserl returned to the Treatise between 1905 and 1909 and 
appears to have done so on several occasions. If this approximate range is correct, then Husserl’s 
engagement with Hume’s analysis of time vis-a-vis the origin of identity may have played an important 
role in the transformation of Husserl’s theory. I take the likelihood of this possibility to be strengthened 
by Husserl’s subsequent references to Hume when discussing temporality and inner time-consciousness. 
The Analyses (based on lectures presented in the 1920’s) offer a third example of Hume’s 
relevance. There Husserl contends that Hume commits the same error as Brentano in conceiving of time-
consciousness solely in terms of reproductive, secondary memories and representations rather than 
productive, primary memories and immediate presentations. Given that Husserl returned to Hume’s 
Treatise between 1905 and 1909, it is likely that Husserl’s rereading of Hume resulted not merely in 
recapitulating conclusions which he had already reached in 1904 via consideration of Meinong and 
Brentano, but rather enabled Husserl to attain new insights about the nature of temporal awareness per se. 
As late as the Crisis of European Sciences (1936) Husserl employs a technical notion from his 
mature theory of time-consciousness, “primal impression,” to characterize Hume’s proto-
phenomenological inquiry into abstract ideas, including the idea of time. As usual, Husserl’s judgments 
balance criticism and praise. For despite “Hume’s revival and radicalization of the Cartesian fundamental 
problem, [through which] ‘dogmatic’ objectivism was, from the point of view of our critical presentation, 
shaken to the foundations,” Husserl claims that Hume utterly failed to achieve the “Cartesian radicalism 
of presuppositionlessness” required for an adequate theorization.47 Details aside, some of the 
presuppositions that short-circuit Hume’s analyses are his “moderate” empiricist epistemology and theory 
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of abstract ideas (criticized in the Logical Investigations), sensualism (“the error of reducing… all 
experiences to mere primary contents”),48 the copy principle (that ideas are representational copies of 
impressions), and the separability principle (that whatever is psychologically separable is ipso facto 
ontologically separable and capable of independent existence). 
In addition to addressing Hume’s Treatise directly, Hume’s influence is evident in Husserl’s 
diction, with his writings on time-consciousness uncannily echoing formulations expressed in Hume’s 
Treatise even and especially when they deviate from them. This intimate yet critical affinity is 
particularly perspicuous when Husserl emphasizes the phenomenological distinctness yet ontological 
inseparability of moments of time—which, in opposition to Hume, Husserl takes to constitute a 
continuous manifold. In the Bernau Manuscripts, for example, Husserl (as De Warren reports) “notes 
[that] Hume had already emphasized that every ‘impression’ necessarily becomes modified in a 
retentional manner, that is, that every (simple) impression loses its original force and vivacity in 
becoming a (simple) idea.”49 De Warren is right to infer from this that Hume, by Husserl’s lights, 
“remained blind to the protentional modification of impressional consciousness and the manner in which 
retention (speaking here in Husserlian terms) generates a protentional consciousness” (ibid.). Yet Hume 
remains blind to much more than that, from Husserl’s perspective. Hume’s copy, separability, and 
converse separability principles are precisely the kind of “unclarified and unjustified preconceptions” 
from which empiricists begin, “in obvious contradiction to their principle of being free from prejudice.”50 
The copy principle fails (vis-à-vis temporal awareness) because the consciousness or presentation 
of time, as distinct from mere representation of time, involves awareness of moments that are 
interdependent, continuous, and present themselves as such. Suspending the copy principle and 
assumption of independent existence reveals that consciousness of the past, present, and future does not 
involve representational copies that can exist independently, but immediate experience of the inter-
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determined parts of a precise whole. From 1908-9 onward, Husserl maintains that phenomenological 
analysis reveals the continuity of time apodictically: it is inconceivable that time could be otherwise, pace 
Hume. 
The separability principle and its converse fail on similar grounds; the psychological separability 
of temporal moments does not entail their being ontologically separable. On the contrary, 
phenomenological analysis apodictically reveals the inextricably interwoven intentionalities immediately 
constituting the past, present, and future. The question that Husserl takes to be germane to temporal 
awareness, accordingly, concerns the nature of the flowing or running off presented in it: 
The question about the essence of time thus leads back to the question about the “origin” of time. 
But this question of origin is directed towards the primitive formations of time-consciousness, in 
which the primitive differences of the temporal become constituted intuitively and properly as the 
original sources of all the evidences relating to time. This question of origin should not be 
confused with the question about psychological origin, with the controversial issue that divides 
empiricism and nativism.51 
Though Husserl does not state it explicitly, the distinction between empiricism and nativism, the view that 
certain aspects of experience are constitutive and thus knowable a priori rather than empirically, is meant 
to emphasize that time-consciousness is the flow or running off—the constitutive a priori form—of 
experience. (Philosophers who identified at nativists were reacting specifically to Locke and Hume.) 
We have examined how and why Husserl thinks that time-consciousness grounds temporality and 
temporal awareness. But what constitutes time-consciousness? What does so, moreover, in a way that 
enables it to become evident to a subject engaged in phenomenological reflection? It is precisely with 
respect to this question (among others) that returning to Hume’s Treatise became so important for 
Husserl. 
Hume’s influence is especially evident when Husserl analyzes individuation over time. Note the 
similarity between the following formulations. The first occurs in the Treatise, which sometime between 
1905-9 Husserl annotated with the comment, “My lectures and investigations concerning time!”: 
                                                     




In order to justify this system, there are four things requisite. First, to explain the principium 
individuationis, or principle of identity…. One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of 
identity. On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea…. Since then 
both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity, it must lie in something that 
is neither of them…. To remove this difficulty, let us have recourse to the idea of time or 
duration.52 
The second occurs in Time: 
 
How, in the fact of the phenomenon of the constant change of time-consciousness, does the 
consciousness of objective time and, above all, of identical temporal positions come about? This 
question is very closely connected with the question about the constitution of the objectivity of 
individual temporal objects and events: all objectivation is accomplished in time-consciousness; 
without clarification of the identity of the temporal position, there can be no clarification of the 
identity of an object in time either.53 
The passage from Time closely parallels the way in which Hume formulates his interest in the idea of 
individuation over time, grounded as it is in Hume’s analysis of time as the atomistic, discontinuous, and 
irregular succession of ideas and impressions. This may explain why Husserl chose the phrase “primal 
impression” to designate the central part of the tripartite intentional structure <retention – primal 
impression – protention>. Husserl’s formulation of the question regarding trans-temporal identity 
contains a crucial difference, however: it concerns the consciousness of time, in Husserl’s 
phenomenological sense, and not the mere idea of time in Hume’s psychologistic (albeit proto-
phenomenological) sense. Husserl allows that Hume captures something essential: the primordial role of 
impressions as immediate presentations. But given the copy and separability principles, Hume 
misconstrues what impressions of time present: the manifold of intentionalities evident therein, which 
presents itself as atemporal and continuous. 
In 1923-4 Husserl would contend that 
Impression is for Hume the epistemological title for the intuitions qualified for the conscious 
performance of evidence-verification…. Impression is [however] in truth a title for evidential 
consciousness in general, or, taken in the widest sense, intuiting something itself, as possible 
foundation for every sort of evident-making, for every sort of verification.54 
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With that claim in mind, we will now examine Husserl’s detailed engagement with a nexus of “Humean 
problems,” beginning with investigations conducted shortly after the 1904-5 seminar on Hume and 
lectures on time. 
 
6. THE SEEFELD MANUSCRIPTS ON INDIVIDUATION (1905) 
After delivering the “Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time” and 
leading a seminar on Hume’s Treatise at Göttingen during the winter term of 1904-5, Husserl traveled to 
Seefeld to spend his summer vacation researching time, individuation, continuity, and related issues. This 
included detailed discussions with Johannes Daubert and Alexander Pfänder of the Munich Circle of 
phenomenology. Husserl’s studies culminated in a set of texts titled “Seefeld Manuscripts on 
Individuation” which Husserl also referred to as the “Pfänder-Daubert perplexities.” These exploratory 
manuscripts are best known for containing Husserl’s self-proclaimed first “correct use” of the 
phenomenological reduction, a notion that Husserl would not introduce publicly until 1907 in lectures 
now known as “The Idea of Phenomenology.” The Seefeld manuscripts contain several other advances, 
however, including examinations of evidence, abstraction, unity, continuity, extensions of spatial and 
qualitative continua over time, the identity of objects over time, personal identity, change and alteration, 
species belonging to time, and that which fills time—among other topics treated in Hume’s Treatise. 
Fittingly for a vacation, the Seefeld manuscripts focus on the experiential content presented in 
Husserl’s perception of a brown beer bottle. The concepts employed in these analyses (intentions, 
animation, content, determination, fulfillment, and so on) indicate that he is still utilizing the 
apprehension/apprehension-content schema that he had recently elaborated in the 1904-5 lectures on time. 
That said, Husserl’s investigations reveal a newfound interest in abstraction, a topic treated in the Logical 
Investigations via extended engagement with Hume. Unlike the Logical Investigations, which focus on 
abstraction vis-a-vis intentionality and Hume’s theory of abstract ideas, Husserl now focuses attention on 
the role that abstraction plays in individuating moments of time. Here and elsewhere Husserl underscores 




content (in this case, the brown of a beer bottle) which “fills” a continuous duration of time and does so 
continuously. In abstraction, Husserl allows that one may “distinguish phases within its duration” and 
distinguish separate moments of time that the unified content fills. The qualification is that the results of 
such abstractions, namely points of time or temporal minima, differ from the phenomenon of time itself, 
and more specifically “the continuous consciousness of unity, a consciousness that gives unity: 
uninterrupted unity, identity in the continuity of time, something identical in the continuous flow of 
time.”55 Taking the results of an abstraction to be equivalent to the phenomenon itself (which Whitehead 
would describe as a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”) would generate a theory of perception akin to 
Hume’s: an atomistic, discontinuous “bundle theory” of mere succession. Such a view entails that what 
presents itself as being continuous, including both the sensory content <brown> and the duration of time 
that the content fills, in fact are diachronically discrete bundles of discontinuous and ontologically 
separable minima. Hence “we [would] have a consciousness that is broken up, divided into pieces…. But 
these are distinct unities that do not join together to make up the unity of a whole” (ibid.). This is 
precisely the problem that vexed Hume, as we saw in Chapter One. 
The problem with bundle theories is that they derive from illegitimate “transcendental 
presuppositions” about the nature of experience and what presents it therein. Hume’s copy and 
separability principles are especially suspect in this regard. Phenomenological reduction, the first “correct 
use” of which Husserl executes in relation to these Humean problems, entails suspending all such 
suppositions. This enables the phenomenological philosopher to attend to what immediately presents 
itself in experience, including the structure and mode of presentation itself, so that one can theorize on the 
basis of that which is immediately and potentially apodictically evident. (This also entails the kind of 
“zigzagging” characteristic of scientific method, as adumbrated above.) What makes itself immediately 
and apodictically evident to Husserl is the irreducible continuity of his consciousness of uninterrupted 
unities, such as the brown of a beer bottle and the beer bottle itself. (Note that the term “uninterrupted” is 
                                                     




the word that Hume employs to criticize the fictions of external objects and simple, identical persons and 
minds.) This leads Husserl to conclude that the independent and discontinuous unities capable of being 
generated via abstraction essentially and asymmetrically depend for their existence on interdependent and 
continuous unities. We have the power to objectify qualitative and temporal extensions, divide them, and 
distinguish their parts; and for certain purposes (engineering, for example) such operations are appropriate 
and efficacious. Nonetheless, the possibility of such operations is founded upon the unity and continuity 
of experience and the qualitative unity and continuity—not separability—of the phenomena given therein 
and the form in which phenomena are given (in time). 
The paucity of historical data regarding Husserl’s influences between 1905-9 means that there is 
no knock-down argument for the claim that one figure played the predominant role in motivating Husserl 
to first supplement the schematic model with the notion of absolute consciousness and then supplant it for 
a flow model founded on absolute consciousness and its extensive implications. That said, the 
philosophical content treated in the Seefeld manuscripts, including especially the relationship between 
time and the experience of identity, uncannily resembles the content treated in Hume’s Treatise and the 
proto-phenomenological methods that Hume employs to clarify and confirm that content. Furthermore, 
Husserl explicitly connects his analysis of time and trans-temporal identity with the alternative account 
that Hume delivers in the Treatise. Husserl argues that although different qualitative parts of a duration 
are different, “since they fill one extent of time continuously, there is one object that ‘endures’; it is one 
and the same thing that runs throughout this whole extent of time.”56 Husserl takes this insight to spell 
disaster for Hume’s theories of time and perception; in the margin he refers to Treatise 1.4.2.25/200ff. 
Recall that in Husserl’s extensively annotated copy of the Treatise, he annotates 1.4.2.25/200ff. with the 
emphatic comment, “My lectures and investigations concerning time!” Although this annotation is not 
sufficiently specific to clarify exactly how Husserl responded to the Treatise’s treatment of time, it is a 
smoking gun for Hume’s relevance to the development of Husserl’s view. 
                                                     




Did Husserl return to the Treatise after his lectures and before the summer of 1905? Were his 
thoughts during the summer of 1905 directly stimulated by engagement with the Treatise? Did Daubert 
and Pfänder inspire Humean reflections during their weeks of conversation with Husserl? 
We do not have definitive answers to these questions. We know, however, that Husserl associated 
the Seefeld manuscripts with Hume because in reflections on the Seefeld manuscripts Husserl identifies 
“Humean problems” that arise in connection with his interests in time and individuation: 
Now, how does the typical lead us over into the sphere of ideas, into the pure limit-concepts of a 
mathematical sort: the mathematical point, mathematical lengths or straight lines, division in 
infinitum? Humean problems.57 
There are conflicting accounts as to when Husserl introduced this reflection, with Boehm claiming 1905 
and Bernet claiming 1917. What is clear, however, is that Seefeld and Humean problems go hand in hand 
and thus that in addressing Seefeld problems—problems concerning the constitution of temporality and 
trans-temporal identity—Humean problems were distined to arise. The lack of certainty about the date of 
Husserl’s reflection is especially unfortunate because immediately before Husserl’s Humean problems 
arise, he gestures at what would form the foundation of his mature theory: inner time-consciousness.  
While analyzing the concept of divisibility, Husserl observes that although “phenomenological 
stretches” such as qualitative and temporal extensions are divisible in abstraction, they are not infinitely 
divisible into independent parts (“pieces,” in the technical sense). Abstraction ultimately reaches 
qualitative and temporal parts that admit of no further division; but in contrast to Hume, such parts 
present themselves as moments in the technical sense: dependent parts. Husserl goes on to consider 
comparing longer and shorter moments of extension and asks how such comparisons—a mental 
operations to which Hume devotes considerable attention—are possible. Not surprisingly, Husserl’s 
answer invokes intentionality. Surprisingly, however, his answer also invokes a hidden intentionality. In 
this way, Husserl seems to gesture at inner time-consciousness for what may be the first time: “Moments 
are surely classified as ‘short’ here, but we must ask to what extent a hidden intentionality plays a part in 
                                                     




the comparison” (ibid.). Following this passage, Husserl contends that time-consciousness is veiled, 
meaning that it presents itself as veiled, that “something” hidden is nevertheless accessible via 
phenomenological reduction, and which phenomenological attention could unveil—an interesting 
proclamation, given that it replicates, in some ways, Husserl’s relationship with Hume. 
In the sentence immediately following Husserl’s reference to a “hidden intentionality,” he refers 
to Humean problems that arise in connection with it. In the next sheet, moreover, Husserl differentiates 
his position from that entailed by Hume’s separability principle, emphasizing that every qualitatively and 
temporally extended moment “is in itself something that persists, but not something self-sufficient.”58 
I conclude that throughout the Seefeld manuscripts, Hume’s analyses of time and individuation, 
connected as they are to issues concerning continuity, dependence, and constitution, figure significantly 
into the conceptual background of Husserl’s explorations. Whether or not Hume foregrounded Husserl’s 
explorations regarding a “hidden intentionality” that serves as a necessary condition for the possibility of 
comparing durations of time, Humean problems are directly relevant—by Husserl’s own lights. 
 
7. MANUSCRIPT OF AN “INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY” (1906-7) 
The second set of texts exhibiting important developments regarding Husserl’s emerging theory 
time-consciousness consists of Nos. 39-50 of Part B of Time, which Brough titles “On the Dissolution of 
the Schema: Apprehension-Content—Content.” The majority of these sketches, namely Nos. 39-47, 
present material detailed in a lecture course titled “Introduction to Logic and Epistemology” which 
Husserl first delivered at Göttingen during the winter term of 1906-7, then again with important 
alterations in the summer of 1909 under a different title, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Cognition.” Boehm dates Nos. 48-50 as being written between 1907 and the summer of 1909, whereas 
Bernet contends that Husserl produced Nos. 48-50 between September 1909 and the end of 1911. Either 
way, the sketches provide us with important evidence vis-à-vis the development of Husserl’s thought, for 
                                                     




they present Husserl’s reflections on and modifications of earlier explorations, including his seminar on 
Hume’s Treatise, the lectures of 1904-5, and the Seefeld manuscripts of summer 1905. 
Sketch Nos. 39-47 are less exploratory and speculative than the Seefeld manuscripts, in part 
because Husserl designed them with a specific audience in mind. Nonetheless, I agree with Brough that a 
decisive shift occurs in these texts, though I disagree that the primary motivation for this shift was 
Husserl’s reconsideration of Brentano. 
In light of what I argued above with respect to Hume and the Seefeld manuscripts, it is telling that 
in 1906-7 Husserl begins to refer to the fundamental unities of experience as “impressions” and 
subsequent representations (or ideational “copies”) of such impressions as “reproductions,” “phantasms,” 
and “memories”: 
If we call this positing-as-this, which occurs in looking at the object, “act,” then the appearance 
itself is not an act. To the unities experienced in consciousness, the intended unities, there belongs 
the fundamental distinction between those that are original, or impressions, and those that are 
reproductive (reproductions, phantasms).59 
Husserl’s distinction between primal impressions and reproduction represents a phenomenological 
reformulation of Hume’s proto-phenomenological distinction between primary impressions and ideas. 
Fittingly, Husserl’s elaboration of the aforementioned claim explicitly references Hume’s distinction 
between impressions and ideas, implicitly alludes to the copy principle, and alludes to the argument about 
the primacy of continuity that Husserl produced in Seefeld: “The temporal modification and the 
modification of an impression into an idea are fundamentally different. The latter is discrete; the former is 
continuous.”60 Husserl implies that although Hume was right to emphasize the empirical primacy of 
impressions and “impressional experiencing,” Hume’s analyses fail (as Husserl also claims in the Seefeld 
manuscripts) because they are founded on illegitimate “transcendental presuppositions,” principal among 
them the copy and separability principles. Husserl takes the unities and continuities that become evident 
via phenomenological epoché to refute Hume’s conclusion that experiences are nothing more than 
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synchronic and diachronic bundles of independent and discontinuous perceptions. As Husserl puts it, 
apropos of empiricist accounts of association, 
Memory flows continuously, since the life of consciousness flows continuously and does not 
merely piece itself together link by link into a chain…. Thus it is not as if we had a mere chain of 
“associated” intentions, one bringing to mind another, this one recalling the next, and so on (in 
the flow); rather, we have one intention that in itself is an intention aimed at this series of possible 
fulfillments.61 
The implication here (as elsewhere) is that associative principles on their own are not enough to explain 
the evident unity and continuity of experience, especially the experience of continuous temporal passage. 
Association presupposes some form, and more specifically a unified, continuous, intentional manifold, in 
virtue of which association per se is possible: inner time-consciousness.62 
The diction that Husserl employs in a related argument alludes to several central principles of 
Hume’s philosophy, including “Hume’s fork” between matters of fact and relations of ideas, the copy 
principle, the associative principles of the imagination, and the conceivability principle. The infamous 
“missing shade of blue” described in Hume’s putative counterexample to the copy principle (discussed in 
Chapter One) is also at play: 
The empirical psychologist, who is accustomed to treating everything psychic as a mere matter of 
fact, will deny [that “primary memory is possible only in continuous annexation to a preceding 
sensation of perception”], of course. He will say: Why should a beginning consciousness that 
commences with a fresh memory without having been preceded by a perception not be 
conceivable? Perception may in fact be necessary to the production of fresh memory. It may in 
fact be the case that human consciousness can have memories, even fresh ones, only after it has 
had perceptions. But the opposite is also conceivable.63 
Although Husserl does not specify which (or which kind of) empirical psychologist he has in mind, the 
target of his criticism resembles Hume more than any other empiricist, especially Brentano. Several 
considerations justify this inference. First, Brentano’s “descriptive psychology” or “phenomenology” 
does not rest upon principles of the criticized kind. Indeed, Brentano’s empiricism has significantly less in 
common with Hume than figures such as Aristotle or Aquinas, as Tassone notes: 
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Brentano is confident that all knowledge stems from some sensory or immediately given content 
or source, but this immediately given intuitive foundation will be said to be capable of 
articulation by apprehension of non-sensory “rational” principles that, in turn, form the 
foundation and basis for the methods used by the natural or positive sciences…. Unlike 
Hume…Brentano refuses to reduce the source of all concepts to either psychological impressions 
or reflection and conjunctions of associations of ideas…. Brentano’s response to Hume is… that 
cause is not always an empirical antecedent.64 
Second, the principles that Husserl invokes accurately reconstruct Hume’s idiosyncratic copy and 
conceivability principles. Third, the alleged conceivability of having a memory (qua copied idea) before a 
perception (qua primary impression) is structurally identical to the “missing shade of blue” example 
discussed in the Treatise and Enquiry. I conclude that the target of Husserl’s criticism and therefore the 
philosopher that Husserl has most squarely in mind during his explorations in this context is Hume. 
Husserl employs the cited passage to criticize the Humean view that each moment of time need 
not be “impressional” or have an impression that corresponds to it. Hume holds that although the mind as 
a general rule can have ideas only after the contents of those ideas have been copied from lively 
impressions, it is conceivable and thus possible that present experience does not involve an impression or 
“impressional experiencing,” but only a simple idea without any accompanying impression. Hume thinks 
that this is not only possible, but occurs often, as when the mind (via the imagination) enters into a 
reverie. In effect, Husserl rejects Hume’s (and not just a Humean) position: “Over against this, we defend 
the a priori necessity that a corresponding perception precedes the fresh memory.”65 The problem is that 
Hume reifies individual perceptions and perception generally by treating impressions and ideas as if they 
were “things” or static items rather than interdependent moments of a continuous unfolding manifold. As 
Husserl puts it in the Logical Investigations, “Here as elsewhere, Hume left this difference [between the 
appearance of an object and appearance itself] quite unnoticed; for him appearance and the apparent 
phenomenon coalesce.”66 Husserl takes phenomenological analysis to show that impression is a necessary 
form of experience presupposed by even the least lively experiences. Properly analyzed, therefore, so-
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called impressions and ideas are intentional manifolds that exhibit the same tripartite structure at every 
moment qua (proto-Jamesian) specious present. In abstraction, we can schematize any moment m of 
continuous impressional flow {…, m – 1, m, m + 1, …} as follows:   
<…>m-1 — < retention — primal impression — protention >m — <…> m+1 
Even so-called ideas necessarily involve the form of “impressional experiencing” represented in this 
schema, for two reasons. First, every act of consciousness necessarily involves both an ideal objective 
meaning and a primary impression of the object presented in accordance with that meaning. If there were 
no primal impression, there would be no intended object, hence no experience. Second, every act of 
consciousness is a “temporal object,” meaning it is temporal or occurs in time. This means that it is 
constituted by a continuous manifold, any moment of which (as Husserl will come to claim) exhibits the 
tripartite structure represented above. 
Husserl is not yet ready to assert the atemporality or self-manifesting nature of the hidden 
manifold emerging in the lectures of 1906-7. Nonetheless, Husserl’s lectures follow the Seefeld 
manuscripts in developing a flow model of time-consciousness by direct engagement with central 
principles of Hume’s philosophy. 
 
8. MANUSCRIPT OF AN “INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF COGNITION” (1909) 
During the summer term of 1909, Husserl delivered a lecture course titled “Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Cognition.” As with the texts examined in §§6-7, Husserl later returned to the original 
manuscript (Nos. 51-2) to provide commentary and alterations (Nos. 53-4), in this case, at the end of 
1911, when the flow model had supplanted the schematic model.67 
Not surprisingly, the phenomenological reduction that Husserl officially introduced in 1907 plays 
a central role in Husserl’s lectures. Husserl’s initial inquiries concern a worry about phenomenological 
reduction that is directly related to temporal passage and our awareness thereof. Specifically, Husserl 
                                                     
67 This is a contentious historical thesis about which there has been much debate. Whether and/or when Husserl 




worries whether phenomenological reduction entails the exclusion of not only the nature of the material 
world, but also “that transcendence that is inherent in memory and retention [in which case] at the end 
we find ourselves in the moment in which we began,” meaning the now-point and nothing more.68 If the 
phenomenological reduction were to entail excluding retention and protention from consciousness, 
Husserl’s theory would be undermined by the same difficulty that he (following James) takes to 
undermine any theory involving temporally unextended moments, including Hume’s. If 
phenomenological reduction were to restrict attention to a temporally unextended present rather than a 
“specious present” that includes retention and protention as essential parts, philosophical inquiry would 
be confined to judgments concerning discontinuous minima that lack “real connections” with immediate 
predecessors and successors. This would make the experience of succession impossible, which directly 
contradicts the apodictically evident fact that experience “flows.” In Husserl’s words, 
“Phenomenologically, therefore, we would not even have the right to speak of a flow of consciousness, of 
a running-off of ever new acts.”69 If the reduction excluded retention and protention, in other words, 
Husserl would have no right to speak of the absolute flow of inner time-consciousness, which at this point 
had emerged as the cornerstone of his theory of temporality and temporal awareness. Two fundamental 
features of Husserl’s phenomenology, namely the phenomenological epoché and inner time-
consciousness, would exclude each other. The results of this exclusion would be devastating. One would 
have to hold adopt a regularity theory of causation, oppose belief in diachronic objectual identity, and 
conceive of personal identity as a fiction—Humean problems that entail “extreme” or “absolute 
skepticism.” The skepticism entailed would be absolute, by Husserl’s lights, in that 
we [could] not even presume to speak of a flow of consciousness, indeed, to speak of anything at 
all, since the absolute now nowhere seems capable of being apprehended when we attempt, in 
abstraction, to leave the flow out of consideration or even to question it.70 
All Husserl’s hopes would vanish. 
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What prevents this disastrous result is the way in which parts of the flow present themselves in 
phenomenological reduction: not as independent parts, but as dependent parts of a tripartite intentional 
manifold consisting of retentional, impressional, and protentional moments. What Husserl refers to as the 
“Cartesian evidence” of a thematizing regard that apprehends that which is given “in its duration as 
something given in itself, absolutely” (pace Descartes’ meditator) entails “that the restriction to the now, 
which is in continuous flux, would be a fiction.”71 The fact that Husserl invokes Hume’s notion of a 
fiction in this context is telling.  
We know with certainty that by the time Husserl introduced the aforementioned problem, 
appreciated its devastating Humean implications, and formulated a solution, he had not only returned to 
Hume’s Treatise but took the Treatise analysis of identity vis-a-vis time to be directly relevant to his own 
lectures and investigations concerning time. Consequently, in referring to the “absolute skepticism” 
entailed by the “fiction” of conceiving of moments of time as atomistic minima, it seems likely, especially 
in light of the evidence presented above, that Hume was once again the principal foil that Husserl had in 
mind. The disastrous philosophical implications of the copy and separability principles make them 
paradigmatic targets of a claim reiterated throughout texts written after the 1904-5 lectures; namely, “that 
we may presuppose nothing as given in advance, use nothing as premises, allow no method of 
investigation that is itself afflicted with the problem.”72 When we presuppose nothing in advance, what 
presents itself as given is that “all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean 
flux.”73 Presentism (à la Augustine) and Humeanism (à la Hume), in contrast, entail “absolute,” 
“extreme,” and “dogmatic skepticism” in contradistinction to the “phenomenological” or “critical” 
skepticism licensed by phenomenological epoché. “Critical,” of course, alludes to Kant’s critical 
philosophy and expresses Husserl’s “transcendental turn” to an idiosyncratic form transcendental idealism 
inaugurated around 1907 and codified in Ideas I, II, and III. Husserl’s allusion to Kant’s critical 
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philosophy is compatible with Hume’s having been both a foil and inspiration, however. Kant was one of 
many philosophers whose dogmatic slumbers Hume interrupted. 
Husserl’s anti-Humean arguments against discontinuity reemerge in texts written in 1911 and 
directly contravene the primacy of discontinuity asserted in Hume’s analysis of time and the separability 
principle that causes Hume to propone the atomicity of temporal moments: 
This continuity [of continuous changes] forms an inseparable unity, indivisible into concrete parts 
that could exist by themselves and indivisible into phases that could exist by themselves, into 
points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole 
running-off, and this is equally true of the phases (the points belonging to the running-off 
continuity).74 
Husserl elaborates on his rejection of these Humean principles by first invoking and then taking himself 
to resolve the problems of neutrality and origin that we adumbrated above vis-à-vis the schematic model: 
But the question is whether it truly and properly makes sense to say that the constituting 
appearances belonging to time-consciousness (to the consciousness of internal time) themselves 
fall into (immanent) time.75 
Husserl holds that one cannot analyze phases of the flow into further phases ad infinitum. This resolves 
the problem of origin without entailing that there are discontinuous temporal minima. Hume contends that 
the discontinuous succession of temporal minima transpires more or less “rapidly”—a term that Husserl 
employs in this context and encloses in scare quotes, perhaps to refer to Hume’s claims about the 
unpredictable rapidity of succession. Against Hume, Husserl contends that the atemporal “flow” of 
absolute time-consciousness is automatic or (we might say) algorithmic.76 This not only contradicts 
Hume’s claim that the succession of distinct perceptions proceeds with greater or lesser speed, but also 
underscores the kind of continuity that presentation of discontinuity (including Humean rapid succession) 
presupposes. 
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9. MURPHY’S ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT AND “RADICAL SUBJECTIVISM” 
To my knowledge, Murphy has produced the only manuscript-length study of Hume’s influence 
on Husserl, which to Murphy’s credit highlights the importance of Hume’s analysis of time vis-à-vis the 
development of Husserl’s views. I agree with Murphy that Hume played a preeminent role in influencing 
Husserl’s mature theory of time-consciousness. That said, I believe—and will argue—that Murphy 
misconstrues both the trajectory of Husserl’s development and the character of Husserl’s mature theory. 
Husserl is anything but a “radical subjectivist.” 
Murphy claims that Hume’s principal influence concerns the conception of genetic 
phenomenology developed in Analyses and employed thereafter in First Philosophy and Formal and 
Transcendental Logic. We have already seen, however, that Hume’s philosophy occasioned a radical shift 
circa 1905-9. Although Murphy rightly emphasizes the importance that Husserl accorded to Hume’s 
analysis of time vis-à-vis individuation,77 he fails to recognize how early Husserl appreciated the 
connection between his and Hume’s accounts and how consequential those connections were for 
Husserl’s emerging theory of time-consciousness. Because Murphy overlooks this pivotal period, he dates 
Hume’s influence as occurring during the 1920’s. 
It may be true that in 1909 Husserl had not yet introduced “genetic phenomenology” by that 
name. Nonetheless, the analyses that Husserl conducted in the texts considered in §§6-8 are genetic in the 
strict sense, insofar as they aim to clarify the origin of constitution and the objects constituted therein. On 
this point I agree with Bernet, Kern, and Marbach that prior to Husserl’s explicit development of genetic 
phenomenology from 1917-21 (versus 1920-6, as Murphy claims), Husserl already employed the term 
“genetic” in a technical sense that immediately connects it with time-consciousness.78 I would add that 
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Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness also counts as “genetic” in the technical sense of later 
writings, for the analyses conducted in and after the summer of 1905 explicitly aim to clarify the origin 
(qua “passive synthesis”) of temporality and temporal awareness. 
My oppositions to Murphy’s account extend beyond such historicizing. One point of difference 
pertains to Murphy’s claim that Husserl conceives of time-consciousness as being both noetic, meaning 
that it is part of the real (spatiotemporal) content of acts of consciousness, and noematic, meaning that it is 
part of the ideal (non-spatiotemporal) content of acts of consciousness. This claim disregards the 
difference between time-consciousness being an atemporal manifold and the unities that are thereby 
constituted as being temporal, including acts of consciousness qua temporal objects. The “noetic” 
moment of intentional consciousness, as D. W. Smith perspicuously notes, denotes the sense-giving part 
of an act of consciousness that occurs in time, as does the act itself.79 Time-consciousness thus cannot be 
noetic (spatiotemporal), as Murphy claims, because time-consciousness per se is not and cannot be 
temporal. The shortcomings of the schematic model vis-à-vis the problems of neutrality and origin helped 
Husserl realize this fact. Relatedly, noeses (as parts of determinate acts of consciousness)80 cannot have a 
“temporal genesis” in time-consciousness, as Murphy claims. The reason is that the intentionalities of 
time-consciousness that constitute objects and the manifolds in which they appear are not and cannot be 
temporal. If noeses had a temporal genesis in time-consciousness, the problem of origin and infinite 
regress that it entails would ensue. Husserl took the introduction of the atemporal manifold of time-
consciousness to obviate these difficulties. 
These inconsistencies are not mere minutia, but concern the ethos of Husserl’s philosophy as a 
whole and motivate Murphy’s thesis that Hume inspired Husserl to embrace a form of radical 
subjectivism. Murphy’s contention that Husserl’s radical subjectivism derives from a “solipsistic point of 
departure—the pure ego [which is] no less solipsistic than Hume’s,” fails to appreciate the results of the 
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solipsistic thought experiment that Husserl conducted earlier in Ideas II (1912).81 Husserl conducted this 
thought experiment (as he reveals in 1931) specifically to counter-act the alleged solipsism of Ideas I.82 
The dialectic of the argument begins by assuming the possibility of a solipsistic world, a premise that 
leads Husserl to spend approximately eighty pages engaging in detailed analysis of seemingly solipsistic 
phenomena and structures of experience.  
Eventually Husserl rejects this solipsistic assumption, despite the fact that “when we carry out an 
apprehension of a thing we do not, it seems, always co-posit a number of fellow men [sic] and, 
specifically, co-posit them as ones who are to be, as it were, invoked.”83 What Husserl’s solipsistic 
thought experiment shows, by his own lights, is that “strictly speaking, the solus ipse is unaware of the 
Objective Body in the full and proper sense... In other words, the solus ipse does not truly merit its 
name.”84 The subject of such an extreme thought experiment inevitably recognizes that it is still “a human 
subject, that is, still an intersubjective object, still apprehending and positing himself [sic] as such” (ibid.). 
A fortiori, the phenomenological subject’s experiences of intersubjectively constituted objects present 
themselves as occurring in “the one Objective time” shared by other subjects, in relation to which the pure 
ego finds itself fundamentally in the relation of empathy. 
Husserl’s phenomenological point of departure is anything but solipsistic. Instead “the point of 
departure is here, too, a transferred co-presence: to the seen Body [of the Other] there belongs a psychic 
life, just as there does to my Body.”85 
Murphy’s attribution of solipsism and radical subjectivism to Husserl’s later phenomenology also 
disregards the intersubjective constitution of objects accomplished via shared ideal meanings, a form of 
constitution presupposed by any pure ego’s individual noeses (or acts). Husserl defended this position in 
Ideas I, II, and III, which finds even fuller expression in the Crisis of European Sciences when Husserl 
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explicates the interrelated notions of an “historical a priori” and “lifeworld” that constitute the 
background of any act of consciousness, however solipsistic it might seem to be. Bracketing details, the 
important point is that any seemingly solipsistic experience presupposes an intersubjectively constituted 
background of available meanings. The ability to experience a mug of sencha as a mug of sencha versus 
green liquid in a container, for example, presupposes the ideal meanings <mug> and <sencha> that are 
available to many pure egos, even those not yet familiar with them.   
The few passages that Murphy cites in support of his attribution of radical subjectivism do not 
entail what he infers. For example, he cites Husserl’s claim that “anyone who seriously intends to become 
a philosopher must ‘once in his [sic] life’ withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to overthrow 
and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting,” and claims that it exhibits 
methodological similarities with Descartes and Hume—Husserl’s two principal influences, as noted 
above.86 Yet unlike Descartes’ meditator and (arguably) the inquirer of Hume’s Treatise, Husserl’s point 
of departure is not solipsistic. For Husserl, the “world [that] goes on being for [the pure ego]” after 
phenomenological reduction is not only the pure ego’s world.87 It is rather an intersubjectively constituted 
life-world in which the pure ego discovers itself as always-already having (had) experiences that are 
partially determined by intersubjectively constituted and available meanings, meanings which pre-exist 
the pure ego and some, if not most of which, will survive it. Rojcewicz and Schuwer have noted that 
when Husserl speaks of the objects (Objekte) of intentional acts of consciousness, he means a specific 
kind of Gegenstände (his term for any item whatsoever that can be intended in any way): intersubjectively 
constituted Gegenstände.88 This entails that, in principle, whatever can be intended involves 
intersubjective constitution of some kind, particularly with respect to shareable ideal meanings. Referring 
to Husserl’s starting point as solipsistic and Husserl’s phenomenology on the whole as radically 
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The interpretation that I have proffered explains why formulations from throughout Husserl’s 
corpus uncannily echo even as they deviate from Hume’s, among them explicit statements about the 
essential difference between distinctness and separability. In 1929, Husserl emphasizes that: 
The temporal positions are not separated from one another by means of self-differentiating acts; 
the unity of the perception here is an unbroken unity without any internal differences interrupting 
it. On the other hand, there do exist differences inasmuch as each time-point is individually 
distinct from every other one—but precisely distinct and not separated.89 
Here Husserl’s rejection of the separability principles motivates a direct response to Hume’s account of 
time vis-à-vis individuation. Having phenomenologically modified Hume’s question about the 
relationship between the ideas of time, identity, and their origin, Husserl answers Hume’s question 
regarding time and individuation—suitably modified—as follows: “This undergoing of continuous 
retentional modification is the essential part of the constitution of an identical object, one that, in the 
broadest sense, persists.”90 Two years later Husserl reiterates his answer to Hume’s modified question: “If 
we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-
ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time.”91 
Husserl’s answer to Hume’s modified question finds even fuller expression in Experience and Judgment: 
Thus, the sensuous data, on which we can always turn our regard as toward the abstract stratum 
of concrete things, are themselves also already the product of a constitutive synthesis, which, as 
the lowest level, presupposes the operations of the synthesis in internal time-consciousness. These 
operations, as belonging to the lowest level, necessarily link all the others. Time-consciousness is 
the original seat of the constitution of the unity of identity in general.92 
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Holographic writer that he is,93 Husserl effectively if unwittingly exemplifies a claim introduced as early 
as the Logical Investigations: “Hume’s thoughts, suitably modified, provide a basis on which a workable 
theory may very well be built.”94 Hume’s thoughts about time and temporality, suitably modified, 
provided a basis for the workable theory of time-consciousness that Husserl eventually built.
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III. WHITEHEAD’S INHERITANCE AND RECEPTACLE THEORIES OF 
PERSONAL IDENTITY: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO WHITEHEAD’S PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM 
Alfred North Whitehead is known principally for coauthoring Principia Mathematica with 
Bertrand Russell, the doxa being that Whitehead focused on providing proofs while Russell generated 
almost all of the work’s philosophical content. The claim most attributed to Whitehead is that philosophy 
is a series of footnotes to Plato; by the letter: “The safest general characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”1 Unfortunately, little is widely 
known about the philosophical content of the system that Whitehead began developing as early as 1920, 
the doxa being that it is a process philosophy which sharply diverges from the Principia’s logicism and 
that Whitehead’s recondite writing makes it seem impenetrable or dubious—as if over twenty years of 
output were reducible to the impressionistic, naïve speculations of a mathematician. 
Whitehead’s philosophy is speculative, even by his own lights, but in an idiosyncratic sense that 
allies him with Hume and Husserl: “The speculative school appeals to direct insight, and endeavours to 
indicate its meanings by further appeal to situations which promote such specific insights. It then enlarges 
the dictionary.”2 Despite eighteen-year-old Hume’s resistance to the speculative philosophy of the 
ancients and moderns, Whitehead’s speculative methodology agrees with Hume’s in several respects. 
Like Hume’s logic of human nature and Husserl’s logic of transcendental phenomenology, Whitehead’s 
logic of experience allegedly grounds all sciences including (so claims the author of Principia) deductive 
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logic.3 Furthermore, Whitehead agrees with Hume and Husserl that experience, while fallible, allows for 
“superior penetration,” “categorial intuition,” or direct insight about the nature of not only experience, but 
reality as such. He holds that such insights constrain all deductive, inductive, and abductive (hence 
metaphysical and cosmological) endeavors. Unlike Hume, then, and like Husserl, Whitehead allows for 
and insists upon more than probable reasoning. He takes direct insight to be infallible, no less, yet takes 
the concepts and symbolism that we typically employ to express such insights to be are extremely 
fallible—hence the predominance of substance ontology.4 
Whereas Hume holds that most philosophical errors result from the imagination’s fictions, 
Whitehead holds that they result primarily from the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, “the accidental 
error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete,” which we can recast in more familiar terms as 
hypostatization or reification.5 Noonan has argued that Hume reifies perceptions and relations by 
conceiving of them as independently existing things, a claim with which Whitehead would tentatively 
agree.6 Hume commits “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” in this respect, because he begins from an 
inaccurate and inadequate starting point: perceptions qua (potentially) independent existences. Philosophy 
functions as the critic of such fallacious abstractions in scientific disciplines and society more broadly. 
The philosopher’s role is to recognize instances of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness and refocus 
attention on more concrete starting points, whether that involves more, less, or different structure. This 
ensures that a system of thought or experience will be more accurate, adequate, and generalizable vis-à-
vis its respective domain. The philosopher’s explanatory purpose is not merely to identify more concrete 
starting points, however, but to ensure that a system’s starting point enables it to explain more abstract 
phenomena to which concrete phenomena give rise. This purpose is especially germane to philosophical 
inquiry since philosophical systems, by Whitehead’s lights, explain the emergence of relatively abstract 
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entities such as abstract ideas (Hume) or a priori forms (Husserl) from relatively concrete entities such as 
perceptions (Hume) or experiences (Husserl).7 Apropos, Whitehead measures the success of a 
philosophical system “by its comparative avoidance of this fallacy [of misplaced concreteness], when 
thought is restricted within its categories.”8 
Whitehead argues that the principal fallacies of the “Western” philosophical tradition are: first, 
that basic entities—from Aristotelian substances to Humean perceptions—can have independent 
existence; and second, that substances or things are ontologically primary, hence an appropriate basis for 
philosophical theorization. When one suspends (“brackets”) these assumptions and consults the nature of 
immediate experience, two contrary insights present themselves directly, infallibly: everything is 
dependent; all things flow. (Here we stand in immediate proximity to the Buddhist doctrines of dependent 
origination and impermanence. This is especially “auspicious” because dependent origination and 
impermanence are not only mutually dependent, but also presuppose a “background” of indestructible 
space that strikingly resembles the receptacle postulated in Plato’s Timaeus—precisely the notion that 
Whitehead feels he must invoke, as we shall see, to ameliorate the Humean inadequacy of his initial 
theory of personal identity.) Whitehead’s starting point, accordingly, is the experience of relative 
permanence amid inexorable flux: 
That “all things flow” is the first vague generalization which the unsystematized, barely analysed, 
intuition of men has produced…. Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral 
experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the 
final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around which we must 
weave our philosophical system.9 
That all entities are mutually dependent and flow is, for Whitehead, not only compatible with relative 
permanence, but also presupposes it. The reason is that whatever becomes must become somehow, that is, 
in accordance with some form or pattern. The form of an entity’s becoming is (partially) determined by 
what Whitehead refers to as “eternal objects,” which effectively function as quasi-Aristotelian immanent 
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universals.10 Whitehead’s emphasis on the interdependence of flux and permanence remains prominent 
throughout his corpus and receives special attention in Whitehead’s final metaphysical contribution, 
“Immortality” of 1941. There, Whitehead underscores not only the essential fusion of activity and value, 
meaning the forms in virtue of which any entity (qua activity) has a determinate shape, but also personal 
activities and values. 
Here an essential qualification is in order. Strictly speaking, Whitehead is not a dualist, but a 
monist of (idiosyncratic) sorts.11 How dynamic entities and even temporality itself come to be 
presupposes not only eternal objects (forms) per se, but also the fusion and “ingression” of those forms 
into actual occasions. Like the foundational role played by absolute consciousness in Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Whitehead’s “Category of the Ultimate” or ontological becoming is responsible for the 
atemporal constitution of not only all entities, but also temporality itself. The mind-bending twist is that, 
unlike Husserl, yet like James, Whitehead holds that continuity becomes but becoming is not continuous: 
But if we admit that “something becomes,” it is easy, by employing Zeno’s method, to prove that 
there can be no continuity of becoming. There is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of 
becoming…. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but “becoming” is not itself extensive.12 
Whitehead’s explanation of “Zeno’s method” is notoriously opaque. Fortunately, von Wright’s 
elucidation (via Hartshorne’s reconstruction) is crystalline: 
In sum, apart from logical niceties, the argument is: a thing cannot have contradictory predicates 
at one and the same time; but, if change is continuous, no time can be found, unless an absolute 
instant, in which a process is not both p and not-p for some predicate. And, in an instant, nothing 
can happen, no change or process can take place…. The illusion is the continuousness of 
becoming, the reality is the succession of units.13 
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Although Whitehead rejects Hume’s doctrine that time qua “mere succession” is discontinuous, he agrees 
that what grounds experience and makes it possible is discontinuous. Yet we do not experience mere 
succession, but forms of succession.14 
Had Whitehead read Husserl, he would have lauded not only Husserl’s methodology, but also the 
increasing emphasis on flux and process that characterizes his work (which, as argued in Chapter Two, 
occurs as a direct result of Husserl’s sustained engagement with Hume). Fittingly, Whitehead begins 
“where” and approximately how an empiricist or phenomenologist begins: with that with which one is 
most intimately and directly acquainted: “oneself,” the denotation of which could turn out to be neither 
one nor a “self,” as traditionally conceived. Whitehead’s methodology, like Husserl’s, is “Humean” in 
this respect, despite disagreements as to which starting point is most concrete. 
These adumbrations allow us to appreciate the problem of personal identity as it arises within 
Whitehead’s system. If becoming is discontinuous, atemporal, and atomistic, what explains the 
“inescapable fact” of personal identity over time—which for Whitehead, as for Hume and the early 
Humean Husserl, is tantamount to personal unity? 
 
2. WHITEHEAD’S ENGAGEMENT WITH HUME 
Surveying Whitehead’s engagements with Hume will enable us to appreciate more fully why 
Whitehead believed (for a time) that his initial model of personal identity was inadequate for precisely the 
same reason as Hume’s: both allegedly “attenuate” human personality into a genetic relation between 
occasions of experience without explaining their principle of unity. 
Whitehead lauds Hume for the potentially revolutionary insights occasioned in his inquiries, such 
that “we must reverence him as one of the greatest philosophers”; “Hume’s Treatise will remain as the 
irrefutable basis for all subsequent philosophical thought.”15 Whitehead also praises Hume for his “clarity 
of genius [in stating] the fundamental point” that specific body parts, such as the eyes and hands, play an 
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essential role in the transmission from less to more intricately structured nexuses of experience. 
Whitehead chides “Hume’s followers,” in contrast, for the obscurity of their statements and neglecting the 
importance of the body: in effect, what Husserl refers to as the lived body (Leib) versus mere physical 
body (Körper).16  
That said, Whitehead consistently criticizes Hume’s empiricism (more so, indeed, than Husserl) 
and finds greater inspiration in Locke’s later writings.17 Whereas Husserl’s estimation of Hume becomes 
increasingly positive and Husserl’s philosophy becomes increasingly Humean, Whitehead’s relationship 
to Hume remains predominantly negative. Whitehead takes Hume’s failures to be exceptionally 
instructive, however; and Whitehead celebrates Hume’s willingness to acknowledge the problems raised 
by his own philosophy, a virtue which Hume’s followers, by Whitehead’s lights, would do well to 
embrace.18 
Nature of 1920 never mentions Hume, whereas the 1925 Lowell Lectures comprising Science 
include ample references to Hume and Humeanism. Whitehead’s serious engagement with Hume’s 
philosophy thus seems to have occurred during 1920-5. We find initial indications of this in Relativity of 
1922, though there, Whitehead forgoes detailed examination and mostly mentions Hume in passing. From 
1925 until “Immortality” of 1941, examination of Hume’s philosophy figures prominently in Whitehead’s 
writings, particularly in Symbolism of 1927 and Whitehead’s magnum opus, Process of 1929, just as the 
fullest expression of Whitehead’s process philosophy was coming into view. 
At the beginning of the Lowell Lectures, Whitehead criticizes Humean philosophers of science 
for denying science’s rationality, a conclusion which Whitehead thinks “lies upon the surface of Hume’s 
philosophy.”19 The problem with Hume’s and Humeans’ approach is that they assume that causes disclose 
no information about their effects; and this, in turn, entails that the emergence of an effect from its cause 
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“must be entirely arbitrary.”20 On this assumption, science is relegated to establish and systematize 
“entirely arbitrary connections which are not warranted by anything intrinsic to the natures either of 
causes or effects” (ibid.). Humean causation, consequently, reduces science to a “degenerate… medley of 
ad hoc hypotheses” versus a system of universal laws (ibid.). Whitehead’s criticism of Humean causation 
and its implications for scientific inquiry, therefore, parallels the criticism of Hume’s “moderate 
empiricism” that Husserl leveled two decades earlier.21 
Relatedly, Whitehead argues (as Husserl does in the Logical Investigations) against Hume’s copy 
principle and theory of abstract ideas. Whitehead takes Hume’s concession about the “missing shade of 
blue” (to wit, that it is conceivable, hence possible, for a simple idea to arise even when its object was not 
previously sensed) to illustrate the copy principle’s explanatory inadequacy. The problem is not 
specifically that Hume’s counterexample is an exception to a general rule; for Hume takes the copy 
principle to be an empirical maxim that holds almost invariably, not an a priori law that holds universally 
and necessarily. The primary problem from Whitehead’s perspective is that Hume’s counterexample 
demonstrates that the mind employs another principle, in accordance with which “conceptual feelings” 
can give rise to “physical feelings.” Put differently, the counterexample shows that “there is an 
origination of conceptual feeling, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reason of its 
germaneness to the basic data.”22 Recast in Humean terminology, this entails that ideas need not and do 
not even generally have their origins in corresponding impressions, and that impressions of sensation can 
have their origin in ideas, not only the body (especially the brain) or “animal spirits.” Whitehead still 
allows that an extension of Hume’s copy principle is partially correct because ideas of reflection can and 
do derive from actual facts.23 In this (paradigmatic) way, Whitehead takes Hume’s failure to highlight an 
essential aspect of lived experience, particularly as it pertains to personal identity: the fact that one’s 
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values, beliefs, dispositions, intentions, volitions, and thoughts can be causally efficacious in enabling 
that person to introduce novelty into her experience and the universe more broadly. 
In addition to refuting Humean causation and the copy principle, Whitehead repudiates Hume’s 
separability principle (that whatever is psychologically separable is ipso facto ontologically separable and 
capable of independent existence) and Hume’s attendant claims about the possibility of independent 
existence. Again, Hume’s failure is instructive in that it motivates Whitehead to emphasize a 
fundamentally opposed principle: the doctrine of relativity, according to which all events, while 
epistemically distinguishable via intellectual abstraction, are ontologically inseparable in the sense of 
being mutually dependent. In Whitehead’s words, “it belongs to the nature of a ‘being’ that it is a 
potential for every ‘becoming.’”24 (Here we stand in immediate proximity to Buddhism’s metaphor of 
Indra’s net.) Hume’s separability principle exemplifies the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, in this 
respect. 
Perhaps the most promising yet disappointing dimension of Hume’s philosophy, from 
Whitehead’s perspective, is that it recognizes the atomicity of experience and reveals its essential 
dynamicity without appreciating the latter’s revolutionary significance. Despite the fact that Hume never 
moved away from “the subject-predicate habits of thought” that entrain erroneous beliefs about the 
primacy of static particulars,25 Whitehead holds that 
Hume's train of thought unwittingly emphasizes “process.” His very scepticism is nothing but the 
discovery that there is something in the world which cannot be expressed in analytic 
propositions…. But, in effect, Hume discovered that an actual entity is at once a process, and is 
atomic; so that in no senses is it the sum of its parts.26 
A fortiori, Whitehead highlights the significance of the fact that Hume’s discovery of experience’s 
dynamicity and atomicity occurs specifically when he examines the mind or soul.27 Despite Whitehead’s 
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consistent criticism of Hume, he allows that “from the point of view of the philosophy of organism, the 
credit must be given to Hume that he emphasized the ‘process’ inherent in the fact of being a mind. His 
analysis of that process is faulty in its details.”28 As both Whitehead and Husserl recognize, Hume’s 
analyses reveal revolutionary insights: the primacy of becoming in constituting not only experience, but 
temporality itself. 
Hume’s proto-processual theory of the mind’s unity helps Whitehead embrace that which Hume 
felt he could not: causal nexus beyond mere constant conjunction. In his 1933 Adventures of Ideas, 
Whitehead claims that the “general character of this observed relation [of causation, which Hume 
presupposes,] explains at once memory and personal identity.”29 In the sentence immediately preceding 
Whitehead’s introduction of Platonic “receptacles,” which are conceived as structures proposed to situate 
concrete events, he refers to Hume’s and James’s inadequate accounts of personal unity and takes the 
same inadequacy to undermine the model of personal identity developed in Science, Symbolism, and 
Process. Thus while Hume and James were right to reject the notion of a self-identical Soul-Substance, 
“the problem remains for them, as it does for the philosophy of organism, to provide an adequate account 
of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance.”30 
Hume’s philosophy played a critical role in the development of Whitehead’s thought. For some, 
the term “neo-Humean” might sound too strong, as Whitehead’s philosophy is not Humean in the way 
that Husserl’s phenomenology comes to be. Yet the philosophy of organism’s indebtedness to Hume, 
despite his failures and empiricistically unwarranted presuppositions, seems to warrant its being neo-
Humean (or post-Humean, if one prefers). 
Hume’s failures and presuppositions are especially germane to Whitehead’s reflections regarding 
the problem of personal identity. Before we examine Whitehead’s relatively recondite reflections, 
however, it will useful to reflect on why personal identity generally presents itself as a problem. 
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3. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Expressed most simply, the challenge regarding personal identity—a perennial philosophical 
problem—is to explain how persons are both the same yet not the same at different moments. 
Correlatively, one must explain what kind of entity persons are such that so-called “personal identity” 
(whatever that locution denotes) is possible. How one explains personal identity has considerable 
implications for one’s broader ontology; for the way in which persons persist is generally thought at least 
to resemble, if not to exemplify, the way in which persistent objects survive the inexorable flux of time 
and change.  
Given its philosophical and extra-philosophical implications, the problem of personal identity 
continues to garner interest, especially from metaphysicians concerned with whether persistence amounts 
to the endurance of three-dimensional particulars or the perdurance of four-dimensional particulars. That 
said, from a Whiteheadian perspective the majority of metaphysicians share an assumption about the kind 
of entity that persons are; namely, a particular of some kind, specifically one that either endures, meaning 
persons exist “wholly” whenever they occur, or perdures, meaning persons persist in virtue of having not 
only spatial but also temporal parts that “wholly” exemplify incompatible properties. Treatments that 
reject this generic assumption have virtually no influence in contemporary debates. Indeed, most are not 
even recognized as candidate theories because the distinction between endurantism (hence three-
dimensionalism) and perdurantism (hence four-dimensionalism) appears to be mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
Several interpreters have sought to remedy this situation.31 Even if one rejects (relatively) 
“revisionary” theories tout court, consideration of positions with radically different premises helps 
highlight assumptions operating in the “presuppositional depth-structure” of contemporary debates, as 
Seibt has argued.32 Such an approach also can reinforce one’s convictions about her or his preferred 
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premises.33 The present work aims to occasion such (re)considerations by critically examining 
Whitehead’s theories (and not just theory) of personal identity, which have been almost completely 
overlooked, despite their putative abductive virtues. 
In this vein, the purpose of the present project is twofold: to defend a novel historical thesis about 
the development of Whitehead’s thought and to critically examine Whitehead’s contributions. My 
historical thesis, in brief, is that Whitehead developed two incompatible theories of personal identity. I 
will refer to these as his inheritance and receptacle theories or models, respectively. The incompatibility 
of these models concerns how diachronic unity (and not just diachronic continuity) is possible. Whereas 
the inheritance model explains diachronic unity via recurring elements in temporally continuous but 
numerically distinct forms, the receptacle model takes such recurrence to be necessary but not sufficient, 
since it (like Humean association) appears to “[attenuate] human personality into a genetic relation 
between occasions of human experience.”34 In attempting to redress this inadequacy, Whitehead’s 
receptacle model posits formless receptacles: abstract structures that function as the “metaphysical space” 
in which and in virtue of which distinct experiences become unified within one life. The receptacle 
theory’s constructive motivations derive from Plato; its critical motivations derive from Hume and James. 
More specifically, I will argue that Whitehead developed his inheritance theory from the Lowell 
Lectures of 1925 (which later in 1925 would become Science), through the Barbour-Page lectures of 1927 
(which later in 1927 would become Symbolism) until the Gifford lectures of 1927-28 (which in 1929 
would become Process). In his Presidential Address to the 1931 Eastern Division of the American 
Philosophical Association (which in 1933 would become part of Adventures), Whitehead abandoned the 
inheritance theory for the receptacle theory. However, by the time he delivered lectures at Wellesley 
College during 1937-8 (which in 1938 would become Modes), Whitehead jettisoned the receptacle theory 
and returned to refine his reasonings regarding and expressions of the inheritance theory. He continued to 
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refine the inheritance model until his last publicly spoken and written words on the subject: his 1941 
Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality titled, appropriately, “Immortality.” 
One advantage of interpreting Whitehead in this way is that it explains why he introduced Timaen 
receptacles in 1931 yet never clarified how that category was supposed to accord with the categorial 
scheme presented in Process. It seems not to have been recognized that Whitehead’s writings present two 
incompatible theories. Indeed, most interpreters assume that either one or the other model counts as 
Whitehead’s, “the Whiteheadian,” or even, as Mingarelli maintains, “the process conception of personal 
identity.”35 
My systematic claims are as follows. First, Whitehead’s inheritance model accords with the 
categorial scheme presented in Process. As such, it may appeal to those who take personal identity to 
involve entities that are essentially dynamic, but reject the relevance or existence of diachronic objectual 
identity: the (putative) binary equivalence relation that every entity bears to itself and only itself, even 
after undergoing intrinsic change.36 Whitehead’s receptacle model, in contrast, inspired as it is by Hume’s 
inadequacies and Plato’s Timaeus, accords with speculations introduced in Adventures. Yet this model is 
not promising even for those who propone process ontology, reject the possibility of diachronic objectual 
identity, and defend mereological essentialism. The latter view holds that wholes have their parts 
necessarily, such that any change in the parts of whole1 entails that, if another whole2 is composed of not 
all of the parts of whole1 or all the parts of whole1 plus additional parts, whole1 and whole2 are not 
identical. 
Given his fundamental commitments, Whitehead was right to jettison the receptacle theory and 
refine the inheritance theory. The reason is that the categorial scheme proffered in Process already 
contains the resources required (by Whitehead’s, though not necessarily this author’s lights) to adequately 
account for personal identity and our sense thereof. More specifically, the category of the ultimate 
postulated in Process, which also goes by the names of process, becoming, fluency, concrescence, and 
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transition, obviates the need for Timaen receptacles. Explaining why requires a foray into Whitehead’s 
philosophy. 
 
4. SUBSTANTIAL PARTICULARS AND PROCESSES 
Whitehead’s process approach does not readily cohere with any of the prominent approaches to 
personal identity. Following Olson and others, we can categorize those approaches into brute-physicalist, 
psychological-continuity, anti-criterialist, and no-self views.37 (Whitehead’s inheritance model shares 
some affinities with specific psychological-continuity and no-self views, as we will see.) Despite 
widespread disagreement between proponents of these views, which occurs at both generic and specific 
levels, the majority of theorists maintain that persons are and persist in virtue of being substantial 
particulars of some kind. 
Take Perry’s influential introduction to the issue: 
I believe this general framework [of distinguishing between identity and unity relations] should 
be applied to the concept of a person, and the question of personal identity. This may not be 
obvious. After all, baseball games are not “things” in the ordinary sense, but “processes.” And 
they break up easily into discrete events, most of which begin with a pitch and end with a noise 
from the umpire. But persons are not processes, and there is no one natural way to break up a 
person’s life into discrete events. But although a person is not commonly thought of as a process, 
we can think of his [sic] life or personal history as a process.38 
Perry assumes without argument that persons are not processes and intimates that it would be absurd to 
maintain that persons are processes rather than substantial particulars of some kind. Consequently, when 
on the next page he describes the problem of personal identity as concerning what “kind of object [it is 
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that] persists through time,” what Perry countenances as persistent objects, hence candidate kinds, rules 
out processes from the outset.39 
The generic locution “substantial particular” encompasses not only traditional three-dimensional 
substances à la Aristotle, Descartes, Lowe, et al., but also four-dimensional person-stages and space-time 
worms à la Lewis and Sider. Seibt argues that it also encompasses bundles of perceptions or tropes à la 
Hume, Campbell, and Simons, despite the apparently “revisionary” character of such theories. Each of the 
aforementioned kinds counts as a substantial particular, in that instantiations of each are supposed to be 
existentially independent and are able to remain essentially (or numerically) the same through accidental 
(or qualitative) change. Relatedly, substantial particulars are often taken to be the kind of entity that 
ground true propositions about what persists, where “persists” means either endure or perdure. 
Correlatively, most philosophers take substantial particulars to be metaphysically primary (“primary in 
being”) or somehow asymmetrically privileged (“identity independent”), whereas processes are supposed 
to be derivative, dependent happenings that substantial particulars undergo.40 Take Grenon and B. Smith’s 
paradigmatic formulations, for example:  
[Continuant] entities come in several kinds. Examples are: you, the planet Earth, a piece of rock; 
but also: your suntan, a rabbit-hole, Leeds. All of these entities exist in full in any instant of time 
at which they exist at all and they preserve their identity over time through a variety of different 
sorts of changes. You are the same person today as you were yesterday. In addition, however, 
[our Basic Formal Ontology] endorses a view according to which the world contains occurrents, 
more familiarly referred to as processes, events, activities, changes. Occurrents include: your 
smiling, her walking, the landing of an aircraft, the passage of a rainstorm over a forest, the 
rotting of fallen leaves. These entities are four-dimensional…. Substances [a kind of continuant] 
do not depend for their continued existence upon other entities…. Processuals are occurrents or 
happenings; they involve participants of a [continuant] kind, and they are dependent on their 
participants.41 
The authors present these claims as part of a Basic Formal Ontology that purports to remain 
metaphysically neutral on substantive issues such as the nature of persistence and personal identity. The 
aforementioned formulations, however, are not metaphysically neutral. They rule out (without argument) 
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theories according to which processes or occurrents more broadly are asymmetrically fundamental vis-à-
vis continuants, including continuants that are prima facie substantial. 
Similarly, P. F. Strawson’s well-known meta-linguistic denial of the primacy of processes 
presupposes the principal point that it purports to prove; namely, that only material things qua substantial 
“basic particulars” can be the proper referents of our claims about persistence, including personal 
identity.42 Strawson holds that the constitution of the referential framework that we employ to distinguish 
and reidentify concrete entities requires a kind that confers upon that framework the kind’s fundamental 
characteristics. Since spatiotemporal location is essential for our referential needs, whatever kind confers 
spatiotemporal location upon our referential matrix and does so without necessary reference to any other 
kind is the best candidate for the status of basic particulars. 
Processes, Strawson argues, are inadequate to the task, despite, or rather because of, the fact that 
certain processes (the paradigm of which Strawson takes to be flashes and bangs) can in exceptional 
situations be distinguished and reidentified without reference to any other kind. The problem is that the 
type-homogenous framework underlying the distinction and reidentfication of such processes has 
exceedingly limited referential power, by Strawson’s lights, power completely inadequate to our 
referential needs. A process-homogeneous framework suffices only when all relevant parties have directly 
experienced the locatable sequence(s) to which one refers. In other cases, nothing guarantees that the 
series of events that one employs for identificatory purposes is identical with any similar series that 
someone else employs for identificatory purposes.43 
And the fundamental limitations of states, processes, events and conditions, as independently 
identifiable particulars, is their failure to supply frameworks of this [type-homogeneous] kind 
which are at all adequate to our referring needs. Still less can they supply, of themselves, a single, 
comprehensive and continuously usable framework of this kind.44 
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The only kind that can of itself supply such a framework, Strawson alleges, is that of material things. 
Only material things can confer upon our referential framework the space-time matrix essential to the 
distinguishability and reidentification of concrete entities—including not only processes, but also the 
material bodies on which they asymmetrically depend. Only the category of three-dimensional things that 
endure through time, in other words, “supplies enduring occupiers of space possessing sufficiently stable 
relations to meet, and hence to create, the needs with which the use of such a [unified spatiotemporal] 
framework confronts us.”45 Material bodies, therefore, are basic, whereas processes are not and cannot be 
basic. 
The problem with this argument, Rescher argues, is that it begs the question. Physical processes 
exemplify all of the features—spatiotemporal stability and endurance, diversity, richness, interpersonal 
accountability, and so on—that Strawson’s analysis requires.46 Rescher conceives of processes as 
physically embodied entities that occupy sufficiently definite places and last for sufficiently long times to 
function as the coordinate markers of our spatiotemporal referential matrix.47 The sufficiency of physical 
processes for referential purposes becomes evident when we consider two facts. First, there is a wide 
range of “unowned” physical processes, such as cold front movements and lightning flashes, which do not 
asymmetrically depend for their existence or identity on material bodies. Second, “it is theoretically 
possible to reconceptualize material bodies as complexes of physical processes, while the reverse—
reconceptualization of physical processes as complexes of material objects—is just not on.”48 The alleged 
upshot is that Strawson’s framework, like Perry’s, Grenon and Smith’s, and so many others, assumes the 
question-begging process reducibility thesis: that processes asymmetrically depend for their existence and 
identity on substantial particulars of some kind. 
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Process philosophers like Whitehead, Sellars, Rescher, and Seibt, in concert with metaphysicians 
like Steen,49 reject the claim that processes are derivative, asymmetrically dependent happenings. With 
the proviso that “process philosophy” denotes a wide range of theories for which the notion of process is 
not univocal, process philosophers defend the strong claim that processes are fundamental; or less 
strongly, that it is theoretically preferable (say, on abductive grounds) to conceive of processes as being 
fundamental. On such views, all “things” that appear to remain one and the same over time, especially 
what prima facie might appear to be a substantial particular, are dynamic achievements of relative 
stability amid the inexorable flux of time and change. Explaining reality in terms of interfering processes, 
including the phenomenon of personal identity, is thus thought to be more accurate, adequate, 
parsimonious, and/or elegant. 
Whether these claims are legitimate is irrelevant to the purposes of the present study: clarifying 
the historical development of Whitehead’s thought and critically examining his theories of personal 
identity, with a final proviso that contra principia negantem non est disputandum. My arguments do not 
depend on whether substantial particulars or processes are fundamental or whether one generic category 
asymmetrically grounds (all) others. 
 
5. WHITEHEAD’S BASIC CATEGORIES 
Whitehead employs the technical terms actual entity and actual occasion synonymously to refer 
to the basic existents of temporal reality; that is, what becomes.50 He employs the technical term eternal 
object to refer to the most basic existents of atemporal reality; that is, forms that partially determine how 
an entity or occasion, which is itself a process, becomes. Reality per se consists of syntheses of these two 
interdependent categories of existence,51 whereby eternal objects “ingress” into actual occasions 
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somewhat like Aristotelian universals are occurrently exemplified in individual substances via their 
modes.52 The forms of some entities, such as non-living occasions, are almost completely determined by 
the eternal objects pertinent to their becoming. The form of entities with more intricate structure, such as 
living and especially conscious occasions, is less determined. Certain grades of existence can introduce 
novelty into how they become. 
Crucially, the ingression of eternal objects into actual occasions depends not on another category 
of existence, but on what Whitehead refers to as the “Category of the Ultimate,” which all categories of 
existence presuppose. The category of the ultimate involves three interdependent notions whereby many 
become one: (i) many, which represents diversity, difference, and multiplicity; (ii) one, which represents 
uniformity, sameness, and unity; and (iii) creativity, also known as the principle of novelty, which 
represents the dynamic advance from diversity to uniformity, from difference to sameness, from 
multiplicity to unity—from disjunction to conjunction, in short. 
Note that an actual entity does not merely “undergo” the process of creative advance as a 
substantial particular allegedly undergoes various processes. Every occasion is an instance of creative 
advance from multiplicity to unity.53 Whitehead holds, moreover, that processes are “the final real things 
of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real.”54 
Consequently, the category of the ultimate is not “more real” than actual occasions. Any token occasion 
becomes in accordance with the phases of ultimate process that are common to all occasions. Conversely, 
ultimate process presupposes some specific “initial datum” or material upon which it operates, and an 
actual occasion provides its own initial datum which “both limits and supplies.”55 
This seemingly esoteric point invokes one of Whitehead’s fundamental principles: the 
interdependence of all entities, eternal objects, and ontological becoming. These three categories—two 
categories of existence and one category of the ultimate—mutually ground all hierarchy in the order of 
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being.56 In that hierarchy, token processes are primary. So-called “substantial particulars,” which 
Whitehead conceives to be complex syntheses of “data” inherited from previously occurring entities, are 
derivative.  
Whitehead maintains that actual entities often compose more complex units, including societies, 
which are organized complexes of many actual entities. Properly conceived, locutions such as 
“substance,” “thing,” “object,” “bundle,” “four-dimensional space-time worm,” and so on, denote 
societies.57 Examples of societies include bosons, fermions, atoms, molecules, plants, protozoa, amoeba, 
non-human animals, groups of non-human animals, human animals, groups of human animals, planets, 
planetary systems, galaxies, and nebulae. Societies differ from actual occasions in that they are self-
sustaining, persist, and have a history. An actual occasion exists at only one moment; they “perpetually 
perish” (to employ Whitehead’s adaptation of Locke’s locution)58 or puff into and immediately out of 
existence, whereas societies survive the perpetually perishing occasions that constitute them. 
Given Whitehead’s general distinction between actual occasions and the societies that they 
constitute, human living persons or (equivalently) souls count as a specific kind of society. Elsewhere I 
have argued that human persons, as conceived in accordance with the categorial scheme presented in 
Process, exhibit five features, each of which specifies its predecessor: 
(1) Human persons are societies, meaning complexes of actual entities that exhibit more internal 
structure than set-theoretical gatherings, involve antecedent and subsequent occasions, are self-
sustaining, and have a history.59 
(2) Human persons exhibit social order, meaning every token of the human-person type exemplifies 
some (though not all) of the defining characteristics inherited from antecedent occasions, and 
transmits some (though not all) of those characteristics to an immediately subsequent occasion.60 
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(3) Human persons exhibit personal order, meaning the occasions that constitute the society are 
serially ordered along one dimension and each member of the series follows immediately from its 
predecessor. 
(4) Human persons exhibit the relative dominance, central direction, and unified control of a central 
personality or intelligence that can introduce novelty into its personal series by accepting or 
rejecting certain values, volitions, intentions, dispositions, and so on. 
(5) Human persons are capable of becoming self-aware that they meet conditions (1) through (5).61 
Given conditions (1) through (5), the problem of personal identity in Whiteheadian terms is to explain 
how a human-person’s experiences can be not only synchronically unified and diachronically continuous, 
but also diachronically unified. If human persons are complexes of absolutely distinct, transient occasions 
that immediately puff into and out of existence, how can one and the same person persist over time? 
Prima facie, that might seem impossible. 
 
6. WHITEHEAD’S SPECULATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Whitehead’s methodology for interpreting personal identity is speculative, in the idiosyncratic, 
immediately empirical, and proto-phenomenological sense described above. After suspending 
suppositions as far as possible (Husserl and Whitehead agree that “bracketing” can never suspend all 
suppositions, for experience always-already presupposes some background),62 Whitehead takes 
experience to deliver directly the following infallible insight: 
Our experience arises out of the past: it enriches with emotion and purpose its presentation of the 
contemporary world: and it bequeaths character to the future, in the guise of an effective element 
forever adding to, or subtracting from, the richness of the world.63 
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The challenge for Whitehead is to explain how personal identity and our awareness thereof arise out of 
inheriting the character(s) of past occasions and transmitting character(s) to future occasions.64 Do 
persons inherit and transmit one and the same character? If so, a person’s diachronically identical 
character would seem well-suited to ground the “inescapable fact” of personal identity and one’s 
awareness thereof. 
Whitehead’s principle of novelty, however, which he also takes to be justified by infallible 
insights, precludes any occasion from inheriting or transmitting one and the same whole character from or 
to another occasion, even an immediately preceding or succeeding occasion. He is a mereological 
essentialist in this sense: any change of parts entails the nominal existence and, in diachronic cases, novel 
emergence of a unique whole. No two occasions can have numerically the same parts or characteristics. 
The upshot is that assertions about personal identity are not and cannot be grounded by facts regarding 
numerically one and the same (whole) character. Whitehead takes direct insight about the essential 
dynamicity of personhood to entail that personal identity has nothing to do with absolute, strict, full, 
numerical, or objectual diachronic identity, but rather with relative, qualified, partial, qualitative, or 
genetic diachronic identity. Despite natural language’s intimation that persons are substantial particulars 
which remain one and the same through time and change, direct insight reveals that not only all 
experiences but even experiencers themselves are dynamic nexuses of relative stability amid inexorable 
flux.65 Strictly speaking, then, past-persons, present-persons, and future-persons are not and cannot be 
identical entities even if intimately, immediately, and uniquely related. Each occasion is a novel synthesis 
of occasions and characters that preceded it. Thus “what matters” in so-called cases of personal identity, 
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to put the point in Parfitian parlance,66 is not identity, but relations of continuity and unity qua 
constructive, neutral, and destructive interferences between distinct occasions—a neo-Humean (or post-
Humean) proposition.  
Whitehead also holds that what person-tokens are cannot be adequately explained by conceiving 
of persons as a kind of substantial particular, meaning an entity that is supposed to be ontologically 
independent and privileged in the hierarchy of being. Direct insight undermines those widespread 
suppositions and shows that every experience of “a person’s” life is a dynamic synthesis of previous 
experiences’ contents and forms. This person-token (at t1) and this immediately and intimately related 
person-token (at t2) differ even if they are continuous and unified. Two syntheses cannot be one and the 
same. Consequently, personal identity concerns relations of continuity and unity between distinct 
occasions and the characters of those occasions. 
Here a concern (bracketing others) arises. If one takes the Porphyrian tree of being to be rooted in 
processes, has one precluded the possibility of explaining personal identity sensu stricto, meaning the 
strict, essential, and/or numerical identity that is supposed to ground and make-true propositions 
regarding persons’ synchronic unity, diachronic continuity, and diachronic unity? Taking processes to be 
ontologically primary seems to jettison the supposition on which the entire debate rests: the possibility of 
remaining one and the same over time. 
Whitehead bites the bullet. Personal identity has nothing to do with strict identity, but with 
continuity and (especially) unity among multiplicity. The ways in which Whitehead elaborates this 
Humean position brings us to his initial model of personal identity.  
 
7. NOVELTY, SUBJECTIVE FORMS, AND DIACHRONIC UNITY 
What makes possible a person’s experiences being synchronically unified, diachronically 
continuous, and (nota bene) diachronically unified, according to the inheritance model developed from 
                                                     




1925 to 1929, are subjective forms. The subjective form that provides the pattern for a person-occasion’s 
becoming is determined partially by those objective and (especially) subjective eternal objects that are 
relevant to the occasion in question, in addition to other determinations that can introduce novelty into 
how the occasion becomes.67 The Law of Excluded Middle qua objective eternal object, for example, 
constrains each actual occasion from exemplifying incompatible properties. The subjective eternal object 
of gratitude, in contrast, can enable one to attenuate displeasure while completing tedious tasks. 
Subjective forms are determined by those eternal objects that ingress into actual occasions of human 
experience and consist of emotions, intentions, volitions, dispositions, tendencies, beliefs, and so on—
whatever shapes our experiences, including their “affective tone.”68 
The inheritance model that Whitehead developed until 1929 holds that subjective forms fulfill 
three generic functions which serve as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the possibility of 
personal identity. In this section, I will explicate two of these before presenting the problem that 
motivates Whitehead to explain the third in terms of inheritance.  
The first function concerns the fact that each experience—your present experience of reading this 
word, for example—is synchronically unified. The subjective form of your experience provides the shape 
or “form” for the matter or “content” of your experience. Given that any experience qua actual occasion 
literally is a unique synthesis of data felt in previously occurring occasions (via pertinent eternal objects), 
that synthesis must take some form, namely the pattern provided by the occasion’s subjective form. 
The second function is more pertinent to present purposes. Subjective forms establish and 
maintain the diachronic continuity characteristic of experiences of the human-person type. Establishing 
and maintaining diachronic continuity is especially important in light of Whitehead’s aforementioned 
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principle of novelty, which entails that no two actual occasions are (as matter of fact) or can be (modally 
speaking) strictly identical. Even immediately and intimately related occasions of the person-type (the 
occasion that is “me” at this moment and the occasion that is “me” at this distinct moment, for example) 
are not identical. How, then, are experiences of diachronic continuity possible? Subjective forms: those 
dispositions, values, intentions, emotions, etc., that not only occur, but also recur at distinct moments. 
The recurrence of subjective elements belonging to numerically distinct forms ontologically connects 
successive occasions. Such connections constitute a continuous manifold that satisfies conditions (1) 
through (5). 
Whitehead’s principle of novelty applies to both actual occasions and the subjective forms that 
shape them. The subjective forms that underlie a person’s life, meaning the patterns of every occasion of 
her or his life, are numerically distinct.69 Despite the strict non-identity of the subjective forms shaping 
this experience and this distinct experience, however, recurring elements in those forms enable those 
experiences to “flow” or succeed continuously in time.70 Successive subjective forms accomplish this by 
inheriting and transmitting common characteristics: emotions, dispositions, intentions, values, and so on. 
Inheritance and transmission count as species of recurrence, in this sense, and form the basis of 
Whitehead’s inheritance model. 
Even if one were to grant that the inheritance model accounts for diachronic continuity, one might 
doubt whether it adequately explains diachronic unity. (Whitehead himself had this doubt circa 1931, as 
we will see.) If the form of every becoming differs numerically from all others, including those which are 
immediately antecedent and subsequent, how can the occasions corresponding to those forms constitute 
one and the same life? The concern is that, if the underlying form or character of a person’s experiences 
does not remain identical over time, then “one person’s” unity cannot be explained. Inheritance might 
explain novelty, flux, synchronic unity, and diachronic continuity, but not diachronic unity. One of the 
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three characteristics of the category of the ultimate, namely creativity (meaning the principle of novelty), 
seems to preclude precisely what Whitehead must explain: identity of character amid inexorable flux. 
One way to address this doubt would be to maintain that distinct experiences instantiate 
essentially one and the same set of defining characteristics since this would allow for accidental changes 
of form that seems to accommodate Whitehead’s principle of novelty. But consider how abstract that set 
would have to be even to explain “normal” cases, on Whitehead’s model. Is there one set of defining 
characteristics that shapes both my present experience and experiences of my early childhood? Imagine 
radical change. Now we seem perilously close to postulating haecceities that name rather than resolve the 
issue. If distinct subjective forms are never identical, then it is unclear whether Whitehead can explain the 
“inescapable fact” of diachronic unity—the unity, and not mere continuity, of experience. 
Whitehead (like Hume) cannot avail himself of an essentially identical unifying character. 
Subjective forms might be necessary for “personal identity” and one’s sense thereof, but they seem 
insufficient because they are not identical over time. 
 
8. THE INHERITANCE MODEL 
Until 1931, Whitehead maintains that subjective forms, given the functions that they fulfill vis-à-
vis actual entities and eternal objects, adequately explain diachronic unity.71 Precisely how subjective 
forms explain diachronic unity constitutes his inheritance model and (as we will see) marks the principal 
point of difference with his receptacle model. 
Whitehead claims that occasions of the person-type inherit common patterns or defining 
characteristics from their immediate successors and transmit parts of those characteristics to immediate 
successors. Whitehead allows that such defining characteristics can be said with qualification to remain 
the same over time, the reason being that only parts and never wholes can recur. The recurrence of most 
of a person’s characteristics from moment to moment serves to unify distinct occasions within one and the 
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same (whole) life. Consequently, Whitehead’s inheritance model entails that the species of identity 
relevant to personal identity does not concern whole subjective forms or defining characteristics but only 
their parts. The recurrence of these parts at different moments unifies the occasions that they form within 
the same manifold—a manifold that remains “the same” nexus of stability not by remaining numerically 
one, but by dynamically maintaining unity among constructive, neutral, and destructive interference.  
Unfortunately, some of Whitehead’s formulations obscure this subtle point. In 1925, for example, 
Whitehead explicates the earliest version of the inheritance theory in terms of an identical pattern: 
The only endurances are structures of activity, and the structures are evolved…. Physical 
endurance is the process of continuously inheriting a certain identity of character transmitted 
throughout a historical route of events. This character belongs to the whole route, and to every 
event of the route…. What endures is identity of pattern, self-inherited.72 
The problem with this and related passages is that they seem inconsistent with the principle of novelty, 
meaning the fact that not only every occasion, but also every occasion’s subjective form and defining 
characteristic numerically differs from all others. The cited formulation is misleading, in this respect, 
because each occasion’s defining characteristic is a subset of that occasion’s subjective form. More 
specifically, it is that part of the form most relevant to the occasion in question, hence the term 
“defining.” Such characteristics can be said with qualification to remain the same over time, but 
Whitehead’s early formulations do not always perspicuously express that fact. In light of the principle of 
novelty, Whitehead’s considered view cannot be that the criterion of personal identity amounts to 
inheriting numerically the same defining characteristic over time. The defining characteristic most 
relevant to this person-occasion seems to share no parts with the defining characteristic of an ancestral 
person-occasion of thirty-three years prior, for example. 
By 1927, Whitehead is more careful and often speaks of partial identity of forms: 
These concrete moments [of a person’s experience] are bound together into one society by a 
partial identity of forms, and by the peculiarly full summation of its predecessors which each 
moment of the life-history gathers into itself.73 
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There are still exceptions, however. In connection with this claim about partial identity of form, 
Whitehead notes that proper names can have three meanings and (nota bene) that in posing questions 
about personal identity, one may choose any one of these meanings, “but when you have made your 
choice, you must in that context stick to it.”74 A proper name’s first and most concrete meaning denotes 
the person in one occasion of her existence. The second meaning denotes the historic route of that 
person’s life from birth to death. The third meaning, in contrast, denotes “the common form, or pattern, 
repeated in each occasion of [the person’s] life” (ibid.). Again Whitehead speaks of one common form or 
pattern, but this contradicts the doctrine of novelty. 
By 1929, Whitehead consistently qualifies claims regarding sameness of forms and expressly 
states that the principle of novelty applies to subjective forms. Furthermore, he consistently emphasizes 
that only parts of the pattern underlying an occasion can recur in different occasions. Precisely expressed, 
then, Whitehead’s inheritance model amounts to holding that specific characteristics can and do recur in 
distinct occasions and that this recurrence—qua subjective, unique principle of connection—unifies 
appropriately-connected occasions within the same temporally continuous manifold. Rather than one 
pattern having to underlie all occasions of a person-society’s existence, what matters is the recurrence of 
relevant parts.75 Both forms of recurrence, inheritance and transmission, are sufficient principles of 
unification. 
In accordance with the first meaning of proper names, the character and defining characteristic of 
an old-man occasion can differ radically from those of his early-life occasions. In accordance with the 
second meaning of proper names, what unifies occasions within the same manifold are unique, subjective 
characteristics that serve as principles of connection. In accordance with the third meaning of proper 
names, the inheritance model enables us to identify which characteristics recurred most often or most 
strongly throughout a whole life or subset thereof, even as those characteristics change. What matters are 
continuity, connectedness, and unity via recurrence, which allow for development (perhaps even radical 
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development) over time. “The boy was timid and taciturn; the young man was overconfident and 
garrulous; the old man became measured and gregarious.” No parts of a boy’s subjective characteristics 
must recur in an old-man in order for those entities (qua parts of the same person-society) to be 
diachronically unified.  
Whitehead’s inheritance model allows that there may be common elements in the subjective 
forms that shape present experience and the set of experiences to which “one’s childhood” refers. The 
recurrence of such elements qua parts in non-identical forms just is “personal identity.” The occurrence 
and recurrence of parts of subjective forms yields synchronic unity, diachronic continuity, and diachronic 
unity, hence the genetic identity of the person-society in question, secured as it is by subjective 
connections among a unique series of occasions. 
Despite the difference in starting point, Whitehead’s inheritance model resembles Hume’s “true 
idea” of the human mind in one crucial respect: it explains personal identity in terms of “principles of 
connection” that unify ontologically discontinuous atoms. 
 
9. THE RECEPTACLE MODEL 
Here a potentially devastating problem arises. Does the inheritance theory adequately explain 
why occasions with distinct subjective forms are genuinely unified and not merely genetically related? 
Unity relations and genetic relations are distinct; it seems possible for a continuous series of personally-
ordered occasions to be genetically related without also being unified. As with Hume, the concern is what 
makes occasions formed by recurring elements parts of one and the same (whole) life rather than 
instances of mere succession. Even if recurrence were necessary for the synchronic unity and diachronic 
continuity of personhood, hence the genetic relations that obtain between distinct person-occasions, why 
should we believe that recurrence yields diachronic unity versus mere genetic inheritance and 
transmission? To achieve real unity, something else seems necessary—or so one, including Whitehead 




In 1931, Whitehead felt the force of this objection: 
In our account of human experience we have attenuated human personality into a genetic relation 
between occasions of human experience. Yet personal unity is an inescapable fact…. Evidently 
there is a fact to be accounted for. Any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal 
identity. In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man [sic], from birth to death…. But the 
problem remains for [Hume and James], as it does for the philosophy of organism, to provide an 
adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of 
circumstance.76 
The key claim concerns “attenuation,” which indicates that Whitehead takes himself to have committed 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: he takes the inheritance model to have reduced the inescapable fact 
of personal unity to mere genetic relations between distinct individuals. Whitehead responded to this 
apparent inadequacy (in his technical sense)77 of the inheritance model by introducing an abstract 
structure inspired by Plato’s Timaeus: formless receptacles.78 This effectively forces him to shelve the 
inheritance theory and adopt an incompatible model, as we will see. The receptacle model is incompatible 
with not only Whitehead’s inheritance model of personal identity, but also the categorial scheme 
proffered in Process. The reason is that the receptacle model postulates an additional category of 
existence, receptacles, which the categorial scheme of Process does not, cannot, and ought not 
countenance.  
Whitehead introduces the receptacle theory by adapting a passage from Plato’s Timaeus, which 
provides a general description of personal unity that Whitehead takes to be “impossible to improve upon”: 
In addition to the notions of the welter of events and of the forms which they illustrate, we require 
a third term, personal unity. It is a perplexed and obscure concept. We must conceive it [as] the 
receptacle, the foster-mother as I might say, of the becomings of our occasions of experience. 
This personal identity is the thing which receives all occasions of the man’s [sic] existence.79 
That said, Whitehead took the force of the problem of attenuating human personality to extend well 
beyond the sphere of personal identity. The challenge of explaining personal unity caused Whitehead to 
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doubt whether the categorial scheme of Process adequately explains how all entities belong to the same 
universe. Thus Adventures finds Whitehead postulating a Receptacle in addition to receptacles, the sole 
function of which is to unify all actual entities within the same universe, unity that Process explained via 
the consequent nature of God.80 
In what follows, I will focus on the function of receptacles vis-à-vis personal identity. Once I 
criticize the notion of receptacles, I will suggest that essentially the same criticisms undermine the notion 
of the Receptacle. In both cases (for Whiteheadians) the category of the ultimate explicated in Process is 
enough to secure personal and universal unity among multiplicity. 
Considering Timaeus’s motivations for introducing receptacles will help us understand 
Whitehead’s motivations. Timaeus begins Plato’s dialogue by developing a cosmology with two 
fundamental categories: being (“that which always is and has no becoming”) and becoming (“that which 
always becomes but never is”).81 After delivering a breathtaking series of descriptions that explicate 
phenomena solely in terms of these two categories, Timaeus surprisingly stops short and claims that he 
must introduce a less parsimonious, but “more likely” cosmology with three fundamental categories: 
being, becoming, and “a receptacle of all becoming—its wetnurse, as it were.”82 The reason that Timaeus 
postulates the additional category and finds the resulting scheme to be more promising is that his bipartite 
cosmology cannot explain how the same thing can be said to be water; then, upon condensing, earth; then, 
upon dissolving, air; then, upon being ignited, fire; then, upon being extinguished, air; then, upon 
coalescing, mist; then, upon compression, water, which eventually turns to earth again. As Timaeus puts 
it: “Now, then, since none of these appears ever to remain the same, which one of them can one 
categorically assert, without embarrassment, to be some particular thing, this one, and not something else? 
One can’t.”83 
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Timaeus concludes that one should avoid characterizing that which becomes different at different 
times as “this” or “that” because indexical references make it seem as if there is some thing that has 
stability and remains one and the same through time and change, whereas strictly speaking this is not the 
case. (Here Whitehead agrees, and takes mistakes entrained by indexicals and “the subject/predicate form 
of expression,” including those he attributes to Hume, to be fallacies of misplaced concreteness.) Rather 
than “this” or “that,” a more accurate locution for that-which-becomes-different at different times is 
“what is (altogether) such.” This locution more perspicuously preserves the insight that reality is not 
composed of stable things that remain one and the same through time and change, but essentially dynamic 
entities, the nature of which is (literally) constant flux between “what is such” (for example, water) and 
“what is altogether such” (for example, earth).  
In light of this insight, Timaeus takes necessity to impel the introduction of receptacles: 
But that in which [what is altogether such] each appear to keep coming into being and from which 
they subsequently pass out of being, that’s the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions, 
“this” and “that.”84 
A Timaean receptacle performs two essential functions: it receives all (relevant) becomings into itself, yet 
it does not take on the characteristics of that which enters into it, despite the fact that it is shaped by them. 
Correlatively, Timaeus describes the Receptacle that receives all becomings into it as follows: “Its nature 
is to be available for anything to make its impression upon it, and it is modified, shaped, and reshaped by 
the things that enter it.”85 Analogously, a person’s receptacle would be “what is altogether such” that 
remains available for any subjectively relevant occasion to impress, modify, and shape it, without 
imposing constraints on the subjective forms that those person-occasions have taken. 
Strictly speaking, the entities that survive inexorable flux are neither (atemporal) beings nor 
(temporal) becomings, but receptacles, “that in which [that which comes to be] comes to be.”86 The 
principal advantage of this tripartite cosmology, by Timaeus’s lights, is that it accommodates becomings 
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without reifying them. Just as a perfumer requires a liquid that is as odorless as possible to receive the 
scented liquids that he or she adds, becomings require a receptacle in virtue of which locutions such as 
“this” or “that” refer, despite the potentially misleading suggestion that intelligible phenomena are stable 
entities that can remain one and the same through time and change.87 
Whitehead’s motivations for introducing receptacles are similar, but occasioned specifically by 
his concern that the inheritance theory attenuates rather than adequately explains the undeniable unity of 
persons’ lives. Receptacles, accordingly, effectively function as an additional category of existence. A 
receptacle’s sole role is to impose unity upon any and all formed occasions that enter into it, yet it does 
not take on the characteristics of that which enters into it, despite the fact that it is shaped by them. 
My receptacle, for example, purportedly makes it such that Siakel-occasions formed by recurring 
subjective elements belong specifically to me qua society and not any other. My receptacle unifies 
diachronically distinct person-occasions into “my life” (what is altogether such), a life that in virtue of my 
receptacle is the same that I enjoyed in childhood, despite various changes (thank goodness) in value and 
character. Thereby, my receptacle secures and explains the “inescapable fact” of my personal unity. More 
generally, persons’ receptacles allegedly avoid “[attenuating] human personality into a genetic relation 
between occasions of human experience” by ensuring that what becomes, no matter how it becomes, is 
unified within a unique manifold. The interdependence of actual occasions, eternal objects, receptacles, 
and the category of the ultimate is supposed to explain the inescapable fact of personal unity over and 
above mere genetic relation, so the author of Adventures adventurously thought.  
Unlike the subjective forms that shape person-occasions and thereby impose certain restrictions 
on what becomes presently and what can become subsequently, Whitehead holds that receptacles are 
formless in that they do not require any specific kind of experience or unification to take place. On 
account of a person’s receptacle, any token experience of the human-person type (given sufficient 
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personal ordering via recurring parts in subjective forms) becomes a constitutive part of one unique life. 
Such experiences become part of one life, moreover, no matter how discordant they may be with respect 
to the person’s previous experiences, beliefs, desires, intentions, values, and so on. The only restriction 
introduced by receptacles is the imposition of unity on sufficiently ordered occasions, which is precisely 
what Whitehead worried the inheritance model could not explain. 
Note that Whitehead, like Timaeus, does not claim to have direct insights about or experience of 
receptacles. Timaeus takes receptacles to be “apprehended by a kind of bastard reasoning that does not 
involve sense perception, and [are] hardly even an object of conviction.”88 Similarly, Whitehead takes 
receptacles to be a necessary systemic postulate motivated by his speculative methodology. The meaning 
of insights concerning personal identity, by Whitehead’s lights, requires receptacles to promote those 
insights despite our inability to have direct insights about them. Like Timaeus, Whitehead takes 
receptacles to be a necessary systemic postulate despite the additional ontological furniture; and like 
Timaeus, Whitehead takes his resulting theory to be more likely than the categorial scheme proffered in 
Process and the inheritance theory commensurate with that scheme.  
Having introduced an additional category of existence, Whitehead takes himself (with assistance 
from Plato) to have adequately explained the inescapable fact of personal unity. Therewith, Whitehead 
also takes himself to have obviated the aforementioned objection and remedied the systemic inadequacy 
that he believed to undermine the inheritance theory: its attenuation of human personality, given the 
alleged inadequacy of subjective forms to confer diachronic unity upon a personally-ordered series of 
subjectively continuous occasions. A person’s receptacle, like the Receptacle that unifies all occasions, is 
a unified community “whose essence is process with retention of connectedness.”89 This means that it 
serves as the formless matrix for all occasions of its person-society’s existence. A person’s receptacle, in 
other words, is the “necessary community” within which the course of a person’s history unfolds. It 
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“imposes a common relationship upon all that happens” in someone’s history “but does not impose what 
that relationship shall be” (ibid.). 
It is precisely the formlessness of a person’s receptacle that enables it to unify diverse experiences 
of different subjective characters. Experiences in which I feel I have authentically been myself and 
experiences in which I feel I have not count as my experiences, regardless of how discordant their values 
and characters may (now) seem to me to be. Crucially, receptacles allow truth-makers for propositions 
pertaining to personal identity to be of different subjective kinds, depending on the context in which an 
occasion becomes. (This implication will be essential for my criticism of the receptacle theory and 
interpretive thesis regarding Whitehead’s refinement of the inheritance model.) 
Two pages after Whitehead introduces the receptacle model, he accentuates the fact that forms of 
dominant inheritance from immediately past occasions can be attenuated and interrupted—as if to provide 
additional criticism of the inheritance model and conditions (1) through (5) that he proposed in Process. 
The interruption of strict personal order, Whitehead claims, results from the “peculiar status of the human 
body” and more specifically the fact that subjective continuity and unity may be interrupted by 
experiences in which bodily sensations predominate. Whitehead takes the upshot of this observation to be 
that “the transference of affective tone, with its emotional energy, from one occasion to another in any 
human personality” does not yield, and in fact “[negates] this notion of strict personal order for human 
inheritance.”90 One might think (as the author of Process thinks) that personally-ordered occasions, in 
light of recurring elements in their subjective forms, could in virtue of those forms be diachronically 
continuous and unified. The author of Adventures rejects this idea. By his estimation, inheritance per se 
cannot secure either diachronic unity or even continuity. This inadequacy motivates the introduction of 
receptacles, a category of existence that grounds personal identity qua personal unity even in the absence 
of linear seriality and subjective continuity. For although “our dominant inheritance from our immediately 
past occasions is broken into by innumerable inheritances through other avenues,” especially by bodily 
                                                     




avenues, in the absence of the dominant inheritance characteristic of a human personality a person’s 
receptacle will still secure the continuity and unity of that person’s experiences (ibid.). My ennui and 
ecstasy will still be mine—in “me” qua structure that includes, necessarily, a receptacle. 
 
10. AN OBJECTION AND CRITICISMS 
One might object to my account by citing Whitehead’s preface to Adventures:   
The three books—[Science, Process, and Adventures]—are an endeavor to express a way of 
understanding the nature of things, and to point out how that way of understanding is illustrated 
by a survey of the mutations of human experience. Each book can be read separately; but they 
supplement each other’s omissions or compressions.91 
If we take Whitehead at his word (so the objection goes), we should not interpret the introduction of 
receptacles as yielding an incompatible theory of personal identity or categorial scheme, but merely as a 
supplement to omissions or compressions delivered in Science and Process. The omission of receptacles 
in Science and Process enables Whitehead to supplement his inheritance model by introducing 
receptacles. It does not require him to supplant that model or the categorial scheme detailed in his 
magnum opus. 
The problem with this objection is that it fails to appreciate the systemic implications of 
introducing an additional category of existence that plays an essential role for not only all societies, but 
also all actual entities, even those that do not compose parts of societies. Furthermore, it underappreciates 
the importance of Whitehead’s statement that the inheritance model of personal identity, like Hume’s and 
James’s, reduces personal identity into a genetic relation. Receptacles do not supplement an omission or 
compression; they supplant the explanation of personal and cosmological unity proffered in Science and 
Process. The reason is that the introduction of receptacles essentially modifies Whitehead’s 
understanding of both local and global unity. All societies and even the universe itself, hence actual 
entities that do not compose societies, must have receptacles and the Receptacle (respectively) in order to 
be unified. Science and Process explain persistence via recurring subjective elements. Adventures 
                                                     




explains persistence via formless manifolds because Whitehead comes to think that recurring subjective 
elements yield only genetic relation, not unity. 
More specifically, Science and Process explain cosmological unity via the consequent nature of 
God, meaning that aspect of God’s being that embraces whatever occurs, whether “good” or “evil.” 
Adventures explains cosmological unity via an all-embracing formless manifold: “the foster-mother of 
becoming.” Although Adventures countenances God’s primordial nature, it does not mention God’s 
consequent nature or attribute to God the role of unifying whatever occurs. The introduction of 
receptacles and the Receptacle, therefore, generates an ontological scheme incompatible scheme 
incompatible with that of Science and Process, despite their intimate connection. This progression mirrors 
that of Plato’s Timaeus, as I believe was Whitehead’s intent. Timaeus does not take receptacles to 
supplement omissions or compressions in his first cosmology. He takes it to yield an incompatible 
cosmology. Were Whitehead to have introduced a “Category of Explanation” or “Categorial Obligation,” 
both of which are derivative with respect to his “Categories of Existence” and the “Category of the 
Ultimate,” one could charitably interpret him as having introduced a supplement to Process’s ontological 
scheme. Whitehead goes further: he postulates an additional category of existence. 
Whitehead’s claim that Adventures introduces supplements to previous omissions and 
compressions, therefore, is consistent with his also introducing an additional category of existence that 
yields an incompatible model. An ontology that postulates n number of fundamental categories of 
existence is incompatible with an ontology that postulates n + 1 categories of existence, especially given 
Whitehead’s contention that he needs receptacles to explain not only the unity of persons (and societies 
more broadly), but also the unity of all occasions. 
Having addressed the aforementioned objection, I will now advance three criticisms against 
Whitehead’s receptacle theory. The character of these criticisms differs markedly from those recently 
raised by Mingarelli, whose account I will scrutinize subsequently. 
The first and most obvious criticism is that the notion of a formless receptacle is mysterious—as 




course, does not undermine the notion. Nevertheless, the mysteriousness of formless receptacles coupled 
with the impossibility of experiencing them requires Whitehead to provide some reason other than sheer 
convenience as to why we should believe specifically that a formless receptacle exists for and is 
superposed with every person.92 The most charitable way of interpreting Whitehead on this point, it seems 
to me, is taking his reasoning to be abductive. Even on abductive grounds, however, his “argument” falls 
short. Whitehead does not explain why we should postulate formless receptacles versus some other 
postulate, say an additional category of explanation or categorial obligation that would enable Whitehead 
to preserve his system’s parsimony. Instead, Whitehead invokes Plato’s authority, and the passage that 
Whitehead adapts from the Timaeus merely asserts a position; it does not provide an argument for that 
position. 
Second, and relatedly, the introduction of formless receptacles seems ad hoc in that it explains 
personal unity by fiat or what Timaeus might refer to as “bastard reasoning.” It seems as if Whitehead has 
presupposed what must be shown. To press the point, we could ask what it is about receptacles that enable 
them to unify the specific occasions of one society versus another. If the answer is that receptacles are 
formless or that each receptacle belongs to one and only one society, then the account would seem to be 
vacuous or viciously circular. If a receptacle is formless, then what about it or the society to which it is 
“linked” explains the linkage? Furthermore, what differentiates one receptacle from another? Whitehead 
does not say. Unique spatial location would not be a sufficient criterion of individuation because the 
receptacle of one molecule that partially composes my brain’s primary visual cortex overlaps with a 
deluge of other receptacles, including that of my cortex, brain, head, and body. Those receptacles and my 
receptacle, moreover, overlap with the Receptacle. Whitehead assumes that there are such overlapping 
receptacles—his receptacle theory requires it—without explaining what differentiates and individuates 
one from another. Yet this is an essential part of what any theory of personal identity must provide. Even 
if we interpret Whitehead’s inference about receptacles to be abductive, it is not clear that his explanation 
                                                     




is abductively preferable to alternative Whiteheadian accounts. Whitehead does not specify why we 
should prefer the receptacle theory to alternative models, nor does he explore alternative models. 
This invokes a third, more devastating criticism. Whitehead came to believe that Process’s 
categorial scheme is inadequate because it attenuates human personality into a genetic relation between 
occasions of human experience without explaining personal unity. Is Process’s categorial scheme 
incapable of explaining personal unity? I believe that it is not. There are two interrelated arguments for 
this claim, the first of which is systemic and the second of which is historical. 
 
11. INHERITANCE REFINED 
The key is to appreciate the systemic implications of the following claims. First, the relations of 
recurrence in virtue of which successive subjective forms become interconnected and continuous are 
essentially dynamic. Second, the inheritance and transmission of such characteristics is context specific. 
This means that different subjective characteristics are capable of unifying new occasions within the same 
series, depending on what form of unification is most relevant to the occasion in question. The fact that 
the questions we pose about personal identity are contextually sensitive and sometimes equivocal accords 
with the fact that the preservation of personal unity is contextually sensitive. Indeed, Whiteheadian 
inheritance and transmission per se are contextually sensitive. The ways in which a person-society 
preserves itself depends on the situations in which it finds itself vis-à-vis destructive, neutral, and 
constructive interferences. On certain occasions, memory might be most relevant to someone’s 
persistence; for example, when now I remember that I determined to complete the current chapter in a 
timely fashion. More generally, the recurrence of remembered determinations can sustain me throughout 
an interval during which I remember, value, and act upon previous intentions and dispositions. In other 
contexts (on other occasions), memory might be less or even irrelevant to my persistence.93 
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To further illustrate the context-sensitivity of Whiteheadian inheritance and transmission, 
consider the explanatory power that the inheritance model (once refined) has to explain even exceptional 
examples such as Clive Wearing. (Nothing depends on this specific case; a less extreme case would 
demonstrate essentially the same point.) In the midst of a thriving career as a musicologist, conductor, and 
musician, Wearing contracted herpesviral encephalitis. This severely damaged his hippocampi, amygdala, 
and other brain regions, resulting in retrograde and anterograde amnesia among the most significant ever 
recorded. Wearing has virtually no episodic memory of past events, cannot form long-term declarative 
memories, and can retain information in short-term memory for at most seven to thirty seconds, hence 
lives in an “eternal present,” as his wife Deborah puts it.  
Despite Wearing’s profound amnesia, an undeniable ethos endures. Memory rarely makes 
Wearing the same person that he was on prior occasions; it rarely can. Other recurring elements sustain 
Clive: performing compositions on the piano; the value of communicating coming to consciousness for 
the first time; a tendency to quip; an awareness that he is ill; and most poignantly, enduring love for 
Deborah. 
To illustrate the profundity of Wearing’s amnesia, documentarians asked Deborah to enter and 
leave Wearing’s room in quick succession. Each time she enters, Clive exults and embraces her as if 
being reunited after decades. He tells Deborah how much he loves and has missed her, then reveals that 
he has become fully conscious for the first time. Deborah leaves the room, reenters, and the scenario 
repeats. Several documentaries demonstrate that Clive is fully present there, then, on those occasions 
wherein his love sustains him (literally) whatever the interval. Sacks’s explication is apt: “[Deborah’s] 
appearance, her voice, her scent, the way they behave with each other, and the intensity of their emotions 
and interactions—all this confirms her identity, and his own.”94 Deborah concurs: 
                                                     




Whatever the damage, however devastating the damage, his being, his center, his soul, is 
absolutely functioning as it ever did…. He’s saying something about ego; he’s saying something 
about identity. He’s saying: “I know now; I know this moment now. I have no conscious 
recollection of those previous entries in my handwriting, though I acknowledge obviously they 
were me. Therefore, I—this is the real awakeness; and you have to take notice of that.95 
Considering all of [his lack of episodic memory and knowledge about the present], his state of 
mind is extraordinary calm, happy, content, and very much himself; he’s himself.”96  
Clive’s at-homeness in music and in his love for me are where he transcends amnesia and finds 
continuum—not the linear fusion of moment after moment, nor based on any framework of 
autobiographical information, but where Clive, and any of us, are finally, where we are who we 
are.97 
There is still a Cliveness about Clive. I realized that we are not just brain and [neural] processes. 
Clive had lost all that and yet he was still Clive.98 
In Whiteheadian terms, Clive remains himself despite the impossibility of certain subjective features 
being able to recur in future forms. Recurrence, however, still occurs, wherein Wearing is sustained. 
The inheritance model enables us to explain even extreme examples such as Wearing without 
attenuating personal unity. Three refinements help demonstrate this point. (I call these “refinements” to 
underscore the fact that no additional category of existence is needed.) The first concerns the model’s 
entailing that diverse forms of inheritance and transmission can constitute personal unity and do so in 
ways that are contextually sensitive. The diversity and context-sensitivity of recurrence is especially 
important in light of the equivocality of the questions we post about personal identity, equivocality that 
Whitehead himself highlights in 1927. Ten years later, Whitehead explicitly maintains that personal unity 
does not depend on one “criterion,” such as memory, but that personal unity can be multiply determined: 
I find myself essentially as a unity of emotions, enjoyments, fears, regrets, valuations of 
alternatives, decisions—all of them subjective reactions to my environment as active in my 
nature. My unity—which is Descartes’ “I am”—is my process of shaping this welter of material 
into a consistent patterns of feelings.99 
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The process that Whitehead mentions is tantamount to inheritance and transmission: maintaining oneself 
in the present while allowing parts of oneself to shape the future. Given the diverse and contextually-
specific forms that recurrence can take, inheritance and transmission do not attenuate but secure personal 
unity, pace Adventures. 
This brings us to the second refinement: accentuating the “interweaving” of actual occasions and 
eternal objects that is accomplished via ontological becoming, which yields not only temporal, but 
personal continuity and unity. The unification of many into one made possible by creativity, that is, the 
category of the ultimate, explains the unity that Whitehead worries he has attenuated. We have already 
examined how personal order involves each person-occasion’s subjective form transmits parts of its 
pattern to relevant successors, depending on the context. This entails that principles of connection 
between predecessors and successors are already “in place” as new occasions emerge. Another “place,” a 
receptacle, is not needed. The fact that recurrence relations are dynamic (constitutive parts of ontological 
becoming) means that new occasions immediately emerge as constitutive parts of a unified manifold. 
Consider the dynamic recurrence of subjective characteristics that forms your present experience. These 
characteristics—your characteristics—unify emerging experiences that immediately presents themselves 
as yours. What characteristics are most relevant or “defining” depends on the circumstances. Sometimes 
memory secures personal unity; sometimes love secures personal unity. The fact that characteristics of 
individual occasions can recur in subsequent occasions, despite various shifts in character that you have 
introduced or underwent, helps explain why emerging experiences immediately present themselves as 
yours, as constitutive parts of the unified society that you are. Diverse and contextually-sensitive 
recurrences, accomplished as they are via ontological becoming, are enough to achieve this Whiteheadian 
explanation of personal unity. Receptacles are neither here nor there. 
The third refinement involves minor revisions in how Process expresses conditions (1) through 
(5). Specifically, Whitehead comes to allow that occasions can be unified even if there are temporary 
interruptions in experience, as when a strong sensation interrupts a train of thought. Relatedly, is it not 




example, may be interrupted by the sensation of thirst. Although the sensation interrupts my intention and 
causes me to drink water, the nexus of control which Whitehead refers to as my “central intelligence” can 
cause future occasions to be defined by the same intention, where this “defining characteristic” unifies all 
relevant occasions—until I decide to stop writing and enter another context, for example. Despite the 
sensation’s relative interruption, moreover, I experienced and now remember it as being inextricably 
mine, as a constitutive part of my history. These revisions regarding personal ordering also enable 
Whitehead to explain how personal unity can be preserved during periods of intelligence’s relative 
absence, such as sound sleep: “The continuity of the soul—so far as concerns consciousness—has to leap 
gaps in time. We sleep or we are stunned. And yet it is the same person who recovers consciousness.”100 
The person who falls asleep, enters into dreamless sleep, and awakens afresh remains the same person in 
light of the values, dispositions, intentions, passions, and other subjective characteristics that recur upon 
waking, despite the interruption. This directly contradicts Hume’s (in)famous claim that “when my 
perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly 
be said not to exist.”101 
 
12. MODES AND “IMMORTALITY” 
Historical evidence corroborates these systemic claims about Whitehead’s refinements of the 
inheritance model. Whitehead never returned to receptacles or even the Receptacle in texts written after 
Adventures. Furthermore, in lectures delivered in and after 1937, Whitehead refines the notion of 
inheritance specifically in connection with personal identity and does so without mentioning receptacles: 
How can the unchanging unity of fact generate the delusion of change? Surely, the satisfactory 
answer must embody an understanding of the interweaving of change and permanence, each 
required by the other. This interweaving is a primary fact of experience. It is at the base of our 
concepts of personal identity, of social identity, and of all sociological functionings.102 
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The interweaving that Whitehead mentions, as argued above, is accomplished by the category of the 
ultimate. Recall that process (in Whitehead’s idiosyncratic sense) is neither temporal nor spatial. 
Furthermore, it is discontinuous and formally distinct from categories of existence like actual occasions 
and eternal objects. This means that process qua ontological becoming is well suited to play the role of 
marrying activity and character, of forming matter and unifying occasions that are—in light of recurring 
elements in their subjective forms—parts of a unique and unified series. The systemic postulates of 
Process are enough, from a Whiteheadian perspective, to explain personal unity. Receptacles are not 
needed. 
Note Whitehead’s contention that the interweaving of change and permanence is “a primary fact 
of experience,” meaning an infallible insight about the nature of reality in general and personal identity in 
particular. Instead of postulating an additional category of existence on abductive grounds, the author of 
Modes grounds his theory of personal identity in the interweaving of activity and recurring characteristics. 
Unlike receptacles, this interweaving is not only directly experienceable as such, but also the proper 
“base” or foundation of our concept of personal identity. Modes thereby explains personal unity via the 
inheritance and transmission of character about which we can have immediate, infallible insight: “In fact 
we are directly conscious of our purposes as directive of our actions.”103 Explaining personal identity via 
recurrence, therefore, is not only metaphysically but epistemically preferable to the receptacle model. 
Texts written from 1937 onward consistently emphasize the interweaving, fusion, and ingression 
of activity and character (in Whitehead’s broad sense of that term).104 Modes, for example, finds 
Whitehead reiterating that bodily sensations can interrupt the relative dominance of a central intelligence. 
Instead of using this fact to motivate the introduction of receptacles to explain how personal unity can be 
maintained across gaps, as Whitehead did in Adventures, Modes characterizes such interruptions as one 
side of persons-societies’ twofold relationship with novelty. Bracketing details, the upshot is that the 
interruption of occasions’ “dominant characteristics” no longer threatens, but underscores the explanatory 
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adequacy of recurrence. “It is by reason of individual expression and reception,” or transmission and 
inheritance, so Whitehead claims, “that the human body exhibits activities expressive of the intimate 
feelings, emotional and purposeful, of the one human person.”105 Whitehead goes on to emphasize the 
fact that different wholes (his example is sensory experiences) can be unified if they are partially 
identical—if parts of them are identical—via recurrence. 
Modes also highlights how the characters of connected occasions “enter into the character of the 
connectivity which joins them.”106 This is particularly important for personal identity. On this view, the 
defining characteristic of a person-occasion1, for example my desire to express myself clearly, enters into 
the character of its connectivity with its immediate successor, person-occasion2. The fact that the desire 
enters into the transmission itself enables person-occasion1 to be unified with person-occasion2. Parts of 
person-occasions’ subjective forms, in other words, characterize not only those individual occasions, but 
also the relations that connect them, meaning inheritance and transmission per se. Such relations are the 
“existential essence” of personal identity, the description of which “must apply to the unborn child, to the 
baby in its cradle, to the state of sleep, and to that vast background of feeling hardly touched by 
consciousness.”107 On the receptacle model, occasions and their forms are unified by formless structures 
into which they enter. On the refined inheritance model, recurring subjective features enter into 
inheritance and transmission themselves, and this explains the “inescapable fact” of personal unity. 
Modes also recognizes the importance of allowing for grades of permanence and “compulsive 
stability,” depending on the context.108 Immediately after noting that self-identity in the sphere of realized 
fact is merely partial, Whitehead elaborates that partial identity holds for specific purposes, depending on 
the context. He illustrates the context sensitivity of persistence by emphasizing the equivocality of our 
questions concerning personal identity: 
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For the purpose of inheriting real estate, the identity of the man of thirty years of age with the 
former baby of ten months is dominant. For the purpose of navigating a yacht, the differences 
between the man and the child are essential; the identity then sinks into metaphysical 
irrelevancy…. In other words, the data, the forms of process, and the issues into new data, are all 
dependent upon their epoch and upon the forms of process dominant in that epoch.109 
A few pages later, Whitehead reiterates the diversity and context sensitivity of inheritances that preserve 
diachronic unity with direct reference to personal identity: 
Complete self-identity can never be preserved in any advance to novelty. The only question is, as 
to whether the loss is relevant to the purposes of the argument [regarding self-identity]. The baby 
in the cradle, and the grown man in middle age, are in some senses identical and in other senses 
diverse. Is the train of argument in its conclusions substantiated by the identity or vitiated by the 
diversity?110 
It depends—both on the question that the argument addresses and the contexts relevant to that question. 
The author of Adventures did not appreciate the systemic implications of recurrence taking on 
diverse and contextually sensitive forms. Receptacles are supposed to secure personal identity regardless 
of context. The author of Modes realizes that the receptacle model contradicts an infallible insight about 
the diversity and context sensitivity of recurrence. He also recognizes that recurrence, so understood, 
obviates his earlier concern about having attenuated personal unity. Ontological becoming fuses 
characteristics into activities. Thereby, personal unity is established and maintained in diverse ways, 
depending on the context. The ways in which Wearing endures often differ from, even as they inspire, my 
own. Yet each of us fuses characteristics of previous occasions into unified activities. Every person 
“fuse[s] these new elements with the basic stuff of experience provided by our state of mind a quarter of a 
second ago.”111 Equivocality, diversity, and context sensitivity are no longer problems to be solved via 
receptacles, but virtues of recurrence itself.  
Whitehead’s final written words on the matter reassert the inheritance theory vis-à-vis Plato’s 
theory of imitation, but not Timaen receptacles. The following formulation, for example, emphasizes, 
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diversity, context sensitivity, and the fusion accomplished by the ingression of eternal objects into actual 
occasions: 
Each single example of personal identity is a special mode of coördination of the ideal world into 
a limited rôle of effectiveness. This maintenance of character is the way in which the finitude of 
the actual world embraces the infinitude of possibility. In each personality, the large infinitude of 
possibility enters into the finite actuality. Also this entrance is more or less; there are grades of 
dominance and grades of recessiveness.112 
Whitehead takes personal identity to be the “outstanding example” of partial identity of character amid 
the flux of what becomes. The fusions accomplished by ontological becoming, which here Whitehead 
refers to as “evaluations” or essential processes of interconnection, unify distinct occasions. Apropos, 
Whitehead takes the problem of explaining personal unity to be “the key example for understanding the 
essential fusion of the World of Activity with the World of Value.”113 In an effort to enhance our 
understanding, Whitehead proceeds to explain personal identity in terms coordinate with Modes. Personal 
identity obtains when details of fact exhibit partial but coordinated unity of primary character amid 
secondary changes of value. Such “evaluations” both shape an occasion and realize a value. Personal 
identity is a “unity of style” qua maintenance of character, in this sense. Recurrence, which Whitehead 
now describes as evaluation, establishes such unity.  
As in Modes, Whitehead accentuates the diversity and context sensitivity of recurrence. The 
entrance of ideal existence into a finite actuality is “more or less,” meaning there are grades of dominance 
and grades of recessiveness. Such differences in grade determine how we should answer specific 
questions concerning personal identity. The privileged contexts of inheriting real estate and navigating a 
yacht determine which characteristics of relative dominance or recessiveness are relevant. To inherit real 
estate, I merely have to be me. To navigate a yacht, I have to exercise my intelligence. Thus although 
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there is inexorable vagueness in the questions that we pose about personal identity, it lies within our 
power to answer such questions with confidence. 
 
13. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF WHITEHEAD’S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Cobb’s influential treatment holds that Whitehead’s theory of personal identity (which Cobb 
interprets solely in terms of inheritance) faces seemingly inexorable difficulties in explaining phenomena 
such as moral responsibility, gratitude, and the possibility of life after death. If it is not one and the same 
entity, but only the same society that persists through time, it is not clear whether we would be justified in 
holding one subset of a society’s entities morally responsible for the actions of a distinct subset of that 
society’s entities. This is especially concerning if the defining characteristics of the first set differ 
radically from those of the second. Similarly, when one expresses gratitude for another person’s actions, 
Whitehead’s position suggests that one’s gratitude is misplaced; for the set of entities responsible for the 
gratitude-generating actions is ontologically, and not merely temporally, distinct from the set of entities to 
which I express my gratitude. Finally, if inheritance necessarily involves both physical and mental 
aspects, then it is not clear whether Whitehead’s theory can allow for the possibility of life after death, as 
(according to Cobb) a theory of personal identity should. The dissolution of the physical body entailed by 
biological death seems to negate one of the necessary conditions for the possibility of personal identity, 
namely its physical pole. This renders the persistence of subjective elements impossible, even for the soul. 
Cobb maintains that there are two ways in which Whitehead can address the aforementioned 
concerns: by claiming that personal identity depends on either one common character being inherited 
through successive occasions or a special mode of inheriting. Cobb takes these options to be mutually 
exclusive and criticizes Whitehead for sometimes seeming to adopt the first. Indeed, Cobb takes it to be 
“an indication of desperation on Whitehead’s part, that he fell into the trap of describing the personal in 




novelty and not the repetition of past patterns.”114 Novelty and repetition, on this view, are essentially at 
odds. Consequently, Cobb contends that Whitehead must adopt the second option and explain personal 
identity in terms of a special mode of inheriting. Because Cobb believes that Whitehead never developed 
such a position, he develops his own Whiteheadian conception of memory in an effort to fill the lacuna. 
Cobb ultimately takes his Whiteheadian attempt to be insufficient, however. 
The options that Cobb enumerates are not mutually exclusive, for reasons commensurate with the 
explanation of recurrence that we examined above. The repetition of parts of prior patterns does not 
preclude novel expressions of character, but makes them possible. Novelty and repetition are not 
essentially at odds, but complementary, mutually necessary, and interdependent vis-à-vis personal unity. 
On this point, I agree with Bennett’s claim that “the specific actuality, the concrete content, of the 
members of that society is not prescribed by the defining characteristic… Inheritance of a common 
character does not require sacrifice of originality.”115 This response to Cobb accords with Whitehead’s 
statements that the concrete moments of a living person “are bound together into one society by a partial 
identity of form, and by the peculiarly full summation of its predecessors which each moment of the life-
history gathers into itself.”116 Furthermore, the case of Clive Wearing helps show that memory is not, and 
for a Whiteheadian cannot be, the only criterion or “special mode of inheriting” which constitutes 
personal unity. Whitehead himself (as we have seen) comes to hold that relevant modes of inheritance are 
diverse and contextually sensitive. Cobb’s paradigmatic focus on Process overlooks the increased 
emphasis on diversity and context sensitivity that Whitehead propones in later writings. Receptacles, too, 
are overlooked. 
Despite our agreement about the essential complementarity of novelty and repetition, Bennett errs 
in claiming that the common form inherited from occasion to occasion derives from one and the same 
complex eternal object that shapes every occasion of a person-society’s experiences. Commonality of 
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form, on Bennett’s reading, amounts to identity of an eternal object. The problem is that Whitehead’s 
principle of novelty does not permit one and the same complex eternal object to shape distinct occasions 
of experience. Each occasion of experience selects its own complex eternal object. The whole subjective 
form that results from the occasion’s selection and rejection of different objective and subjective eternal 
objects differs in every instance. The problem with Bennett’s interpretation is that it explains 
commonality of character via the trans-temporal identity of a complex eternal object.117 This contradicts 
Whitehead’s doctrine of novelty, which requires there to be some difference, however minute, in the 
eternal objects that contribute to the forms underlying individual occasions. Subjective characteristics qua 
parts of previous forms can and do recur throughout a unified series, but no whole can persist beyond the 
moment that it partially determines. (As explicated above, this follows directly from Whitehead’s 
principle of novelty and mereological essentialism.) The upshot, contra Bennett, is that personal identity 
cannot involve the strict identity of either an eternal object or a subjective form, but only (pro Hartshorne) 
their partial identity.118 
While I agree with Hartshorne that the defining characteristic of a person “is less concrete or 
particular than its expressions; [and that] it has a certain abstractness or neutrality with respect to 
alternative possible experiences and acts,”119 Hartshorne’s account, as virtually all others, recognizes only 
the initial version of Whitehead’s inheritance model and neither the receptacle model nor the refined 
inheritance model. Lucas briefly mentions formless receptacles in connection with Whitehead’s theory of 
personal identity but forgoes interpreting the relevant passages from Adventures and contends without 
argument that “Whitehead chooses not to develop a detailed response” to the problem, since doing that 
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would allegedly reintroduce “some new form of epistemological or ontological dualism of the sort he was 
committed to overcome.”120 The letter of Whitehead’s text does not support this claim.  
Given the attention that Bennett Cobb, Hartshorne, Lucas, Sherburne, Weiss, and others have 
given to Whitehead’s thoughts about personal identity, it is striking that only Mingarelli has recognized 
how important receptacles were for Whitehead’s thought—for a time. In Adventures, Whitehead goes so 
far as to identify a person’s receptacle with his or her personal identity: “This personal identity is the thing 
which receives all occasions of the man’s [sic] existence. It is there as a natural matrix for all transitions 
of life”121 Mingarelli rightly emphasizes the relevance of “the chôra” (meaning receptacle or space) for 
Whitehead’s thoughts concerning personal identity. However, she does not recognize that in 1937 
Whitehead jettisoned the receptacle model and returned to refine his inheritance model.122 Mingarelli also 
takes Whitehead’s receptacle model to be “the process conception of personal identity.”123 This is 
misleading in two respects. First, there are several process conceptions of personal identity, including 
non-Whiteheadian models.124 Second, if any model developed in Whitehead’s corpus represents his 
considered view, it is the refined inheritance model that he developed after the receptacle model. 
I agree with Mingarelli that Whitehead’s receptacle model faces insuperable difficulties. The 
three difficulties that she describes, however, do not threaten their intended target. One general point of 
disagreement is that Mingarelli does not distinguish between the “universal,” all-encompassing 
Receptacle that Whitehead introduces to account for the unity of all occasions and the “particular,” 
person-facilitating receptacles that he introduces to account for the diachronic unity of persons. 
Consequently, she defines “Whitehead’s chôra, unlike Plato’s, [as] not a physical place, but rather the 
common ground, the over-determined horizon where all experiences, both actual and potential, lie and are 
contained even before they can be realized.”125 This definition leads Mingarelli to interpret Whitehead’s 
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theory of personal identity as involving the Receptacle rather than person-specific receptacles. Although 
person-specific receptacles exhibit the same general principle of unity exhibited by the Receptacle, 
Whitehead holds that person-specific receptacles are “marked out by [their] peculiarities,” given 
differences introduced by relatively “minor details of humanity.”126 All entities whatsoever, from person-
occasions to occasions that do not contribute to the sustenance of any society, belong to the Receptacle. 
Only person-specific receptacles are directly relevant to personal unity and to Whitehead’s Hume-inspired 
worry about attenuating human personality. If the author of Adventures postulated only the Receptacle 
and not person-specific receptacles, the problem of attenuation would remain, albeit in a different form: 
he would have to explain how personal unity not only derives from, but is inescapably evident in, 
universal unity. 
This brings us to Mingarelli’s first criticism: “it is not clear how an impersonal entity, such as the 
chôra, can give rise to personal strands of unity and, thus, be the source of personal identity.”127 Although 
Whitehead does not elaborate how the Receptacle and receptacles relate, he differentiates between two 
types of chôra and explicates personal identity in terms of person-specific receptacles.128 From this, it 
does not follow that receptacles per se “give rise to” personal strands of unity. Thus the criticism that 
Mingarelli raises fails to hit its target even if we reinterpret her claim in terms of person-specific 
receptacles. On the receptacle model, personal unity results from not just person-receptacles, but also (as 
we have seen) inheritance and transmission of recurring subjective characteristics. Even on the receptacle 
model, person-receptacles are necessary but not sufficient for personal identity. 
What makes the occasions that enter into a person-receptacle personal, moreover, consists in their 
partially constituting a person-society. This entails that the occasions which enter into or become within a 
person’s receptacle are always-already instances of the person-society type—that is, personal—and are so 
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in virtue of what recurs: defining characteristics. Consequently, to hold that the Receptacle is the structure 
most relevant to the achievement of personal identity; that the Receptacle somehow gives rise to personal 
identity, as if it were a sufficient condition; and that Whitehead’s theory fails to explain how the 
Receptacle confers personal unity upon a series of occasions that are always-already of the person-type, 
seems to target a position that Whitehead never held. 
The claim that Whitehead’s Receptacle is an “impersonal entity,” moreover, seems problematic 
on two counts. First, Whitehead takes the Receptacle to exemplify the general principle of personal unity 
that he takes person-receptacles to exemplify, modulo irrelevant considerations concerning “minor details 
of humanity.”129 Thus it seems as if the Receptacle is personal, in the technical sense explicated above. 
Second, neither the Receptacle nor receptacles are “entities” in Whitehead’s technical sense, as Mingarelli 
claims, but are a distinct category of existence as they must be to accomplish their only distinctive 
function: unifying diachronically distinct entities within the same manifold. Even if the Receptacle or 
receptacles appear to be “impersonal entities,” when taken in abstraction from concrete instances of 
becoming, every concrete becoming involves an actual occasion which becomes in accordance with some 
form, a complex eternal object that partially determines that form, and a process of creativity in virtue of 
which many previous parts become unified into one novel whole. Conceiving of the Receptacle as 
impersonal, therefore, seems to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Appreciating the essential 
interdependence of person-occasion, person-society, and person-receptacle presupposed in any concrete 
instance, in contrast, suggests that person-receptacles are always-already “personal.” The type of 
occasions that enter into a person’s receptacle are person-occasions that, as such, partly constitute the 
person-society to which they (via that person’s receptacle) belong. What makes persons’ receptacles 
personal, in other words, are parts of subjective forms that person-occasions inherit and transmit. 
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Mingarelli’s second criticism is that, since the chôra theory takes the concept of human 
personality to be community-based, a “logical fallacy” arises.130 What Mingarelli means by the concept of 
personality being “community-based” is that self-recognition involves awareness of being part of a series 
of past and future experiences. Self-recognition represents this series as being unique vis-à-vis all other 
unified streams. The logical fallacy entailed by this view, Mingarelli claims, is that recognition of one’s 
uniqueness and uniqueness per se can occur “only in connection with all the others.” Mingarelli takes this 
to entail that one’s personal identity “totally depends” on that person’s relationship to all other strands of 
unity. Personal identity’s total dependence on other societies’ unity, however, contradicts the sense of 
“‘pure identity,’ or intimacy” that Mingarelli claims to have—hence the logical fallacy. 
This criticism also seems to miss the mark. First, Whitehead explicitly allows societies of various 
kinds, especially persons, to introduce novelty into how they develop. This means that neither uniqueness 
per se nor self-recognition thereof totally depends on all other strands of unity. My choice to become self-
aware and my subsequent self-awareness do not totally depend on my awareness that nature contains an 
indefinite number of unique societies. It partially depends on that implicit awareness, but also on my 
novel choice. (A person’s subjective characteristics can be causally efficacious, in this sense.) Whitehead 
would maintain that my choice introduced genuine novelty into my stream’s creative advance and that he 
experience qua choice was partially self-determining, in this respect. Whitehead’s position regarding the 
essential connectedness of all entities does not entail that all entities are totally dependent. (As we have 
seen, Whitehead maintains that no actual entity is totally dependent.) A fortiori, it does not entail that a 
person’s principle of identity or her recognition thereof totally depends on that person’s relations to all 
other threads of unity. One’s uniqueness and recognition thereof may essentially depend on others’ 
uniqueness and one’s implicit recognition thereof, but essential dependence is not tantamount to total 
dependence. 
                                                     




Second, Whitehead’s philosophy (like Hume’s) rules out the possibility of diachronic objectual 
identity and discredits belief in a perfectly simple and identical self. The only “pure identity” that 
Whitehead countenances is synchronic self-identity, a trivial “property” necessarily exemplified by all 
entities. At the same time, he maintains that a person’s sense of intimacy and uniqueness derives from 
those recurring characteristics that the person qua society inherits and transmits. Whitehead’s receptacle 
model involves neither “total dependence” nor “pure identity.” 
Mingarelli’s third criticism concerns the notion’s vagueness: “how can we explain the chôra in 
our everyday lives; do we have any experience of it? And if we do not…, can we ground the chôra in the 
natural world?”131 I have argued that Whitehead’s motivations for introducing receptacles are abductive, 
where an additional motivation for introducing the Receptacle may be to account for the universe’s unity 
without referring to God. Although receptacles are not directly experienceable, introducing an abstract 
structure of this kind is compatible with Whitehead’s speculative methodology. The issue is not that 
receptacles cannot be directly experienced and have to be introduced by a kind of “bastard reasoning” that 
fails to ground them in the natural world. The issue is that even when we interpret Whitehead charitably 
by taking his motivations to be abductive, his reasoning fails on abductive grounds: he does not explain 
why we should postulate receptacles versus some other systemic postulate that would preserve his 
system’s parsimony. Thus while I agree with Mingarelli that the notion is vague and such vagueness is 
prima facie problematic, the notion’s vagueness per se is not the issue. Whitehead’s argumentation and 
the notion’s extraneousness are the issues. 
 
14. THE RECEPTACLE 
This specific lesson regarding the receptacle theory also applies to Whitehead’s cosmology as a 
whole. Whitehead does not need to postulate a Receptacle to explain the unity of all occasions within the 
                                                     




same universe.132 Modes finds Whitehead claiming that there are two interdependent aspects of the 
universe: a factor of unity and a factor of multiplicity. Explaining “the summation of the many into the 
one” or “the derivation of importance from the one into the many” does not require a Receptacle, but 
rather creativity, which is precisely the position that Whitehead defends in Process. Understanding how 
the unity of the universe requires its multiplicity requires only “two ultimate types of existence,” namely 
realized fact and eternal forms, and the creative process that involves them.133 Relatedly, Whitehead now 
explains the unity of all realized facts via the notion of a “world-process,” meaning “the totality of 
process,” which he takes to convey the proper sense of a supreme being or deity.134 These descriptions 
refine the explanation of universal unity proffered in Process, which accounted for it via the consequent 
nature of God. The Receptacle receives no mention. 
Whitehead’s final written words on the matter postulate a World of Activity (involving actual 
occasions) and a World of Value (involving eternal objects). These “Two Worlds,” Whitehead tells us, 
“require each other, and together constitute the concrete Universe. Either World considered by itself is an 
abstraction.”135 Again, Whitehead describes the “essential unification” accomplished by the Two Worlds 
and evaluation in terms of God’s nature.136 A Timaen Receptacle is neither here nor there. 
Whitehead’s legacy (via Hartshorne, Cobb, et al.) was once strongly associated with Christian 
theology. Yet Whitehead’s conception of God in the end was more pluralistic and abstract than (strictly) 
ecumenical. In his words, 
The World of Value exhibits the essential unification of the Universe. Thus while it exhibits the 
immortal side of the many persons, it also involves the unification of personality. This is the 
concept of God. (But it is not the God of the learned Christian Theology, nor is it the diffused 
God of the Hindu Buddhistic [sic] tradition. The concept lies somewhere between the two.) (ibid.) 
Whitehead’s mature conception of God accords with his Humean motivations—so one might argue. 
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One advantage of interpreting Whitehead in the way that I have suggested is that it explains why 
he introduced receptacles and the Receptacle in 1931 yet never explicated precisely how they were 
supposed to accord with the categorial scheme presented in Process. The fact that a thinker of 
Whitehead’s caliber never detailed these issues, in concert with his omission of receptacles and the 
Receptacle in later writings, suggests that he abandoned the notion altogether. He was right to do so. 
Receptacles are extraneous, even for a Whiteheadian. Introducing receptacles was thus an adventure of 
ideas that discorded radically with previous ventures. The identity of Whitehead’s system, as it were, 




Ainslie, Donald. “Hume’s Reflections on the Simplicity and Identity of Mind.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (2001): 557-78. 
 
Anderson, Holly K. and Rick Grush. “A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to 
James and Husserl.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 47, no. 2 (2009): 277-307. 
 
Baier, Annette C. Death and Character: Further Reflections on Hume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Basson, A. H. David Hume. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. 
 
Baxter, Donald L. M. “Hume’s Labyrinth Concerning the Idea of Personal Identity.” Hume Studies 24, 
no. 2 (1998): 203-33. 
 
———. “Hume’s Theory of Space and Time in Its Skeptical Context.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Hume, edited by David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Anne Taylor, 105-46. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Beauchamp, Tom L. “Self Inconsistency or Mere Self Perplexity?” Hume Studies 5, no. 1 (1979): 195-
232. 
 
Bennett, John B. “Whitehead and Personal Identity.” Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 37, no. 3 
(1973): 510-21. 
 
Bernet, Rudolph. “Husserl’s New Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts.” 
In On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, edited by Dieter 
Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi, 1-19. New York: Springer, 2010. 
 
Bernet, Rudolph, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993. 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation. Living Without Memory: The Mind, Second Edition. Aired 1998. 
Accessed August 20, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipD_G7U2FcM 
 
Brough, John B. “The Emergence of Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-
Consciousness.” In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, edited by Frederick A. Elliston and 
Peter McCormick, 83-100. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 
 
———. Introduction to On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), by 
Edmund Husserl, xi-lvii. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. 
 




Cobb, John B., Jr. A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead. 2nd 
ed. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007. 
 
Cottrell, Jonathan. “David Hume: Imagination.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by James 
Fieser and Bradley Dowden, ISSN 2161-0002. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-ima/. 
 
———. “Minds, Composition, and Hume’s Skepticism in the Appendix.” Philosophical Review 124, no. 
4 (2015): 533-69. 
 
Dainton, Barry. “Temporal Consciousness.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2014 ed., 
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Published August 6, 2010. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consciousness-temporal/ 
 
DeRoo, Neal. “Revisiting the Zahavi-Brough/Sokolowski Debate.” Husserl Studies 27 (2011): 1-12. 
 
De Warren, Nicolas. Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Ellis, Jonathan. “The Contents of Hume’s Appendix and the Source of His Despair.” Hume Studies 32, 
no. 2 (2006): 195-232. 
 
Fogelin, Robert J. “Hume’s Worries about Personal Identity.” Chap. 5 in Philosophical Interpretations, 
81-94. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
France, Louise. “The Death of Yesterday.” The Guardian, January 22, 2005. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/jan/23/biography.features3  
 
Frege, Gottlob. “Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic.” Translated by E. W. Kluge. Mind 
81, no. 323 (1972): 312-37. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Translated by James Strachey. New York: 
Basic Books, 1962. 
 
Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997. 
 
———. Hume. New York: Routledge, 2015. 
 
———. “Hume’s Self-Doubts about Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review 90, no. 3 (1981): 337-
58. 
 
———. “Once More into the Labyrinth: Kail’s Realist Explanation of Hume’s Second Thoughts about 
Personal Identity.” Hume Studies 36, no. 1 (2010): 77-87. 
 
———. “Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts about Personal Identity.” Original version in The 
Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, 
167 
 
Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong, 15-40. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Cited 




Grenon, Pierre and Barry Smith. “SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial Ontology.” Spatial 
Cognition and Computation 4, no. 1 (2004): 137-71. 
 
Hartshorne, Charles. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing, 
1970. 
 
———. “Personal Identity from A to Z.” Process Studies 2, no. 3 (1972): 209-15. 
 
———. Whitehead’s Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1972. 
 
Haugeland, John. “Hume on Personal Identity.” Chap. 3 in Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of 
Mind, 63-71. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Hoerl, Christoph. “Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 86, no. 2 (2013): 376-411. 
 
Hume, David. Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume, 403-17. Edited by David Fate 
Norton and Mary J. Norton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
———. Advertisement of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume, 83. Edited by 
Tom L. Beauchamp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
———. Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume, 396-401. Edited by David Fate 
Norton and Mary J. Norton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
———. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 2nd ed. Edited by Richard H. Popkin. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. 
 
———. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
———. Introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume, 3-6. Edited by David Fate Norton 
and Mary J. Norton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
———. The Letters of David Hume. Edited by J. Y. T. Grieg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
 
———. “My Own Life.” Rutgers University Electronic Texts, edited by Jack Lynch. Accessed on August 
20, 2016. https://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/humelife.html  
 
———. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. New York: 




Husserl, Edmund. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. 
Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
 
———. Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917-1918). Vol. 33 of Husserliana, edited 
by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
 
———. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion Cairns. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
———. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970. 
 
———. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1969. 
 
———. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book; General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2014. 
 
———. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Second 
Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre 
Schuwer. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. 
 
———. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Third Book; 
Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences. Translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. 
Pohl. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. 
 
———. Logical Investigations: Volume I. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Edited by Dermot Moran. New 
York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
———. Logical Investigations: Volume II. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Edited by Dermot Moran. New 
York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
———. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by John 
B. Brough. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. 
 
———. Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts 
from 1887-1901. Translated by Dallas Willard. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 
 
———. Späte Texte zur Zeitskonstitution (1929-1934): Die C-Manuskripte. Vol. 8 in Husserliana, edited 
by Rudolph Bernet and Dieter Lohmar. New York: Springer, 2005.  
 
Ierna, Carlo. “Husserl’s Notion of Manifold: Beyond Cantor and Riemann.” Seminar presentation, 





Imhof, Beat W. Edith Steins Philosophische Entwicklung: Leben und Werk. Boston: Springer Basel, 
1987. 
 
Inukai, Yumiko. “Hume on Relations: Are They Real?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 
(2010): 185-209. 
 
———. “Hume’s Labyrinth: The Bundling Problem.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2007): 
255-74. 
 
Kail, P. J. E. Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Kames, Lord. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Religion (1751). 1st ed. New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1976. 
 
———. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Religion: Corrected and Improved (1779). 3rd ed. 
Edited by Mary Catherine Moran. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1352 
 
Kemp Smith, Norman. The Philosophy of David Hume. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1941. 
 
Klose, Joachim. “Alfred North Whitehead’s Receptacle.” In Beyond Metaphysics? Explorations in Alfred 
North Whitehead’s Late Thought, edited by Roland Faber, Brian Henning, and Clinton Combs, 
147-64. New York: Rodopi, 2010. 
 
Lalor, Brendan J. “The Antilogistic Puzzle of Hume’s Appendix to the Treatise.” Philosophical Inquiry 
20, nos. 3-4 (1998): 22-30. 
 
Lowe, E. J. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Lucas, George R., Jr. The Rehabilitation of Whitehead: An Analytic and Historical Assessment of Process 
Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press, 1989. 
 
Mascarenhas, Vijay. “Hume’s Recantation Revisited.” Hume Studies 27, no. 2 (2001), 279-300. 
 
McIntyre, Jane. “Is Hume’s Self Consistent?” In McGill Hume Studies, edited by David Fate Norton, 
Nicholas Capaldi, and Wade L. Robison, 79-88. San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979. 
 
Merricks, Trenton. “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time.” Noûs 32 (1998): 106–24. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Edited by Elizabeth Rappaport. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1978. 
 
Miller, Izchak. “Husserl on the Ego.” Topoi 5 (1986): 157-62. 
 




Mingarelli, Eleonora. “Is Personal Identity Something That Does Not Matter? An Inquiry into Derek 
Parfit and Alfred N. Whitehead.” Process Studies 42, no. 1 (2013): 87-109. 
 
Moore, James. “Hutcheson and Hume.” In Hume and Hume’s Connexions, edited by M. A. Stewart and 
John P. Wright, 23-57. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995. 
 
Murphy, Richard T. Hume and Husserl: Towards Radical Subjectivism. Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1980. 
 
Nathanson, Stephen. “Hume’s Second Thoughts on the Self.” Hume Studies 2, no. 1 (1976): 36-45. 
 
Noonan, Harold W. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 
1999. 
 
Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016 ed., edited by 
Edward N. Zalta. Published July 9, 2015. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/. 
 
Parfit, Derek. “Is Personal Identity What Matters?” Unpublished manuscript, New York University, 2007. 
Accessed August 20, 2016. 
 http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_is_personal_identity_what_matters.pdf 
 
———. “Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review 80, no. 1 (1971): 3-27. 
 
Patten, S. C. “Hume’s Bundles, Self-Consciousness, and Kant.” Hume Studies 2, no. 2 (1976): 59-75. 
 
Pears, David. “Hume’s Account of Personal Identity.” Philosophic Exchange 6, no. 1 (1975): 15-26. 
 
Penelhum, Terrence. “Hume on Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review 64, no. 4 (1951): 571-89. 
 
———. “The Self of Book I and the Selves of Book II.” Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 281-91. 
 
Perry, John. “The Problem of Personal Identity.” In Personal Identity, 2nd ed., edited by John Perry, 3-
30. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008. 
 
Pitson, Tony. Hume’s Philosophy of the Self. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
———. “Skeptical Realism and Hume on the Self.” Hume Studies 39, no. 1 (2013): 37-59. 
 
Plato. Timaeus. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 1224-91. Translated by Donald J. 
Zeyl. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 
 
Rescher, Nicholas. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1996.  
 




Robison, Wade L. “Hume on Personal Identity.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (1974): 
181-93.   
 
Rodemeyer, Lanei M. Intersubjective Temporality: It’s About Time. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. 
 
Rojcewicz, Richard and Andre Schuwer. Introduction to Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and 
to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book; Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, 
by Edmund Husserl, xi-xvi. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. 
 
Ross, Ian. “Le Bon David Again: Three New Hume Letters.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 
10, no. 4 (1969): 537-45. 
 
Roth, Abraham. “What Was Hume’s Problem with Personal Identity?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 61, no. 1 (2000): 92-114. 
 
Sacks, Oliver. “The Abyss: Music and Amnesia.” The New Yorker, September 24, 2007. Accessed 
August 20, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/09/24/the-abyss 
 
Schaffer, Jonathan. “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” Philosophical Review 119, no. 1 (2010): 31-76. 
 
Schuhmann, Karl. Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1977. 
 
Seibt, Johanna. “Existence in Time: From Substance to Process.” In Perspectives on Time: Boston Studies 
in Philosophy of Science, edited by J. Faye, 143-82. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1996. 
 
———. “Process Philosophy.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016 ed., edited by 
Edward N. Zalta. Published October 15, 2012. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/process-philosophy/ 
 
Sherburne, Donald W. Glossary to A Key to Whitehead’s Process and Reality, edited by Donald W. 
Sherburne, 205-48. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
 
Siakel, Daniel R. “The Dynamic Process of Being (a Person).” Process Studies 43, no. 2 (2014): 4-28. 
 
Simons, Peter. “Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and Reality.” Topoi 34, no. 1 (2015): 297-305. 
 
Smith, David Woodruff. “Basic Modes of Being: Meta-Metaphysical Reflections in Light of Whitehead, 
Husserl, Ingarden, Hintikka.” In Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic, Present and Past: 
Essays in Honour of Peter Simons, edited by Sandra Lapointe, 217-42. Boston: Brill Rodopi, 
2015. 
 
———. “Consciousness and Actuality.” Chap. 7 in Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and 




———. Husserl. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Steen, Mark. “Bare Objects, Ordinary Objects, and Mereological Essentialism.” Unpublished draft, 
Boğaziçi University, 2009. Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.113.1490&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
 
Strawson, Galen. “‘All My Hopes Vanish’: Hume on the Mind.” In Continuum Companion to Hume, 
edited by Alan Bailey and Dan O’Brien, 181-98. New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2012. 
 
———. “David Hume: Objects and Power.” In Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and 
Contemporary Responses, edited by Stewart Duncan and Antonia LoLordo, 231-41. New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 
 
———. The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
———. “Hume on Himself.” In Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Actions to Values, edited by Dan 
Egonsson, et al., 69-94. Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2001. 
 
———. “‘Humeanism.’” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no. 1 (2015): 96-102. 
 
———. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume. Revised ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014.  
 
———. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. New York: Routledge, 1959. 
 
Stroud, Barry. Hume. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. 
 
Swain, Corliss. “Personal Identity and the Skeptical System of Philosophy.” In The Blackwell Guide to 
Hume’s Treatise, edited by Saul Traiger, 133-50. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
 
Tassone, Biagio G. From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano’s “Psychology from an 
Experiential Standpoint” and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Thiel, Udo. The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to 
Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Tieszen, Richard. Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Treays, Jane. The Man with the Seven Second Memory. Produced by Sarah Murch. Edited by Jane Harris. 




Trungpa, Chögyam. “Four Levels of Space.” Chap. 17 in The Profound Treasury of the Ocean of 
Dharma, Volume III: The Tantric Path of Indestructible Wakefulness, edited by Judith L. Lief. 
Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2013.  
 
Tsugawa, Albert. “David Hume and Lord Kames on Personal Identity.” Journal of the History of Ideas 
22, no. 3 (1961): 398-403. 
 
Waxman, Wayne. “Hume’s Quandary Concerning Personal Identity.” Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 
233-53. 
 
Wehmeier, Kai. “How to Live Without Identity—And Why.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 
4 (2012): 761-77. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
 
———. “Immortality.” In The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd ed., edited by Paul Arthur 
Schlipp, 682-700. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951. 
 
———. Modes of Thought. New York: Macmillan Company, 1938. 
 
———. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Corrected ed. Edited by David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press, 1978. 
 
———. Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures (1925). New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
 
———. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. 
 
Willard, Dallas. Introduction to Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with 
Supplementary Texts from 1887-1901, by Edmund Husserl, xiiv-lxiv. Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003. 
 
Winkler, Kenneth. “‘All is Revolution in Us’: Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume.” Hume Studies 
26, no. 1 (2000): 3-40. 
